



DURHAM MIDDLE EAST PAPERS

UNDER SURVEILLANCE:
POLICE AND POLITICS IN THE ARCHIVE OF
KHEDIVE ABBAS HILMI II

Pascale Ghazaleh

*The American University in Cairo
Fellow, The Mohamed Ali Foundation*

Durham Middle East Paper No. 104

DURHAM MIDDLE EAST PAPERS

INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES

UNDER SURVEILLANCE:

POLICE AND POLITICS IN THE ARCHIVE OF
KHEDIVE ABBAS HILMI II

Pascale Ghazaleh

Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
Durham University
Al-Qasimi Building
Elvet Hill Road
Durham
DH1 3TU
Tel: +44 (0)191 3345680

MAF Papers No. 01
Durham Middle East Papers No. 104
ISSN 1476-4830
January 2021

The Durham Middle East Papers series covers all aspects of the economy, politics, social science, history, literature and languages of the Middle East. Authors are invited to submit papers to the Editorial Board for consideration for publication.

The views expressed in this paper are the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher or IMEIS. All Rights Reserved. This paper cannot be photocopied or reproduced without prior permission.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS), within the School of Government & International Affairs, is a Social Science-focused academic institute of excellence, research-led in ethos, with a track-record of internationally acclaimed research outputs across all sub-areas of its activity. Success in this respect obtains largely from the interdisciplinary nature of the Institute's activities and the fruitful interaction of political economists, political scientists, historians and Islamicists, as well as with colleagues from Anthropology, Arabic, Archaeology, Geography, Business – all linked together by their collective focus on the study of the Middle East and the Muslim world in the widest sense.

ABOUT THE PAPERS

Established in the early 1970s the multidisciplinary series includes topics on all aspects of the social sciences and arts in the Middle East, written by leading and emerging scholars in their respective fields.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Professor Anoush Ehteshami

Exofficio member

Professor of International Relations
in the School of Government and
International Affairs

Dr Colin Turner

Reader in Islamic Thought in
the School of Government and
International Affairs

Professor Clive Jones

Professor of Regional Security in
the School of Government and
International Affairs, Durham
University

Dr Carly Beckerman

Art editor

Assistant Professor in the
International Relations of the Middle
East in the School of Government and
International Affairs

Dr Rory McCarthy

Assistant Professor in Politics and
Islam in the School of Government
and International Affairs

ADVISORY BOARD

Professor Rory Miller

Georgetown University, Doha

Professor James Piscatori

Australian National University

Professor Beverly Milton-Edwards

Queen's University, Belfast

Sir Harold Walker, KCMG

Member, Luce Foundation

Mr Richard Muir, CMG

Chair, Luce Committee



MOHAMED ALI FOUNDATION

In 2018 Durham University and the Mohamed Ali Foundation¹ launched a fellowship programme to encourage academic research in the archive of the last khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi II (1874–1944), and to make the collection’s strengths more widely known to international researchers.

The collection, which is deposited in Durham University Library’s Archives and Special Collections, provides a rich resource of material on political, social, economic and cultural affairs in Egypt in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. It is hoped that this endowment by the Mohamed Ali Foundation will foster deeper understanding of an important period of Egyptian history and of a transformative era in East-West relations.

BIO

Dr Pascale Ghazaleh is Chair and Associate Professor of History at The American University in Cairo. Dr Ghazaleh has taught in AUC’s History Department since 2005. She is an expert on Ottoman history and 19th century Egypt, on which she has published widely. She holds a PhD in History from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, writing on “Généalogies patrimoniales. La constitution des fortunes urbaines: Le Caire, 1780-1830” (“Patrimonial Genealogies. The Constitution of Urban Wealth: Cairo, 1780-1830”).

Contact email : ghazaleh@aucegypt.edu

INTRODUCTION

Among the most remarkable features of the Abbas Hilmi II Papers are the reports by informers and secret police agents, many of which may be found in the files of the Department of Interior (AHII 6). These documents speak of the state's increased ability to police and observe; more importantly, they tell us of surging political activity and the ruling class's perception of such activity as potentially useful, if it could be harnessed in the struggle for independence from British rule, and potentially threatening, if it turned against the class interests of landlords and urban elites. Intelligence reports thus reveal not only a broadening of the political base – the birth of mass politics and indeed a changing understanding of what politics entailed – but also a dawning awareness of the potential power that students' and workers' movements wielded. They also signal to new forms of solidarity based on class or national interests rather than professional affiliation or position vis-à-vis the state.

The development of institutions, technologies, and techniques of surveillance, and the spread of informers along with increased interest in different kinds of information, resulted principally from the expansion and growing complexity of the state apparatus (as expressed in the ability to produce population censuses, implement universal conscription, apply quarantine measures, and monitor potentially productive populations). Surveillance intensified and became increasingly institutionalized as mass politics gained momentum, becoming a force that could prove useful to the nationalist movement while also posing a threat to the colonial authorities and / or the indigenous ruling class at different points in time.

The development of the intelligence apparatus during this period has already been the topic of some research,² and this chapter will therefore present an overview of some of the Abbas Hilmi II Papers' contents, which shed light on the proliferation of political activity and the concomitant deployment of a network of informers, while showcasing the main findings of recent scholarship on the topic.

1. *The Meaning of Politics*

Until the nineteenth century, in Egypt as elsewhere in the Ottoman sultanate, the Ottoman ruling class was made up principally of military personnel and state administrators. Historians have outlined the main features of the relatively austere apparatus of government that characterized the earliest period of Ottoman rule: the state was concentrated around the sultan and his extended military-bureaucratic household; it was

concerned principally with defense, the administration of justice, and the construction and maintenance of public works. This system evolved, leading to the expansion of an increasingly complex and centralized bureaucracy; by the eighteenth century, centralization had given way to autonomous provincial centers of power.³ Albert Hourani, in a seminal albeit now dated text,⁴ defined what the members of this class engaged in as the "politics of notables," to indicate the empire-wide shift in the eighteenth century towards diffuse power, no longer concentrated principally in Istanbul but increasingly situated in the provinces. During this period, dynasties of military commanders and wealthy, powerful merchants exercised authority through their households and extended networks of associates and followers. Some of the most powerful of these local rulers were able to implement trade policies, strike coinage, have Friday sermons given in their name, and undertake military campaigns autonomously of Istanbul, even while the sultan remained their nominal suzerain.⁵

The *`askar* – those the Ottoman state identified as its 'servants'⁶ – had clearly defined rights and duties. Affiliation with the state meant contributing to its defense in various capacities; thus, state officials, soldiers, and members of the religious and educational establishment were all considered *`askar*. By the seventeenth century, however, such affiliation had become a commodity, and soldiers, religious scholars, and other members of the state apparatus could sell their offices, and the revenues appertaining thereto, to members of the *ra`aya* (the 'flock' – designating the general population, producers and taxpayers, traditionally the inseparable counterpart of the *`askar*, echoing the dyad of *`amma* and *khassa*, or 'popular' and 'privy' – although the terms were not coterminous, and these translations would remain anachronistic arguably until the end of the nineteenth century).⁷

“AFFILIATION
WITH THE
STATE MEANT
CONTRIBUTING TO
ITS DEFENCE...”

