



DURHAM MIDDLE EAST PAPERS

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THE LAST KHEWIVE OF EGYPT AND THE EGYPTIAN
STUDENT MOVEMENT

Taqadum Al-Khatib
Fellow, The Mohamed Ali Foundation

Durham Middle East Paper No. 108

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INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES

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In 2018 Durham University and the Mohamed Ali Foundation¹ launched a fellowship programme to encourage academic research in the archive of the last khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi II (1874–1944), and to make the collection’s strengths more widely known to international researchers.

The collection, which is deposited in Durham University Library’s Archives and Special Collections, provides a rich resource of material on political, social, economic and cultural affairs in Egypt in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. It is hoped that this endowment by the Mohamed Ali Foundation will foster deeper understanding of an important period of Egyptian history and of a transformative era in East-West relations.

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During the First World War, Germany and the Ottoman Empire had cultivated pan-Islamic propaganda in an attempt to mobilize Muslims against their (colonizing) enemies, and Germany presented itself as more appealing in terms of both the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist contexts. Also, Germany sought greater influence with the young Egyptian students in Berlin and Switzerland. My paper will draw on police reports and other primary sources from the German Archive related to Khedive Abbas II, comparing that with the collection of Abbas Hilmi II at Durham University Library, as well as other published primary sources, contemporary books, articles, memoirs, and Egyptian newspapers. On the other hand, drawing on the scholarship of twentieth-century imperial, international, and global history as well as immigration, race, and ethnicity in Germany in that period, my paper will ultimately offer a new understanding of the roots of the idea of the Third World.

The exiled groups prior to the 1919 revolution consisted of deposed Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, leaders of Egypt's nationalist movement like Muhammed Farid, and a large number of students who had moved from Istanbul to Berlin. There was also a group around Khedive Abbas, who was still contending for the restoration of his throne, his son's right of succession, and his Egyptian properties. All of these groups agitated for Egypt's independence, but with no significant results and no impact on the National Party (*al-hizb al-Watani*) in Egypt. However, a study of the special collections of Khedive Abbas, as well as relevant European archives, reveals several untold stories that he did not mention in his memoirs, and will explain why the Great Powers, especially Germany, treated Khedive Abbas as an influential player in Middle Eastern politics. This chapter will therefore present an overview of some of the contents of the Abbas Hilmi II papers, which shed light on his transnational activities during his exile and his relationship with the Great Powers, as well as the Egyptian opposition and the concomitant deployment of a network of informers, while showcasing the main findings of recent scholarship on this topic.

Methodology

In this paper, the relationship the last khedive of Egypt had with the Egyptian student movement in exile (Germany and Switzerland) will be studied for the first time in a transnational context. The paper will also examine the networks that the khedive and the nationalist movement established, in order to shed light on Egyptian diasporas, national liberation movements, and the impact of host states' policies toward the activities of Egyptian exiles, especially the last khedive of Egypt. It thus combines a bottom-up perspective on migrants and their transnational political practices at the microlevel with a policy perspective at the macro level. The chapter looks at both individual activities and the institutional and policy contexts in an effort to explain why diaspora mobilizations take different forms in different contexts. In order to understand the dynamics of Egyptian political diasporas, two methodological

elements have been combined: the transnationalism method, and the analysis of documents obtained from the German archives and the special collection of the khedive.

Questions

This paper addresses the following questions: who constituted the diaspora groups that, along with Khedive Abbas, pursued transnational political activities and What was the nature of the relationship between Khedive Abbas and the nationalist party, along with the student movement in Berlin and Switzerland?

The formation of Egyptian student movement in exile

The increased presence of colonial subjects in Europe since the First World War meant that anti-colonialism also emerged as a political field in the imperial centers. The urban environment provided them with the opportunity to interact with fellow colonial migrants from different origins and with actors from their host societies; it also allowed them to pursue their academic studies and to participate in the lively exchange of political ideas that characterized the European cities at this formative period in the development of their political thought.¹ Berlin differed from London and Paris insofar as it accommodated only a small number of immigrants from Germany's overseas territories during both the imperial period and afterwards. This meant that, even while the German empire lasted, anti-colonial politics in Berlin were not primarily directed against German colonial practices. While Syrian and Lebanese students were often attracted to French universities, German universities gradually gained prominence among students from Egypt.