I contend that it was in fact the transformation of state office into a commodity that could be traded (if not on the open market then within networks of buyers and sellers) that paved the way for the explosion of political activity that occurred after the mid-nineteenth century. Purchasing a position in the state apparatus entailed more than just the right to a salary: it made possible some degree of involvement in the domain of state administration and, as such, eventually led to commoners taking an active interest in spheres from which they had been excluded until then. This was not an inevitable consequence of commoditised state office, of course; rather, the subsequent upwelling of activism required three profound transformations:

1) the growing involvement of wider segments of the population in areas that had previously been considered the sole remit of the state, such as the right to monitor and dispose of resources, oversee the construction and use of infrastructure and public works, or even participate in decisions regarding to the defense of the empire's borders; 2) an articulation of politics itself that encompassed a broad understanding of government as a public good, beyond the narrow confines of state action; and 3) the state's deployment of new modes of population control, to count, conscript, tax, and monitor social groups whose labor power was understood as crucial to the state's survival.⁸

By the 1860s, evidence of intensified and diverse political activity is abundant. Juan Cole's masterful study of the decades that preceded the Urabi uprising traces the proliferation of workers' clubs, political gatherings, night schools, and other forms of association. Political activity, deliberately defined as such by the social actors who engaged in it, may also be detected in nationwide support for the Urabi revolt – support that, as Cole points out, was underpinned by developments in transport and communications technology: “The spread of the telegraph, railroad lines, and newspaper distribution in the 1860s and 1870s allowed villages far apart to keep abreast of key political intelligence.”⁹

This political activity, I argue, resulted from two related developments: intensified government involvement with changes in the agrarian and urban economies, on one hand; and the translation of the types of authority that artisans and peasants had exercised into the more formal, broader-based politics of the late nineteenth century.

Intensified state involvement in the Egyptian economy may be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century at least. The state incorporated prerogatives related to economic activity (for example, Mohamed Ali's confiscation of tax farms and transfer of their management to state employees) and thereby created an association between the political sphere and

“AS THE STATE EXPANDED ITS CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS, IT CREATED AN INEXTRICABLE ASSOCIATION...”

the Ottoman ruling class had defined it, in narrow and relatively minimalist terms, and productive or distributive capacities, which had been under the jurisdiction of a variety of different actors, ranging from guilds to merchants. This association, while it did not entail a wholesale monopoly of the state over any activity (not even agriculture, where the state's intervention was limited, in the first half of the nineteenth century, to control over cash crop production and distribution), would prove difficult to separate.

Alan Mikhail, in *Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt*,¹⁰ ties new understandings of the Ottoman state, Egyptian society, and the relation between the two to the expansion of irrigation works starting early in the nineteenth century. As the state expanded its control over production and distribution networks, it created an inextricable association between the mechanisms of government and those of the economy. It is hardly surprising, then, that overt popular demands for involvement in decision-making at the state level quite explicitly associated economics and politics. These, however, were spheres that the British vigilantly endeavored to separate in theory, principally in an effort to prevent the nationalist movement, and especially the mass of the population, from claiming any right to involvement in government.

In *Egypt's Occupation. Colonial Economism and the Crises of Capitalism*,¹¹ Aaron Jakes points out that the British colonial rulers saw their Egyptian subjects, particularly among the working classes, as incapable of pure political engagement; Gorst and others systematically ascribed popular unrest to economic interests (an elitist argument that may be frequently heard in Egypt even today). Indeed, it appears that one of the main conflicts in this period was precisely over what constituted politics, who was entitled to participate in that sphere, how to define the public good and in which circumstances it could open up to previously excluded parties.¹²

While Jakes has analyzed the sophisticated political analyses that nationalist figures developed after 1907, my interest here is the genealogy of working-class understandings of what politics meant, and what the population at large could contribute to it. The Abbas Hilmi archive provides astonishing insight into this particular question at a crucial point in Egypt's history; in the stories the spies narrated, I discern echoes of the language ascribed to guild masters in eighteenth-century court documents, and of the grievances presented by striking workers in late nineteenth-century petitions to the government.

Within certain groups, political activity in the sense of involvement with state matters and opposition to colonialism constituted a deliberate change of policy. The documents in the Abbas Hilmi II Papers, particularly the informers' reports prepared for the Ministry of Interior, provide examples of this shift. According to an informer attending a meeting of *al-Ruqiyy al-Islami* (Islamic Improvement) association,¹³ in 1909, the association's head told members that *al-Ruqiyy* had considered prohibiting speeches mentioning politics, but that now speakers were free to speak of whatever their conscience dictated. This decision had been made, he said, "because it has become obvious that we are dead;" a particular cause of despair was the imprisonment of "Shaykh Abd al-'Aziz [Jawish]," editor of *al-Liwa'* and the founder of the 'People's Night Schools,' which targeted the urban poor.¹⁴ Thus, the emergence of a figure like Jawish, an activist who criticized the British occupation vehemently and was a hero among the urban working class, could crystallize a groundswell of popular engagement and move it towards deliberate political opposition to colonial policies.¹⁵

The effects of British occupation, especially on the political effervescence noted by Cole, were inescapable, whether in the cities or in the rural areas. But the Ottoman rulers' own political affiliations mitigated these effects to some degree: Abbas Hilmi II, for example, became a well-known supporter of nationalist activism. The ruling class could dismiss the masses as motivated by crass material interest; at the same time, regardless of its agenda, it had

to contend with pressure from below and recognize that this pressure could be useful to various parties in the struggle being waged around the question of political independence and (less overtly) economic sovereignty. The question, for the leaders of the independence movement, was then how to harness this energy and co-opt elements of the popular opposition – often while suppressing the working class's world view and political agenda in favor of a more liberal understanding of power and relations of production.¹⁶

The workers' and students' associations were heir to a long tradition of urban opposition; contestation in the rural areas also drew on traditions of solidarity and collective action, for example, in managing resources like agricultural land and irrigation water. I would argue that workers' activism did not distinguish between politics and economics, while increasingly formal politics sought to treat these as two separate realms (each the realm of its own experts), and to exclude the workers from the political sphere. It would be no exaggeration, indeed, to say that this was one of the most important struggles of this period. Thus, it seems that this period witnessed a wide-ranging – not always conscious or explicitly formulated – class struggle over the traditional understanding of the public good, and how it might be incorporated into the anti-colonial movement. Its outcome was to divide

that understanding into specialized spheres and exclude rural and urban workers from the new politics, now strictly defined as matters of government. What remained were resources, their definition, extraction, and management. These too would later be subsumed into the sphere of state prerogative.¹⁷

If political activity and awareness were most intense and visible in the capital, even in areas more remote from the center of power, the population articulated its grievances in ways that show a clear understanding, and a specific interpretation, of the ruling class's rhetoric. One striking document recounts how the respected leader of one of the tribes in Sudan had presented a complaint to Hunter Pasha,¹⁸ phrasing it in the following terms:¹⁹

The time of the dervishes [the Mahdi's rule] was better for us than this time, and we have not seen the meaning of the freedom you claim to have bestowed upon us, because our supervisor [the mudir or administrative head] takes camels from us by force under the pretext that they are needed for public works, so he takes them and loads them beyond what they can bear, and marches them beyond their strength; and when one of them tires, they shoot it with a bullet. As for those that are strong enough, they return them only when they are worn out and weak, and do not pay us for them. Thus has our condition worsened, so where is justice and where is the freedom that you wish for us?

Hunter Pasha informed this petitioner that the leader of Egypt was Lord Cromer and that he would convey the tribe's complaints. This remains consistent with the long

“THE REPORTS
IN THE ABBAS
HILMI ARCHIVE
INDICATE THAT
THESE CONCEPTS
REMAINED
IMPORTANT WELL
INTO THE LATE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY.”

Ottoman tradition of petitions presented to rulers; what is perhaps remarkable is the tribal leader’s clear understanding of the incongruity between the rhetoric of freedom and justice, on one hand, and not only the violation of the tribe’s economic rights, but also the *mudir*’s abuse of the animals he had requisitioned, on the other.