Although France retained its appeal in parts of the Egyptian *effendiyya*,² the strong presence of Egyptian nationalist circles in Germany contributed to the popularity of German campuses.³ The core of the community was formed by members of Berlin universities, in particular students. Berlin became the preferred destination, with medicine, law, engineering, economics, agriculture and social science increasingly supplementing the previous interest in war sciences. Many of the students had been sent officially to study in Germany by the Egyptian government, which also funded their stays. In fact, the majority of the Egyptian diaspora community were Muslim, and they constituted a part of the educated bourgeoisie (the *Bildungsbürgertum* in the German context): persons who made a living through specialist knowledge and who strongly believed in the value of education. Furthermore, beyond its communist affiliations, Berlin had a very diverse landscape of publications that offered

space for oppositional voices, a space that migrant activists would make use of during the Weimar Republic. Egyptian nationalists therefore were able to make Berlin a hub for their publishing activities. Various students joined the circles and activities that were organized by the Egyptian National Party, particularly its second branch, which was established in Berlin under *Muhammad Farid*, or participated in events of the Orient-Klub in Berlin Schöneberg.⁴

The student movement in Berlin, along with the leaders of the National Party, had played a crucial role in mobilizing migrant Egyptians to make their national demands known to a wider European public in hopes of securing sympathy for the Egyptian cause. They also discussed the same subjects with Arab students of different nationalities, who were also keen to highlight the political bonds linking Arab and German aspiration and concerns. Conflicts such as the German dispute with the Entente powers over the postwar order thus worked to highlight communalities and to situate Arab nationalist demands in the context of a shared struggle against imperial power.⁵

Evidence from the archive of Abbas Hilmi shows the deposed khedive exhibited a special interest in the student movement in Germany and Switzerland, stemming mainly from their activities in the mobilization of Egyptians to make their national demands known to a wider European public. The khedive realized that he could utilize them as a tool to support his personal and dynastic ambitions to return to his rulership of Egypt. As the conflict between the khedive and the leaders of the nationalist movement, particularly *Muhammad Farid*, intensified, the khedive resorted to German tactics to recruit many of the Egyptian students to work for him as secret agents. The khedive's funding of student groups and of individual exiles played a decisive role in this situation;⁶ he maintained networks of agents who relayed news about the activities of students in exile, as well as the general situation in Egypt.

Ironically, the khedive's archive includes spies' reports on gatherings where attendees denounced the presence of spies in their midst. It explores the proliferation of the khedive's secret agents in different places, such as workers clubs, political gatherings, and student associations in exile.⁷ Special agents' reports contained in the khedive's papers thus show an intense concern not only with monitoring political activity in general, but also with identifying the perpetrators of such activities.

According to different materials in the German national archives, all these groups (special agents) around Khedive Abbas were under constant surveillance by the German, British, and Swiss intelligence services in Switzerland.⁸ Both

Britain and Germany expanded their surveillance networks in Switzerland and Vienna to observe the deposed khedive and other Middle Eastern nationals there. They were able to recruit some people from the group around the khedive.

The Egyptian student movement and the arrest of Adly Yakan Pasha

News of heightened tensions between Abbas Hilmi on one hand and the Ottomans and Germans on the other quickly reached British agents in Switzerland. One of the untold stories, which is not mentioned in either the khedive's memoirs, nor in the special collections (only a few reports about the khedive's legal moves in regard to the case),⁹ was the arrest of 'Adly Yakan Pasha, and how the German stepped in to protect the former khedive and his agents.¹⁰ Swiss authorities, on information supplied by a British spy named "OZALE", whom Abbas had unwittingly hired, arrested his financial agent and cousin 'Adly Yakan Pasha. Several documents in the German archive reveal that 'Adly Yakan Pasha was detained by the Swiss authorities at the instigation of the British. The British looked to find any evidence in 'Adly Yakan's documents that could implicate the deposed khedive in the espionage and propaganda activities of the Central Powers. The British had hoped that if they had intimate relations with the western Swiss

authorities, they would get hold of these documents and in this way find a means of forcing the khedive to abdicate, making his possibility of a political comeback impossible.¹¹