In the various ways that had been available to working class people in Ottoman lands until the nineteenth century – and that historians know about through the study of petitions and court documents in which artisans or agricultural laborers articulated their grievances or demanded the redress of certain situations – ideas like equity and solidarity appear prominently.²⁰ The reports in the Abbas Hilmi archive indicate that these concepts remained important well into the late nineteenth century. At a meeting of the Workers’ Association, held in a school that belonged to the National Party in Bulaq, and bringing together about sixty workers and students, according to the informer’s report, a railroad worker named Muhammad Badr took the floor to recount a story intended to illustrate the benefits of solidarity (*ittihad*). The story concerned a “Muslim individual,” a comrade of Badr’s, who had been responsible for the carriage in which “the British engineer” (*al-bashmuhandis al-inglizi*) rode. This

worker died destitute, and his colleagues approached the British engineer to ask him for eighty piastres, owed to the worker in arrears on his salary; they planned to use this money to pay for the burial, which the widow and orphans could not afford to do. The engineer shooed them away (“*Mafish! Ruh barra!*”); the workers, for whom it was payday, then took up a collection that yielded the considerable sum of fifteen pounds. Badr was given the money and the engineer spotted him standing near the cashier’s office holding it. He questioned Badr about it and, upon learning what the workers had done, reportedly exclaimed: “I didn’t know that you Muslims were so united.” So impressed was he, Badr continued, that he pulled three pounds out of his pocket and contributed them to the burial fund. “See, brothers,” Badr concluded, “what unity is and how the British admire our unity (*ittihadana*).”²¹

This story – narrated almost as a morality tale – can be read as the realization that traditions of artisan solidarity were effective as leverage whether the rulers happened to be Ottoman or British. Until the eighteenth century, court documents drawn up by guild members refer to collective funds used to pay pensions to colleagues who had fallen ill and were unable to work, or burial expenses for members who had died.²² The underlying understanding of solidarity was contrasted, here, with the “British engineer” and his peremptory dismissal of the request for the deceased worker’s due; and, in the story at least, the workers’ decision to rely upon their collective generosity, despite their relative need, was sufficient to prompt the engineer’s admiration and unexpectedly lavish gift.

These examples illustrate the ways in which working-class people understood political engagement, as a form of activism or a mode of being that was familiar to them, rather than actions dictated to them by the nationalist leaders or the press. Their engagement was not exclusively about political independence but rather entailed a particular understanding of social justice and fairness; whether framed in terms of religion (“Muslim unity”), class interest, or native vs foreign identity, it was still rooted in concrete considerations, and indeed could not be abstracted from them. The protests of students at al-Azhar University thus combined criticism of political figures with demands for the payment of delayed stipends: at one gathering of 250 students, mainly but not exclusively from the *riwaq* of the Upper Egyptians, speakers condemned the political parties, and in particular the Umma Party and its leader, Mahmud Pasha Suliman. They pointed out that, if “those who wish to have their chests decorated with medals” were able to obtain what they sought from the government, they would then disown the students’ cause and look upon their legitimate demands with disgust.²³ This wariness of support from opportunistic politicians is summed up pithily in the comment of one

individual who remarked contemptuously to his companions: “Ignore them, fellows, government talk is shit” (*sibukum minhum ya wilad bala kalam hukuma bala khara*).²⁴

Not all reports, of course, explicitly articulated connections between concrete material grievances and political demands. At a meeting of Jam`iyyat al-Hayat (the Life Association) held in March 1909, members repeated the widespread condemnation of those who sought state honor and exhorted each other to contribute to the development of the nation (*umma*), no matter what sacrifice this required in terms of life, wealth, and involvement in politics (*wuluj abwab al-siyasa*). The association’s treasurer spoke up to say that the situation would not improve until power was wrested from the government’s hands – by force if necessary. He concluded by observing: “The Egyptian nation is no less than the French during their revolution.” Two members of the audience contributed to the discussion by holding the British colonial authorities responsible for the collapse of security and suggested that, by refusing to pay taxes, the population could force them to restore order.²⁵

Along similar lines, a report concerning the Egyptian Youth Association (Jam`iyyat al-Shabiba al-Misriyya) recounts that, at a meeting held in the Preparatory School of Sayyida Zaynab, and chaired by the school’s principal, members enunciated, among other things, their support for consultative government (*al-hukuma al-shuriyya*) and their rejection of despotic one-person rule (*hukumat al-fard al-istibdadiyya*). To illustrate the evils of the latter type of government, one of the members spoke out in condemnation of the shah of Persia, who had bombarded the Parliament and attacked the Great Mosque in Tabriz.²⁶ This ability to engage with the discourse of the political parties was combined here with awareness of revolution and repression elsewhere. The international dimension of anti-colonial action reappears at several points throughout the archive; another report refers to an Indian member of Jam`iyyat al-Hayat calling on the members to support the Indians and their uprisings.²⁷

At the same time, new or refurbished forms of engagement caught the interest of the ruling class, who saw in them an opportunity for patronage that could bring political benefits. Thus, a memorandum on the creation of a Workers’ Party (undated but likely written in 1909)²⁸ notes that the founders’ meeting was held in “an elegant neighborhood” of Cairo (*hayy raqi*) and lists among the reasons for establishing such a party the fact that in Europe, the “Western notables” saw such parties as beneficial and vied to obtain votes so that they could represent them. The Workers’ Party, according to this document, was to unite all groups and unions and classes of workers, to make them as “one

hand and one heart” in the service of the common interest; financial life, the report continued, is in the hands of workers and benefit could only be achieved with their consent.

While it is unclear from this document whether one or perhaps several notables sponsored this iteration of the Workers’ Party, the report cites “social scientists” (*ulama al-ijtima`*) and European example to justify its establishment, and acknowledges approvingly that workers control strategic areas of production and transport. Gradually, as groups previously marginalized from formal politics began to engage in political activity that threatened the legitimacy and worldview of the ruling class, nationalist notables sought to encourage these groups to create parties and unions that could be incorporated into traditional types of patronage networks. In turn, the workers could draw upon their own practices of collective bargaining, the guilds’ use of precedent as leverage in negotiations with various parties in the governing structure, and the customs of solidarity that persisted until late in the nineteenth century.

Thus, the expansion of the state apparatus, and the creation of political parties by nationalists who intended to rule alongside or instead of the British, also fostered the increasing entry into politics by groups who had their own understanding of class and national interest. In turn, this expansive practice of citizenship

exerted pressure on the notables, who sought to counter it in a variety of ways, ranging from outright opposition to patronage to tactics of surveillance and control.

2. A History of Spying

If political activity was linked to the expansion of the state apparatus, then, it continued, for the working class, to draw upon long-standing concepts of economic justice and was particularly focused on the authorities’ imposition of increasing and inequitable control over production and distribution. In turn, this activity provided an impetus for the government’s desire to monitor the population and, when necessary, to suppress it, but also to regulate it as a potential labor force and a competitor in the struggle for resources. Surveillance was an important weapon in an arsenal of measures designed to render the working population legible to the state and its administrators. Cole discusses at length the development of state control over the urban population during the two or three decades preceding the Urabi uprising:

State regulation had an impact on a wide variety of labor issues. Even in the 1850s, not times of significant expansion in the bureaucracy, the state began attempting to bring within its purview areas of life previously not very constrained. The bureaucracy grew under Isma`il [r. 1863-79] and he increased the powers given to officials, including, for instance, building and health inspectors. Modern medicine provided officials with an unwonted tool whereby to exercise control over guild leadership. The state also began depriving guildmasters of certain prerogatives, taking these functions

over itself. The imagery of the panopticon probably overestimates the resources of an Old Regime state of the viceregal sort, but the state's 'eyes,' as contemporaries called them, certainly multiplied greatly under Isma'il.²⁹

Well before Abbas Hilmi II's time, then, the grid of state surveillance and control had expanded and grown more sophisticated than in previous times. Of course, spies were not new instruments of government; as early as the Umayyad period, and certainly before, rulers maintained networks of agents who relayed news about rebellions, as well as the general condition of the subject population, to the centers of government. The position of secret agent was associated with the postal service; one study suggests that the caliphs' reliance on it in peacetime shaped the state's military, civic, and administrative functions.³⁰ The Abbasid rulers developed these networks, granting them official status and relying on them heavily. Hitti notes:

The postmaster-general had another important function besides looking after the imperial mail and supervising the various postal establishments; he was the chief of an espionage system to which the whole postal service was subordinated. As such his full title was sahib al-barid w-al-akhbar, controller of the post and intelligence service. In this capacity he acted as an inspector-general and direct confidential agent of the central government. The provincial postmaster reported to him or to the caliph directly on the conduct and activities of the government officials in his province, not excluding the governor himself.³¹

Thus spies were hardly unknown to the history of the region; rulers used them to a lesser or greater extent, relying on different types

of agents and seeking various types of information. What was perhaps different about the deployment of spies in the nineteenth century, and particularly from the 1860s onward, in Ottoman lands, was the complexity of the bureaucracy and the "staggering intensification of domestic surveillance." After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the struggle for power between the colonial authorities and the Ottoman-Egyptian ruling class, as well as the explosion of political activity among the population at large, provided the parameters for this intensified scrutiny. Informers could report that popular sentiment distinguished clearly between the British and the khedive's government, and reserved its opposition for the former. Thus, "[t]hree of the Khedive's secret agents who toured the city's quarters and nightclubs reported that 'the nationals and foreigners are totally united' and that 'all nationals and foreigners are filled in their heart with the love of Your Highness and are not desirous of the occupation authorities.'"³²

This situation was not to be taken for granted, however. Jakes remarks:

[The] spread of political surveillance ensued from the "policy of conciliation" in two respects at once. First, in cultivating 'Abbas Hilmi II as an ally, Gorst was willing to grant him a freedom of action that Cromer had long withheld. The daily memoranda the Khedive was receiving from the Interior by 1909 suggest that he had availed himself of this new latitude to monitor any and all organizations that might now challenge his authority. Second, a growing public awareness about the Khedive's rapprochement with the

British exposed him to new levels of popular disapproval. The Interior's growing web of informants indexed this heightened polarization of political energies, as new parties, societies, unions, and student associations seemed to multiply day by day."³³

The intelligence reports contained in the Abbas Hilmi II papers thus show an intense concern not only with monitoring political activity in general, which seems to have meant efforts to rally large numbers around issues that the government sought to monopolize; but also with identifying the perpetrators of such activity, especially when these activists belonged to what the informers called the "lower class" (*al-tabaqa al-watiya*).³⁴ A degree of anxiety was attached to the expression "public opinion" (*al-ra'y al-'aam*), which is mentioned in some of the informers' reports: one, dated 30 August 1909,³⁵ refers to the government's decision to use force against those who "departed from the sphere of legality" and observes that this decision had affected demonstrators seeking to sway public opinion against the government, particularly in the matter of Shaykh Jawish's sentencing to jail. The same document mentions that Shimi Bey³⁶ had met with a group of students at the National Party club and condemned one student's attempt to commit suicide in his acute distress at Shaykh Jawish's imprisonment. Significantly, Shimi Bey did not condemn the suicide attempt in religious or moral terms, but because it was "of no use to the country;" far better, in his opinion, to attack someone "known to cause great harm to the country," and thus sacrifice one's life by receiving a death sentence. The document does not say whether this attempt at channeling the demonstrators' despair toward assassination met with any success.

The proliferation of new media, as documented by Ziad Fahmy,³⁷ required a broader network of surveillance, as well as the ability to monitor different venues and modes of public expression. One report thus recounts in considerable detail a play performed at a school in Sayyida Zaynab in April 1909.³⁸ The informer narrated all the acts as well as some of the lyrics to the songs featured in the show; they are worth summarizing here. The first act concerned an Egyptian civil servant whose nephew was dismissed from his job in the Diwan and replaced by a foreigner who received a higher salary, although the nephew's children were going hungry. In the second, an actor dressed as a peasant sang Upper Egyptian songs. The lyrics described the Agricultural Bank taking the clothes off Egyptians' backs; while the peasants work the water wheel and mend their hoes, "Mister *Kharuf* [Sheep]" eats their lentils. Finally, the song compares the British unfavorably to the Ottomans: "The Albanians (*Aranita*) were merciful, while Mister James is riding us." The characters in the third act address Egypt, asking what ails its children, when foreigners hold the list [i.e. of debts or taxes] in their hands and "the Pasha and the Bey are collecting the money ... The fat has come to you in a barrel and the butter has gone to Somalia; they've ground sesame paste with dust and they

are eating macaroni and taro.” The fourth act featured an inebriated Egyptian who is robbed and beaten by a policeman; the fifth, a corrupt and ignorant mayor in an Upper Egyptian town, who takes the peasants’ land and receives honors (*rutbat bey wa kiswat tashrif*a) from the government.

While it may seem surprising that an informer should painstakingly summarize a theater performance and jot down detailed lyrics to the songs performed, the play touches on all the tropes of a strong and often explicit opposition to the British occupation, and the local notables allied with it: the greedy and exploitative occupiers, the unjust impoverishment of the peasantry, the corruption and stupidity of the native ruling class. The intelligence gathering activities of the informers thus had to be calibrated to the political effervescence that was becoming ubiquitous.

The Ministry of Interior files also reveal a variety of technologies of surveillance: the agents monitoring large gatherings in Azbakiya Gardens estimated numbers of attendees by questioning the ticket sellers about how many visitors had been admitted to the gardens. On 29 August 1909, for example, 2700 people were admitted, among which an estimated 2200 were demonstrators and spectators, “of the middle rank;” according to the informer’s report, very few if any were Azhar students and “turban wearers.” When the

demonstrators had gathered, one Ali Fahmi, reportedly an employee of the Irrigation Department, ascended the music kiosk and delivered a speech in stentorian tones, paying tribute to those Egyptians who were now ready to serve jail sentences, or even offer the ultimate sacrifice, in order to reveal the evils of the occupation. He was referring to Shaykh `Abd al-`Aziz Jawish; the gathering in Azbakiya was a fund-raiser to organize a celebration marking the shaykh’s imminent release from jail.³⁹

The concern for scrutinizing and censoring political activity was evident in Egypt as it was in Istanbul, where Abdul Hamid II’s paranoia was well known: ironically, the Abbas Hilmi archive includes spies’ reports on gatherings where attendees denounced the presence of spies in their midst,⁴⁰ as well as reports on secret societies, night schools, and demonstrations organized by Azhar students. The reports filed by Shimi Bey and his “collaborators” (AHII 15 and 16) offer insight into the use of informers to monitor not only the “dangerous classes” but also those members of the ruling class whose behavior might draw opprobrium upon the ruling family. Some of these reports mention high-ranking individuals whose disorderly conduct had to be controlled, or accounts of the comings and goings of individuals who had been targeted for observation. One informer does not mince his words when describing Ali Pasha Thabit, the governor of

“THE OTHER
TWO DOSSIERS
CONCERNING SHIMI
BEY AND HIS
COLLABORATORS
ALSO CONTAIN
NOW CHILLINGLY
FAMILIAR
REMINDERS...”