A private detective named OZALE denounced *Yakan* Pasha as a spy and he was searched, as was his house. He was subsequently detained for 14 days, and during his detention he was interrogated only twice. Several documents related to the khedive were confiscated during this process. The seized records included receipts showing the large payments made to Abbas by Germany in 1915 to spread defeatism in France and Italy (1,023,00 francs, was found to acquire for Germany the newspaper in France *Le Figaro*). Two payments of two million marks paid by Germany to the deposed khedive were squandered, largely to no purpose.¹² The khedive is known to have written a long official letter to the Swiss government (the Federal Council) in October 1916, protesting *Yakan* Pasha's arrest, pleading his innocence, and requesting he be released.¹³ At the same time the khedive is known to have written to the German government requesting their support for releasing *Yakan* Pasha and returning his own confiscated documents.¹⁴ After the German intervention, *Yakan* Pasha was released and offered an apology by the Federal Council, but the seized records were never returned. The British believed that the release of *Yakan* Pasha was a direct result of the

“THE GERMANS BELIEVED ALSO IN THE KHEDIVE’S INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WITH BRITAIN...”

intervention of the Central Powers and not only the German influence.¹⁵ The German intervention to protect the khedive and his special agents indicates that Berlin continued to believe in his value for Germany's political policies, especially German propaganda in the Middle East and in Europe. The Germans believed also in the khedive's influence in the Middle East and with Britain, in part because Berlin continuously received erroneous reports from Egypt of his popularity there.¹⁶

As mentioned above, when *Yakan* Pasha was arrested by the Swiss authorities and they confiscated the files belonging to the khedive, as well as his correspondence with leading

Germans, including letters about the German funding that the khedive received for press purposes. The amount of money that the khedive had received from the German authorities had appeared in the British documents.¹⁷ In addition, information found in the seized records reached British agents in Switzerland via an Egyptian student. According to one of the British documents, a certain number of the documents found at *Yakan* Pasha's house were taken to an Egyptian student for translation. The documents, which he started to translate in the presence of the Swiss police, were taken away before the student was able to get through more than a few documents, as the Swiss police were apparently warned against him, and the documents were taken away.¹⁸

The student in question was 'Alī al-Gayyātī.¹⁹ The documents that 'Alī al-Gayyātī was able to translate includes a) a copy of the accounting book in *Yakan* Pasha's handwriting (sum, 1,923,000 frs.), including several bank orders; b) different notes from the former khedive.²⁰ *Al-Gayyātī* was the person who translated the information for the Swiss police and sent it to the British, which means that he was recruited by British intelligence to work for them, observing the khedive and the group around him. Another document from the German archive also reveals that "Alī al-Gayyātī was recruited by British and French intelligence." *Al-Gayyātī* was a completely uneducated man who originally worked for a publisher, where he would sign his name under articles written by French and English agents. He received monthly 1000 francs for this service.²¹

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The disclosure appeared in French press, which made the khedive a little nervous, and he decided to depart for Constantinople.²² The Abbas Hilmi archive does not provide more information about the arrest of *ʿAdly Yakan* Pasha, but does include an important report written by Dr. Said Bey Kamil, which reveals that *ʿAlī al-Gayyātī* was responsible for the leaks of information relating to the khedive to the British, and the khedive had to seek revenge against *Al-Gayyātī* through legal means.²³

The only real translator of the khedive’s confiscated papers was *ʿAlī al-Gayyātī*, and this was proven by the testimony of one of the witnesses (Monsieur Cazella, Counselor of the French Embassy in Berne) in the case of Polo Pasha before the court. He said that there was a journalist who translated these papers, and he was Sheikh *ʿAlī al-Gayyātī*, as indicated by a French magazine published in Paris in January 1918. And because there was no other Egyptian journalist who could be entrusted with translating these papers, *al-Gayyātī* had revealed their secret to the French and the British, unlike the British spy *ʿAlī al-Gayyātī*. Therefore, he should be punished.

One report written by Dr. Said Kamil lists three ways to punish *ʿAlī al-Gayyātī* as follows:

“After an interview with Mr. Bittar,

a lawyer in his office in Geneva, Khedive Abbas must submit a request to the Ottoman High Commission in Bern to request their intervention with the Swiss government, where he first expressed His Highness’s surprise at the choice of an Egyptian with political aims during the investigation of the case of *ʿAdly Yakan* Pasha to translate the documents, and why it was not translated by one of the Swiss Orientalists, as he would be more concerned with justice than this translator. The authorized person asked the Swiss government to clarify the reason behind the disclosure of the secret that this translator had to keep based on Mr. Cazella’s public testimony before the Military Council in the Polo Pasha case, and also requested that the translator be punished, whose negligence had led to the disclosure of this secret.

The second possibility would have been the judicial way, as it would result from the previous political endeavor that the Swiss Foreign Ministry commissioned the Al-Haqqaniyyah Office to commission the Public Prosecutor to file a public lawsuit against *ʿAlī al-Gayyātī*, based on the complaint of His Highness, that the lawsuit was filed directly in the name of His Highness. This would have meant that we would take the political path first, and if it did not succeed, we would take the judicial path. Mr. Bittar believed that *ʿAlī al-Gayyātī*’s administrative punishment in this incident might lead to his expulsion from Switzerland.”²⁴

At the same time, the khedive expanded his surveillance networks among the Egyptian student movement in order to observe the leaders of the nationalist movement. The reports filed by Dr. Said Bey Kamil (HIL/202/1-543) and his “collaborators” offer insight into the use of informers to monitor not only the “student movement” but also those members of the nationalist leaders whose behavior may have threatened the khedive’s legitimization as the only representative of the Egyptian people.²⁵ One of the documents in the German archives states that *Mansūr al-Kādī*²⁶ heads the khedive’s intelligence service in Switzerland.²⁷ *Al-Kādī* was very active among the student movement; he published a magazine (*Le Nil*) which covered Ancient Egypt and was mainly distributed in academic circles.²⁸ *Le Nil* had consistently reaffirmed the demand “Egypt for the Egyptians,” as a predominant unified goal for the Egyptian people. In addition to the hope of triggering an awakening among the Egyptian people, the magazine also reflected the hopes of Egyptian nationalists to pursue and realize the principle of self-determination first proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson.²⁹ According to the Abbas Hilmi archive, *Mansūr al-Kādī* received a monthly sum from the khedive.³⁰

A report written by *al-Kādī* provides detailed information on the Egyptian National Party congress in Geneva. The meeting was held in the Egyptian Student Association (Sphinx), which established by *Ahmad al-Dardīrī*.³¹

The report written by *al-Kādī* about the meeting held by Sphinx association focuses on five issues: the purpose of the conference, the conference and the khedive, the conference and the Turkish political approach toward Egypt, the division between Islamic ideas and Egyptian nationalism, and financial aids. The report reveals that *Farīd* has decided to pursue a separate political trajectory from Khedive Abbas, and had decided to organize the Egyptian conference in Geneva on December 15, 1915. According to two separate reports written by Dr. *Said Kamil* and *al-Kādī*, Article 5 from the program of the conference states that “the rulers of Egypt do not represent the Nation ‘umma’”. The report indicated that *Farīd* organized this conference without coordination or any cooperation with the Germans.³²