Sharqiya, who was reportedly “a renowned homosexual and a drunkard who cares only for enjoyment,” as well as an expert gambler (*sifatuh luti muhimm wa sukari wa shayif mazajuh ... wa ustadh fi lu`b al qumar*); as for the deputy governor, he was “ignorant in administrative matters” and appeared kind, “meaning that he does neither harm nor good.” The same report noted that hashish consumption and prostitution were widespread in Daqahliya.⁴¹ The two dossiers concerning Shimi Bey and his collaborators also contain now chillingly familiar reminders of the other reasons for which surveillance was deployed: one document refers to rewards given to people who inform on those who are ill (presumably to prevent contagion from spreading); subsequent pages in this report recount incursions into homes by public health officials accompanied by soldiers and neighborhood headmen to take the sick away to the hospital (*asbitalia*).⁴²

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to highlight some of the diverse and often astonishing material contained in the Abbas Hilmi II Papers with regard to political activity and surveillance. Neither the activity nor its monitoring were entirely new, of course; but these documents illustrate the new modes and articulations of political engagement as well

the increasingly fastidious scrutiny to which they were subjected. I cannot do justice to the range of material in the archive, or to the transformations that took place in the complex relation between the Palace, the British, and the nationalist movement (which itself was a multifarious and changing thing). In this regard, Dinshway seems to have been a fulcrum; the terrible sentences handed down to the peasants accused of having killed a British officer operated in some ways as the Dreyfus trial did in France, galvanizing public opinion and focusing grievances. So much of the popular politics of this period must still be brought to light and understood, not as the reflection of the intelligentsia's ideologies or the translation of European ideas but as the adaptation of deep-rooted understandings of equity and representation to new circumstances – the spread of capitalism and an increasingly intrusive state apparatus foremost among them.

اجتمع في جامع السلطان الاشرف بعد صلاة عصر يوم الخميس ٤ الجاري اغلب الطلبة الموجودين في رواق الصعايدة بالجامع الازهر والتف حولهم اخبرين من طلبية باقى الازهر وعدد هم نحو المائتين وخمسين شخصاً تقريباً وتفاوضوا في امر حرمانهم من الاستحقاقات الموقوفة عليهم وتنبؤوا من تصرف مشيخة الجامع الازهر وعدم مراعاتها قاعدة مخصوصه في توزيع تلك الاستحقاقات حاله كون الواقفين لم يميزوا احد دون الاخر ثم قالوا ان ظروف الاحوال لا تسمح لهم بالمطالبه بهذه الحقوق لانهم في احتياج لرضاً الأمير حتى لا يكون في نفسه شئ من المطالبه ثم تبيوا من الاحزاب خصوصاً من حزب الأئمة ورئيسه محمود باشا سليمان وقالوا فليقت الله ولا يجعل عدم تشريف الأمير لساحله في الصعيد سبباً من الاسباب التي يبيح بها المواطن على الأمير الى ان قالوا لو كانت المعية انال محمود باشا ما يتضاه وانال ايضا الذين يريدون ان تتحلى صدورهم بالنياشين لقاموا في الحال يقبحون عمل الطلبة وينظرون اشمرزاهم من طلبيات الأزهرين وانصرفوا في الساعة ٤ و ٣٠ افرتكى مساءً وفي الساعة ٨ افرتكى مساءً اجتمعت جمعية الطياه بمدرسة حسن المسرات بالداويه تحت رئاسة خليل مذكور احد تلامذة المدرسة التوفيقية وكانوا الحاضرين ثلثمائة شخصاً تقريباً وبعد اقتراح الحفله قال الرئيس من الواجب على اعضاء الجمعية ان يسعوا وراء ترقية الأئمة مهما كلفهم ذلك من تضحية النفس والنفس وولوج ابواب السياسة - وانتقد طريقة الانعام بالرتب والنياشين وقال انها طريقة غير قانونية ثم تكلم بعده التلميذ احمد شكري امين صندوق الجمعية عن اختلال الأمن العام في بلاد القلتر حتى في العام وعن جور الحكام المستبدين الى ان قال لا تقوم للأئمة قايمة الا اذا انتزعت السلطة من يد هذه الحكومه ولوغسبا وليست الأئمة المصرية باقل من الفرنسيين ايمان ثورتهم ويده وحق الشيخ ابوالفتح وخطب في الحاضرين وقال ان الاحتمال مسئول عن الأمن العام ثم احمد عليه احد مرفوقى المدارس الثانوية والتي قميده قال في مطلعها وختامها

سئسناكم سئسناكم فيها الى بلادكم شدوا الرحال
وأرخ ان بعد الاحتلال سقوط انجلترا سيكون حالاً

واوعد الحاضرين الذين طلبوا منه القصيده بانه سيطبعها لتوزيعها على الاهالى ليعرفون منها معنى الحره والاستقلال ويعدده تكلموا اخبرين على التريه وانحطاطها بين الأئمة ثم وقف كل من على مصطفى احمد وعلى على برهام من الاهالى وتكلموا عن الأمن العام في القلتر وما يجب عمله لالزام الحكومه بحفظ الأمن وروا ان خيرا واسطه للوصول الى ذلك هو امتناع الأئمة عن دفع الضرائب للحكومه حتى تحفظ الأمن

وبعد ما اتى محمد افندى لمى المهندس كلمات قليله عن نزايه الاتحاد الى قال ٥ وبه تنول الأئمه حقوقها ٥ ثم وقف الشيخ مسعود من طلبية الازهر وسمى ازالة ماعلق في الأزهان بين الطلبة والتلامذه وطلب اتحادهم وقال ان ولاة الأمور اخذوا يفكرون في رد مطالب الأزهرين بدون اصلاح فدعوا جميعاً الى الله ان يصلح الاحوال وانفض الاجتماع حيث كانت الساعة ١٠ و ٣٠ افرتكى مساءً

Right: Reports on meetings of Azhar students; accusations leveled against "corrupt" ulama; meeting of students from the different colleges to protest the suspension of their stipends (HIL/6/39).

مذكرة

ليلة الجمعة ٥ برين الماضي حصل اجتماع في المدرسة التحضيرية في سيد زين وجري ميش روي عنوا في عمرة ابيته مئة
 بمعرفة حبه كمال الرسم بحوسه المدرسه
 - الفص الاول نزل ميش موظف مصري في الحفوم اجري رفته ابيه ثقيفه من الديوانه بنوع الوفه وعينه خلدوه شوقه اوياري
 بما هيهم اكثر منه ما لقيه الرفوت ولم يراع حاله اولاده وهم يتفقون ورجوعنا
 - الفص الثاني مثل شخص فذبح يعني اوار صميدى عمه الوطيه اقطف من بعضه الكلمات الديره
 يا ايه مصر عار حوم (قوم) البناك الزراعي جز على اليروم البنوك سوس حذت اموالنا واليروم احنا تنقل
 في الشدوف ونضلع جروف والستر خروف اكل العرس منا مال الدنيا جا حطه هو احنا في مالنا وشباب بلوانط
 كما فواير حومنا والمترجس على راليه علينا
 - الفص الثالث مثل شخصيه اربايتة يعني على طيله جدي يقولوا يا مصر مال اولادك نايم يا مصر مال اولادك نايم
 والوجيني في ايه القايم والباشا والبييه لو المال يا مصر انك عميا والوجيني يجمع في المال والقطر فيم انتر تاره
 يا مصر فتحي مالك الاحيان واخيه مالك والشجر في البريس جالك والزبد راحته على الصويال طمخا طمخيه تيا
 يا ناس كلوا مكره وقطس غشوك يا ايه بعد بقولكم على المال والدم سلومه واري بين القطر فذيت فيه الحسة
 والباشا والبييه كالتقال الوجيني ايه في الجيب وابيه البلد يا اولادك يا اهل الوطيه يا اهل لغير شروع نصيه نصير
 جزوم اما المعنى حاصر لوزم والجرحيل ميتا باله ورزوم والعص ما يجيش نقال الجامع قطب اعانه يقول البسيه
 ابي ارفو في التبع اسكره
 - الفص الرابع مثل شخص مصري كراه وباشا وبي مصرى يلب ما في حيوه وبعده ايه نصير بوسله للقسم
 - الفص الخامس مثل عمه صميدى الغم عليه برتبه بيه وكسوة تشريفه مو ان جباله ولم يجسه القلم وياخذ
 اطيبه الفدا حيه الفقرا بالوقف صايب
 - الفص السادس مثل محله الجنايات نظره في قضية اعلام شخص فدمع يمشي حله بقصه تدمي دوله وبعد
 المرافعت اهل القاصي له العمد وانز اتم حله الضمخ ليقبله ليقطب من قيراطيه من الاصد فحلت المحاكمه
 بيراة الضمخ والقصص على العمد وحيه
 وقد انتهى التمثيل حيث كانت الياحه بعد نصفه اليه في اول ماين ١٩٠٩

نظرة الالة

6/50

قدم الضبط
قلم التحريرات

مذكوره

في ليلة امس الساعة ٨ افركي مسأ توجه الشيخ عبد العزيز جاويش رئيس تحرير جريدة
 اللؤلؤ لمدرسة الصناع اليلية الكائنه بدرسه الاجتهاد الوطنييه بيولاقي والقي خطبه على
 ماشتي شخص تقريبا ندد فيها على عدم اتفاق واتحاد المصريين حتى تفرقت كلمتهم واعاب
 في ذلك فريق الأعميا من الأمه حتى قال انهم امموزج للطبقة الوسطى والفقرا ولكن
 مع الأسف توامهم تار كين كل شيئي نافع ويقلدون الأجنبي في الشيمى الضار وليس يسمم
 من تعتمد عليه الأمه بل ان اعانهم كلها كاعمال الطبقة السفلى وقد قال الله تعالى
 يا اذا اردنا ان نهلك قرية امرنا مترفيا ففسقوا فيما فحق عليها القول فدبرناها تدميرا
 فيلزم ان تجتمع كلمة الطبقة الوسطى من الأمه لتقوم المعوج ومحاربة الظلم والاضطهاد -
 الحاصل من رجال الحكومه ورجال الاحتلال الى ان قال يلزم عمل جمعية كبرى تضم بين
 اعضاؤها الطبقة الوسطى من الأمه للقيام بهذا الغرض وقد اوعد بفتح الجمعية في الشهر
 المقبل وانفن الاجتماع في الساعة ٩ و ٤ افركي مسأ
 تحديرا في ٢١ مارس سنة ١٩٠٩



Above: Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Jawish gives a speech at the Workers' Night School (HIL/6/50)

Right: Account of a play performed at the Sayyida Zaynab Preparatory School on 20 April 1909 (HIL/6/83)

مذكره

تبلغ انه السيد الذي دعى في ليبيا، لنتم التجسس والجواسيس هو نظرا لوجود بعضه ما تسمى الواسم لجمعا وقد علم انه السيد افندي محمد بن حسين الشاه الحديدي والسيد محمد بن يوسف القاضي بن حسين جميعا الرقي ليوثي صرحا علانية بانهم الحكومة استدعتما ونبرت عليهما بضم القصره لليبيا وطافقا. وان هذا لهنبيه الراسب جيمر الفطيا، بما وقع لهما متفقيه بانهم تجسس الجواسيس واقفوا الجيمر على ما واد الطمه عليهم بما يؤدي الى عدم حضورهم لجمعيتهم

١ اما الفطيا الصنادير على القاء الفطيا بالجمعا ضد الحادو والاحتلال لانهم مع الحزب الوطني فوس
 ٢ السيد محمد زوقه من قسم العالم بمدرسة القضاء الشرعي ووالده مدرس بالزهر
 ٣ السيد محمد بن يوسف القاضي ازهرى بن حسين الرقي الاسدي وخليل نظير الشاعر
 ٤ احمد زكيا ضابط بمدرسة اللواتي له المنصبه المنه حكم عليهم في قضية القاهره
 ٥ محمد افندي علي سرور لقبه المهندس ومعه الوله فطيا متجولا بالاريا في مدينه الحزب الوطني
 ٦ السيد محمد الشريه ومحمد افندي فوس ازهرية والسيد محمد عثمان فوس بالمدراس الاهليه
 ٧ ومحاوله اجتماعهم بقوه دار السلام وناوي القلوب المصري بجوه سيدنا الحبيب
 ٨ وكان السيد افندي محمد يعرضهم ويجمعهم على الخطايات المبرجه ولما اشيع بينهم انتداب الحادو له وهو
 طلب منهم ايضا عدم القصره للكيانه خفيه مع بطرس الحادو فظنوا انه لو كرهوا انه تحول الى الحزب
 الاصلاح فلم يصغوا لقوله وصاروا يذموا على الطمه في الاحتلال ولواوي فذلك ليوثي الجيمر
 فتكى السيد افندي للسيد جاوريس وعرفه اللبنيه فجمعهم الشيخ وعرفهم بان السيد افندي من الكبر حال الحزب
 الوطني ويقصد بذلك تره الرماد في اعينه الحادو وكسبوا والى ما كان عليه بعد بضعة اسابيع فاستلوا
 ويقول المذنبون انه جواسيس المحافظه انتشروا بالجمعا حتى انه ضباط البوليس يلبسونه ملابسهم
 ويدونونه ما يقال بالجمعا وانهم احمد زكيا ليعيد بانهم يملكون معرفه كل الجواسيس لونه يتروك على من يظن
 بهر ليعرف محزبهم وقدينيه السيد عبد العزيز على الفطيا، يا بايع خظه السيد افندي محمد الى انه تخلف و
 الحادو وانهم يملكون انه يتعلموا في منتهى القوم ومجتما لهم بما يؤثر على السب الكثره الخطاب
 وتبلغ ايضا انه فريد بك استدعى فريد وهدي وانتهى عندهم لثمايه حيه مع صندوفه الحزب الوطني
 كلفه تروك على اقتلا في مدة ثلاث سنوات لتفضيه سياسته الحزب الوطني وقد خيرا ايضا محمد مسعود
 صاحب جريده النظم بتركة جريده وجهه محررا جريده اللواتي فاوعدوا الخبير بالرد عليه بعد التوره
 قريبا بالايجاب او السلب
 ويشاع انه تقدمت المدارس والوزاريه متفقيه على مقابله الجناح العالم عند تريف سوره لهما
 برضا هره كبيره بلطونه من الدستور وقهر يستدونه من التوره حيث افرحوا عليه لهنه لباله
 موضع الهايهم يتجادونونه بل على العتق وي ويعل مجتمعا لهم موعظيه كل الى الاقضية منهم ملك
 ١٩ غلظ ١٩٤١

Left: Reported fears of spies attending nationalist meetings; rumours of a demonstration organized by Azhar students (HIL/6/181)

مذكره

تبلغ ان ما ذكرته الجرائد عن مظاهره يوم الوجد ٢٩ غلظ الحادي عشر من تيفظ الحادو وتصير على استقبال القدره فوسه يجمع عن الدائرة القاونه اثره نفس المظاهره التي كانه ليعيد لهم بقولهم ما لعل
 الرأي العام ضد الحادو بسبب الحكم على الشيخ جاوريس وانما جريده اللواتي ولزكيا فوسه لونه
 الا انه فيما اذا كانه يمسد بوسه القمام بالظاهره. ويقال انه الحزب الوطني ليعي الا تظهر شانه هذه الظاهره
 وتبلغ ان السيد جاوريس كظمه في تاروق الحزب الوطني مرجعته من القصره بل يوم التمهيد لاد الواسم
 حينئذ جاوريس يقول انه لكانه لعل غير معقول حيث لوقا انه من ليلاد على الاوضاع ليه بريده ليه
 في سبل حذره بلوه انه ليعتقد به ليعرف انه من سبب الصاب ليلوه فيقتدي بغيره حتى حكم عليه
 بالعدم (ولكنه العبارة مرجعته من ليلاد ليعتقد به ليلوه قالوا ليه سببهم ليلاد حتى يكت
 حيث كانه لكانه)