Farīd gradually distanced himself from Khedive Abba after the later refused to have an audience with the Kaiser to gain his support for the Egyptian’s nationalist aspirations.³³ The khedive was hesitant to show his links with Germany, because he was afraid that the British might confiscate his property in Egypt if he took such an initiative. Thus, he stayed in Switzerland for two years trying not to commit himself to either side,³⁴ and embezzling large sums provided by the Germans to purchase controlling shares in the leading Paris newspaper through his financial agent Bolo Pasha.³⁵


The report provides insight into the division in the Egyptian National Party which, the khedive believed, had undermined his cause in Constantinople. While *Farīd* supported him, other influential nationalists, including the fiery pan-Islamist and pro-Ottoman *Šaiḥ ‘Abd al-‘aziz Gāwīš*, had not.³⁶ There were two competing streams in the National Party: *Šaiḥ ‘Abd al-‘aziz Gāwīš* represented the Islamic wing, which insisted on close ties with Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), and as a result meant that *Gāwīš* did not support the khedive. *Farīd* represented a more secular, pragmatic orientation which aimed at complete autonomy for Egypt, and as a result he supported the khedive. *Farīd* was thinking of a pan-Islamic union modelled on the same lines as the Pan-Germanic Union, to be founded after the war and led by the Ottomans, but with each Muslim country enjoying autonomy and sharing equal rights with the Turks. He believed that an alliance between the Germanic and Islamic unions would be a stronghold against imperialist European power.³⁷ The report does not mince his words when describing *Šaiḥ ‘Abd al-‘aziz Gāwīš*: “We got rid of him and his moral decay.” The same report notes that *Šaiḥ ‘Abd al-‘aziz Gāwīš* had some disadvantages, and that explains why Jamal Pasha expelled him from Constantinople and the Sheikh of Islam removed him from the presidency of Damascus University.³⁸

Conclusion


In this chapter I have made extensive use of German archival sources to highlight some of the diverse and often astonishing material contained in the Abbas Hilmi II papers with regard to Germany’s relations with Egypt after the British occupation in 1882, and the pan-Islamic anti-colonial policies that Germany adopted after 1914. I trace Berlin’s increased engagement with and patronage of Egyptian nationalists in Europe and Egypt, and Germany’s political activity and surveillance. Neither the activity nor the monitoring of the activity were entirely new, of course; but these documents illustrate the new modes and articulations of political engagement, as well as the increasingly fastidious scrutiny to which they were subjected.

On the other hand, the student movement in Berlin and Switzerland, along with the leaders of the ENP, had played a crucial role in the mobilization of Egyptians to make their national demands known to a wider European public, in hopes of securing sympathy for the cause. To combat the Egyptian exiles in Germany and Switzerland, especially the khedive of Egypt. Britain and Germany dedicated itself to gaining support among Egyptian expatriates and to sowing discord among them. It had focused on trying to recruit some people from the group around the khedive.

The British wanted to win the Egyptian opposition, especially those who had enough prestige with the broader Egyptian population (such *‘Alī al-Gayyātī*) to be able to exercise influence. Given this rise in conflicting views on Britain’s future role in Egypt, it was only natural that Germany would seek greater influence among Egyptian students in Switzerland. Funding played a decisive factor in this.



Report written by Dr. Said kamil mentioned three ways to punish 'Alī al-'ayyātī. 14-1921 -HIL/202/1-543



Mansur al-Qadi and Muhammad Taufiq al-Banbi, 1915-1938 - HIL/98/1-89

auch mit der britischen Gesandtschaft in Bern in Beziehung steht. Auch Habib Lutfallah verkehrt dort. }

{ Ali El Gahaiasty- ein gänzlich ungebildeter Mensch- ursprünglich Drucker von Beruf, setzt seinen Namen unter Artikel, die von französischen und englischen Agenten verfaßt sind. Er besteht dafür Fracs. 1000.- monatlich. } 7 -----

BIOGRAPHY

Taqadum Al-Khatib is lecturer in the contemporary politics and modern history of the Middle East in the Department of Islamic Studies, Heidelberg University, Germany. From 2021-2022 he was a Non-Resident Fellow at the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar.