وتبلغ ان من الورد استكوره جيمر الفطيا الى سلق قاصده على ايدى السيد ليوثي جاوريس ومجسا و غم
 بعضهم انه يتفقوا البوليشانه خصوصى يري اليه عند خروج من ليه
 ويقال انه استدعا المظاهره حياست احمد زكيا المشهور بالزهر لثما واحد حتى مجده الرقي ليوثي الى لم
 يرخصه بل حذره فطيا وشريه نظير السيد محمد بن يوسف القاضي ايضا والسيد محمد زوقه الازهرى وعبد الحامد
 كراء القائل بانهم يلاحظون ليوثي ومجسا بالجانه بمصر
 ويقال انه الاية الحزب الوطني استتخافا المرسته مجلس ليوثي ليه عناه عقب صدور الحكم على الشيخ جاوريس
 تبلغ نظره الحكم وقال احد زوى العداقه بالحزب - الفقيه والحادو من هذا المتفرق لى وجوه عقوبات
 ووقد تم شديده بينه رضايك يس مجلس المبعوثان وفريد بك بن الحزب الوطني زاد هذا ليوثي لوقا نازقه
 فريد بك مرتبه لالاستانه لهنه استه وقدم شافها على فجام فريد بك ما يشاع عندها لقيه ليه افندي
 مصر شيئا للسلام - وكثيروه من المشيبيه ليه ليعقدوه انه اول الايامه الاستانه نظره الالهيات
 واعمال نظره الوعنايه

ويقولون عنده سفر فريد بك الى الاستانه انه لم ير مندوبه على لفر الا جيف لظنوه مؤتمرا الشيبه
 ولذنه اوصى زملاوه بانهم يكونوا على حذر منه الوقوع في مشاكل مع الحادو
 وتبلغ ان من المنه حضره بالمدرسه الاعداد لم يبريزهم سوى التكم في الحكم والوزاره ويقولون انه
 لهذا الحكم كانه مقرا من حيث لم يجبر القاضي بلطقه بصوت جهوري بل كاد ليوثي ولولذلك لما حوس
 القاضي عبره سالما ونسبوه الى بعضه الشيايه من وكلاء الشيايه عدم رضايهم ليوثي الحادو
 وتبلغ ان السيد عبد الرصه الحادوي العالم من الدرجه الثانيه بالزهر خاير اخيه نائب محله بتركة الشريه لانه
 غزم على السفر ليوثي خرفا من توره سمحت في الجامع وقلموا سفر الابد وانهم صنفوا ليعقل المنه ليعينه
 يوم خرفا سترقه معهم لونه موقعا على الفطيا الذي كانه تقدم بالثمن من الشريه حيه ليه التي كانت تيت
 ليه. وليستمد حصوله من ذلك. انما الاذهنيه اشلا استنا. ميقه ليه بالثمن ليوثي الحادو
 وكما تقدر خظه اعتدال السيد محمد بن يوسف القاضي كذلك السيد افندي محمد فداوا ليه ليوثي ليوثي
 من الفطيا المبرج كما توضع في خندق هذه المذكره تكلي. ب. غلظ ١٩٤١

Right: Shimi Bey said to have advised a student who intended to commit suicide in protest against the imprisonment of Shaykh Jawish that it would better serve the country to carry out an attack on an enemy of the nationalists and receive a death sentence, thereby sacrificing himself for a worthy cause (HIL/6/189)

مذكوره

اجتمعت جمعية الصناع بمدينة الخبز والاحكام التابعه للون الوطنى ببولاقه في الساع الحامسه مساءً وبوم
 الجمه ١٧ يونيه الحاضر وافتتح المجلس توفيقه افندي الركبى المسمى وكلف بعضه المحاضرين بالنظايه وكاين
 عدد لهم نحو الستيه شخص من الصناع والتلامذه
 فقام محمد بدير من الصناع ومنه مستخدم اسكندريه المديريه وقال انه كان موجود بالصناعه شخص مسلم
 وظيفته عربجي المصير الكسح التي يركب اليه الياسمينى وكانه في كل يوم الياسمينى يركب المصير
 كويرى امبايه لغايه محو المواصله خلف القلم ثلاث مرات او اربعه وكانه لهذا المسلم هو الذي يرفقه المصير
 فتسبب منه ذلك حصول مرضه للمسلم توفي باسبابه وكانه فقير اجيلاً وصاحب اولاد ليس في طقتهم رفقه
 فتوجهوا اليه الياسمينى وطلبوا منه مبلغ ثمانيه قرصه صنع طانت باقيه للموت في ما لهية المرفقيه
 فقال ما فيش روح بيه ومنه حسه حفظ الموتى انه كانه لهذا اليوم اول الشهر وعمال الصنوع جايه صرف ربناهم
 فتوجهوا الاولاد لبرهم واخذوهم فطانه كل منه يقصه ما لهية يطفى لهم شئ على قصد الوعانه فلم يبقه ثوبه
 حتى جبر منه العمال ثمانيه عشرين وفي الاشارة حضر الياسمينى فوجد في واقفا بجوار الصراف ومنه لهذا المبلغ
 العظيم ولما سألني عن عرفه فاخذته الدهشه وقال ما كنت اطبه انكم باسميه متحبه ليه لدرج ومنه عمبايه
 باخرانا خرج من جيبه ثلاثه جنيهات واعطاهم ل؟ فانظروا يا اخواني كيف يكون الاحكام وكيف يكونه
 الانجليزى مبيجا باخرانا

وقام بعده محمود صالح من الصناع بمدرسه الخليفه وكلمهم عن نقابة الصناع وفوائدها واوصى بالانضمام
 في عضويتها واتخذ على عركب لطفى مؤسسك

ثم قام محمد ابراهيم من الصناع وقال انه بولاقه لادبته محمده بالانجليز فقط والحقيقه اني محمده بالانجليزى
 والفرنساوى والتليان والرومى . وما سبب ذلك ؟ اسبابه ان الصناع والعمال الوطنيه غير
 متضامنه فلوا اتحدوا وقضوا منوا لتقدمت الصناع ومنى تقدمت لرحل لنا عموم الاحباب حيث
 لا يجودوا لهم مرتزقا ولذلك فاذا همت جميعه سميتك تعاضد العمال ولم يبقه زوجه علمنا سبيل
 حتى اشتراك فيلن نحو استمايه من العمال وكل مشترك يدفع في الشهر غرضه صنوع واحد ومركزه الجمعيه
 بالخبز ببولاقه فعليكم اليه الصناع والعمال الالتحاقه بل

ثم قام محمود سليمان الطالب بالمدارس ومنه على سرياره البقالوريا وقال اعرفكم ما هو الدار الوطنى
 المنتشر في الود المصير الذى اضعفت واقهرها لهذا الدار وهو تقليدنا الود باوبوه في عزاء لهم القبيحه

التي تمنونه بل علينا ونحبه نريد صونه رئيسنا
 في مصر لتقدم اليه شكوا هذه فافتره هنتر بيت
 بار الرئيس في مصر وكبرها هو اللورد كرومر فقد صوا
 له بشكوى وهو يصفكم من هذا الظلم
 ثم اخبرني ايضا انه جاعده حضور كنيته الاستاين
 الانجليزي في مصر بطروح ومصر جوابات خصوصيه للوزير
 فبجوابه انظر لولا ما عده هؤلاء الناس فيما يظلمونه
 منكم فطانه المصوره بجمع الربانه في حجره ويقطع
 عليه ويقضى منكم على سبب من حضر فيهم ذلك
 عن يديه ونارة تارة جوابات غير سبه للقمندان
 فيع ان يساعده على هذا الجواب بقدر ما يمكنه فيا له
 عما يريد ويعطيه شخصه على بيت منه ويوصيه
 بغيره مما يجبره ذلك انما هي في بعض الزوار
 ويحب القوم انه باعص واي في له بجارة من التي
 اخذها ذلك الزار من هذا قليله من كثير ما يصل

Above: Report of a complaint from the leader of a tribe to Hunter Pasha regarding the British claim of having given democracy to Egypt and Sudan (HIL/34/40)