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German Report about 'Ali al-'ayyātī (Al-'ayyātī was a completely an uneducated man who originally worked for a publisher, where he would sign his name under articles written by French and English agents. He received monthly 1000 francs for this service)

END NOTES

- 1 In this regard, see, Michael Goebel: *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- 2 The term *effendiyya* reflects a different cross section of social groups in Arab and Middle Eastern countries; it is often more appropriate than the term “the middle class” for understanding political developments and the play of social forces in the political arena. The term was prevalent in the first half of the twentieth century in popular discourse in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, as well as among Palestinian Arabs. In Arabic-speaking societies, *effendiyya* took on a double meaning. One meaning encompassed large landowners, the ruling elite, and Ottoman bureaucrats; the other designated members of the modern middle class with a Westernized education. In the eyes of peasants (*fellahin*) or small merchants in bazaars, both groups adopted Western and modern patterns of dress and discourse. In Egypt, a clearer contrast developed between the *effendiyya* as the (primarily urban) middle class and the *bashawiyya*, the wealthy ruling elite. See Michael Eppel: Note about the Term *Effendiyya* in the History of the Middle East. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2009), pp. 535- 539. Also: Lucie Ryzova: Egyptianizing Modernity through the ‘New Effendiya’: Social and Cultural Constructions of the Middle Class in Egypt under the Monarchy. In: Arthur Goldschmidt: *Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919-1952*, (American University in Cairo Press, 2005).
- 3 G. Höpp, “Die ägyptische Frage ist in Wirklichkeit eine internationale” - Zur politischen Tätigkeit ägyptischer Antikolonialisten in Berlin (1918-1928), *Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika*, 15 (1987), 87-98.
- 4 Alain Silvera: The First Egyptian Student Mission to France under Muhammad Ali, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, *Special Issue on Modern Egypt: Studies in Politics and Society* (May, 1980), pp. 1-22.
- 5 Goetz Nordbruch: Arab Students in Weimar Germany – Politics and Thought Beyond Borders. *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2014), pp. 15.
- 6 Taqadum Al-Khatib, 2023, 162.
- 7 In the years prior to the 1919 revolution, Egyptian opposition activists in exile founded newspapers and political entities in order to garner sympathy in Europe for their opposition to British colonial rule, especially in Germany. In Geneva, Dr. *Mansūr Ref’at* established the Egyptian Patriot Club, *Muhammad Fahmi* established the Young Egyptian Committee, and *Ahmad al-Dardiri* established the Egyptian Student Association (Sphinx), while *‘Alī al-‘ayyātī* and *Mansur al-Kadai* both established independent newspapers. See Taqadum Al-Khatib: *Politics from Afar*. 2023, 170.
- 8 PAAA, Rz201-015049-015, 1915. 201.