Left: Report on a gathering of the Workers' Association at a school affiliated with the National Party (HIL/6/453)

END NOTES

- 1 I would like to extend my thanks to the Mohamed Ali Foundation for offering me the opportunity to work on these documents; the wonderful archivists at Palace Green Library, Durham University, and especially Francis Gotto, for welcoming me and facilitating the research process; the librarians at the American University in Cairo's Rare Books and Special Collections Library, and especially Walaa Temraz, for helping me access the digital copy of the collection; and Aaron Jakes, who brought his deep knowledge and generous advice to bear on a draft of this chapter while his book, which touches upon this topic extensively, was still under press.
- 2 See most importantly Jakes, Aaron. *Egypt's Occupation. Colonial Economism and the Crises of Capitalism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (2020); Ellis, Matthew. *Desert Borderland: The Making of Modern Egypt and Libya*. Stanford: Stanford University Press (2018), chapter 3; and narrower studies, such as Badrawi, Malak. *Political Violence in Egypt 1910-1924. Secret Societies, Plots and Assassinations*. Richmond: Curzon Press (2000); Tauber, Eliezer. "Egyptian Secret Societies, 1911." *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 4 (2006): 603-23. www.jstor.org/stable/4284478; Landau, Jacob M. "Prolegomena to a study of secret societies in modern Egypt," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1:2 (1965): 135-186. DOI: 10.1080/00263206508700010; Tam, Alon, "Cairo's Coffeehouses in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: An Urban and Socio-Political History" (2018). *ProQuest*. AAI10793595. <https://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI10793595>;
- 3 Carter V. Findley traces the growth of the "scribal service" even during periods of Ottoman imperial contraction until the end of the eighteenth century: see Findley. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. Princeton University Press (1980).
- 4 Hourani, Albert. "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *The Modern Middle East*. Hourani, Albert, Khoury, Philip S., and Wilson, Mary C., eds. Berkeley: University of California Press (1993): 83-109 (originally published 1968).
- 5 On the military households of Ottoman Egypt see in particular Hathaway, Jane. *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511470738
- 6 See Hanna, Nelly. *The State and Its Servants: Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present*. New York: Columbia University Press (1996).
- 7 Cuno, Kenneth. "Ideology and Juridical Discourse in Ottoman Egypt: the Uses of the Concept of *Irсад*." *Islamic Law and Society*, 6, 2 (May, 1999), 136-163; Ghazaleh, Pascale. *Fortunes urbaines et stratégies sociales. Généalogies patrimoniales au Caire 1780-1830*. Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie orientale (2009). 2 vols.
- 8 See Fahmy, Khaled. "The Anatomy of Justice: Forensic Medicine and Criminal Law In Nineteenth-century Egypt." *Islamic Law and Society*. 6 (1999): 224-271. 10.1163/1568519991208682; and Ghazaleh, *Fortunes urbaines*, ch. 1.
- 9 Cole, Juan. *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press (1993): 267.
- 10 Mikhail, Alan. *Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History* (Studies in Environment and History). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511977220
- 11 Stanford: Stanford University Press (2020).
- 12 See also Omar, Hussein. "The Rule of Strangers: Empire, Islam and the Invention of 'Politics,' 1867- 1914." University of Oxford, 2016.
- 13 Reports on al-Ruqiy al-Islami association and its meetings may be found in HIL 6/56, 64-6, 79, 104, 144, 149, 152-3, 157-9, 177, 188, 213, 226, 264-5, 279, 291, 303, 315, 430, 457, 468.
- 14 Jakes, *Egypt's Occupation*, ch.6. For a basic biography of Jawish, see Goldschmidt, Arthur. *A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*. Boulder / London: Lynne Rienner Publishers (2000): 96. The shaykh is mentioned repeatedly throughout the Abbas Hilmi II collection; the catalogue cites, for example: general reports on Shaikh `Abd al-`Aziz Jawish (HIL 6/106, 156, 186, 281, 292), on his criticisms of the upper classes, the government and the British (HIL 6/50), his visits to various schools (HIL 6/84, 106, 156, 307) and meetings with al-Azhar students (HIL 6/313-314), a party in his honour (HIL 6/282-283, 293-5,300, 308) and demonstrations in support of Shaykh `Abd al-`Aziz (HIL 6/301-2,306).
- 15 For a nuanced overview of Jawish's trajectory, see Lockman, Zachary. "Exploring the Field: Lost Voices and Emerging Practices in Egypt, 1882-1914." In Gershoni, Israel et al., eds. *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner (2002): 137-54.
- 16 Lockman offers a more nuanced view of the relation between elite and workers' theory and practice of nationalism: "segments of the urban working population developed links with the nationalist movement early on, found in their own concrete experience reasons to feel themselves a part of that movement, and came to interpret and conceptualize their own concerns in nationalist terms." See Lockman, Zachary. "The Social Roots of Nationalism: Workers and the National Movement in Egypt, 1908-19." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 24. 4 (1988): 445-59.
- 17 Timothy Mitchell. "Fixing the Economy." *Cultural Studies*. 12. 1 (1998): 82-101. DOI: 10.1080/095023898335627
- 18 Presumably Sir Archibald Hunter (1856-1936). See Hill, Richard. *A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan*, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. (1951; 1967): 168.
- 19 AHII 34/40.
- 20 See Chalcraft, John. *The Striking Cabbies of Cairo and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds in Egypt, 1863-1914* (SUNY Series in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East). Albany: State University of New York Press (2004); and Ghazaleh, Pascale. *Masters of the Trade: Crafts and Craftspeople in Cairo, 1750-1850*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press (2000).
- 21 AHII 6/453, 18 June 1910.
- 22 Cole refers to the practice of rukiya, which "distributed income among guild members with little regard for who worked hardest, ensuring all members of a comparable rank a similar level of income" (*Colonialism*: 71).
- 23 AHII 6/39, March 1909.
- 24 AHII 6/4.
- 25 AHII 6/39, March 1909.
- 26 AHII 6/35, 8 March 1909.
- 27 AHII 6/198.

- 28 Report on the establishment of the Hizb al-`Ummal (Workers' Party) (AHII 6/89); another report discusses whether it can be classed as an association (AHII6/90).
- 29 Cole, *Colonialism*: 98.
- 30 Al-Naboodah H. "'a'ib al-Khabar: Secret Agents and Spies During the First Century of Islam." *Journal of Asian History*. 39/2 (2005): 158–176. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41933414.
- 31 Hitti, P.K. *History of the Arabs From the Earliest Times to the Present*. Macmillan International Higher Education (2002): 325. He continues: "Al-Mansur employed in his espionage system merchants, pedlars and travellers who acted as detectives; al-Rashid and other caliphs did the same. Al-Ma'mun is said to have had in his intelligence service in Baghdad some 1700 aged women. Especially was 'the land of the Romans' covered with `Abbasid spies of both sexes disguised as traders, travellers and physicians."
- 32 Kazamias, Alexander. "Cromer's Assault on 'Internationalism': British Colonialism and the Greeks of Egypt, 1882-1907." Gorman, A. and M. Booth, eds. *The Long 1890s in Egypt: Colonial Quiescence, Subterranean Resistance*. Edinburgh University Press (2014): 253-286, 272.
- 33 Jakes, *Egypt's Occupation*, Chapter 6.
- 34 AHII 6/54, 1909.
- 35 AHII 6/189, 1909.
- 36 Along with Muhammad Rushdi, one of the Khedive's top spies. Jakes, *Egypt's Occupation*, Chapter 2.
- 37 *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation Through Popular Culture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press (2011).
- 38 AHII 6/83.
- 39 HIL 6/191.
- 40 HIL 6/181, August 19, 1909.
- 41 AHII 16/47.
- 42 AHII 16/169.

Images reproduced by kind permission of the Trustees of the Mohamed Ali Foundation and of the University of Durham.