- 9 HIL/408/1-28, Robert Forrer, lawyer, 1916-1917
- 10 *‘Adly Yakan* Pasha (18 January 1864 – 22 October 1933), sometimes referred to as ‘*Adly* Pasha, was an Egyptian political figure. He served as the fourteenth prime minister of Egypt between 1921 and 1922, again between 1926 and 1927, and finally in 1929. He held several prominent political posts including foreign minister, interior minister and speaker of the Egyptian Senate.
- 11 PAAA, Rz201-015049-015, 1916, 326- 347
- 12 FO 141/648/1
- 13 PAAA, Rz201-015049-015, 1915. 345, and British memo, source unknown, distributed to the FO, India Office, and military intelligence. Ex-Khedive of Egypt., FO 02555. 19.11.1916. Bern., p.3
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 FO 02555, 13.11.1916. Bern. P. 2
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 FO 02555, 13.11.1916. Bern. P. 2
- 18 FO 02555. 19.11.1916. Bern. P. 3
- 19 *Shaykh ‘Alī al-‘ayyātī* was an Egyptian graduate of *Al-Azhar* who lived in Switzerland during the First World War and wrote for the French and pro-Entente Arabic press. There, he studied social sciences and also worked as a correspondent for the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Mu‘yyad*. In order to avoid prosecution for the publication of his nationalist-patriotic poetry collection, he fled Egypt on 5 July 1910. *Muhammad Farid* wrote the introduction to *al-Gayyātī’s Dīwān* (collection of poems), which resulted in his prosecution, despite denying that he had ever read the poems).
- 20 FO 02555. 19.11.1916. Bern. P. 3
- 21 PAAA, Rz201-015049-015, 1916, 326
- 22 FO 02555. 19.11.1916
- 23 HIL/202/331-332. 18.06.1918.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 HIL/202/199. 15.12.1915.
- 26 *Mansūr al-Kādī*, born in Alexandria in 1890, lived in Lausanne, Switzerland, from May 1917 to the end of 1925. In 1927, al-Kādī began publishing his newspaper *Le Nil* but was soon hindered by his lack of financial resources. His studies in high commerce at Lausanne University were also stymied by lack of funds. At the end of February and the beginning of March of 1917, several Swiss newspapers reported on *Le Nil*, saying that this new bimonthly magazine would “represent the interests of the nationalist Egyptians,” and was intended “to bring together the various Egyptian groups in Switzerland and to orient the audience about Egypt. See PAAA, R 1 550, 2016, 106.
- 27 Ibid, 2016, 247.
- 28 PAAA, [The Archive of the Germany Foreign Ministry], R1550, 106.
- 29 In his book *The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Erez Manela writes that Egyptian nationalist icon *Saa’d Zaglūl*, as well as a long list of leading politicians, parties, professional organization, women’s groups, student groups, Egyptian organizations abroad, and even private Egyptian citizens, moved to write to the president of the United States when he arrived in Paris for the peace conference. For more on this, see *The Wilsonian Moment, Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*.
- 30 See, HIL/98/1-89: Mansur al-Qadi and Muhammad Taufiq al-Banbi, 1915-1938.
- 31 *Al-Dardiri* was 24 at the time and studying law in Geneva. By distancing himself from

the Fahmi's Egyptian Committee and beginning to cultivate closer ties with the most extreme elements of the National Party, he had succeeded as president of the Egyptian Student Association (Sphinx) among Egyptian nationalists in Switzerland. *Al-Dardiri* was able to continue working unhindered as president of Sphinx in Geneva. After he had already held a big reception in Hotel Bellevue for *Farīd'*, who had returned to the Rohonestadt city, he even managed to call together the Egyptian students and patriots who were staying in Europe for a congress lasting several days, which took place on December 25, 1913. The conference held in Geneva in July 1914 was to be opened under the auspices of the Sphinx society. However, this meeting did not attract much attention from the Swiss public. Its importance was also reduced by the fact that the planned continuation of the congress in London could not be carried out due to the outbreak of the world war. See Marc Trefzger: *Die nationale Bewegung Ägyptens vor 1928 im Spiegel der schweizerischen Öffentlichkeit.*, Basel und Stuttgart 1970.

32 HIL/98/1-89: Mansur al-Qadi and Muhammad Taufiq al-Banbi, 1915-1938.

33 Raouf Abbas Hamed, Bd. 28, Nr. 1/4 (1988), 24.

34 One of the documents in the German archives mentions that the khedive did not find the "climate" of Constantinople to his liking, and he moved to a villa not very far from Lausanne". See PAAA, R1550, 1915, 235.

35 Goldschmidt, Arthur: The Egyptian Nationalist Party 1882-1919. in Holt (ed.): Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt, London 1986, 329. Despite the strong relation between the khedive and Bolo Pasha, the Abbas Hilmi archive does not include several reports about the Bolo Pasha scandal. The trial of Bolo Pasha took place in Paris. He was convicted of treason and sentenced to death. HIL/202/1160, 2018.

36 *Muhammad Farīd, Mudakirātī ba'd al-Higra* (Memoirs), note No. 4, 132. Raouf Abbas Hamed, Bd. 28, Nr. 1/4 (1988), 24.

37 Ibid.

38 HIL/202/235, 1915.

