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## Boundaries in Flux: The 'Green Line' Boundary between Israel and the West Bank - Past, Present and Future

*David Newman*

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## Boundaries in Flux: The 'Green Line' Boundary between Israel and the West Bank - Past, Present and Future

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## Preface

This study is the outcome of research carried out by the author on different aspects of the 'green line' boundary in recent years. While this boundary briefing is the first overall synthesis of all of the material appertaining to the topic of the 'green line' boundary, certain ideas have been published elsewhere, although they have been expanded and elaborated in this publication. The detailed description of the evolution and course of the boundary is largely based on Brawers book *Israel's Borders*. The section dealing with the reemergence of the 'green line' during the 1970's and 1980's appeared in part as a chapter in *World Boundaries Vol II: The Middle East and North Africa* (C.H. Schofield and R.N. Schofield, eds, Routledge, 1994), while an early discussion of some of the considerations concerning the 'green line' as a future boundary for a Palestinian state were published in a short paper in *Geography*, July 1994. The topic continues to be a focus of research for the author, especially as it relates to factors which will influence the future demarcation of this boundary. These topics are currently being investigated by the author, together with Dr G. Falah, under the terms of a research grant awarded by the John T and Catherine D. MacArthur Foundation for the study of territorial aspects and alternatives to a two state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

## The Author

Dr David Newman is a senior lecturer in the Department of Geography at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel. He received his B.A. from the University of London in 1978, and his Ph.D. from the University of Durham in 1981. Dr Newman teaches and carries out research within the field of political geography, with a major focus being the political geography of the Israel-Palestine conflict in general, and of the West Bank in particular. Amongst his publications are*: Population, Settlement and Conflict: Israel and the West Bank*, Update Series, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

## Dedication

This publication is dedicated to those leaders who, since 1993, have made a first attempt at beating their swords into ploughshares for the mutual benefit of both Israelis and Palestinians.

The opinions and comments contained herein are those of the author and are not necessarily to be construed as those of the International Boundaries Research Unit.

# Contents

# List of Figures

## List of Tables

# Boundaries in Flux: The 'Green Line' Boundary between Israel and the West Bank - Past, Present and Future

*David Newman*

## 1. Introduction

> *"Future borders have always been and remain the thorniest aspect of the solution...The borders must, therefore, reflect population distributions as they exist today...every attempt to demarcate borders will inevitably touch a nerve, whether for strategic, national or religious reasons. The sensitivity of both sides is so great that even a simple formula could become the recipe for renewed conflict..We need soft borders, not rigid, impermeable ones. Borders are not walls. We need not close ourselves off with a wall, which in any case would not strengthen the national sovereignty of either side"* (Shimon Peres, 1994: 170-171).

In the aftermath of the implementation of the first stage of the Israel-Palestinian peace accord, attention will now turn to the negotiations concerning a permanent territorial solution. According to the terms of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed by representatives of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Washington in September 1993, these negotiations are due to commence two years after the implementation of the first stage - Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The implementation of the permanent solution is scheduled to take place within five years

Despite the fact that Israel's formal negotiation stance does not yet recognise the establishment of a full and separate sovereign Palestinian state, it would appear to be an inevitable outcome of the continued implementation of the current peace process. Such a solution requires the negotiated demarcation of the territorial entity which will comprise a Palestinian state. Both Israel and the Palestinians are likely to jockey for their own respective territorial demands, with the Palestinians demanding no less than the whole of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as their minimal requirement for an independent state. This is likely to be rejected by Israel who will argue for a redemarcation of the West Bank boundary in line with their own political and territorial agenda.

The geographical focus for the commencement of negotiations is that of the 'green line' boundary which separated Israel from the West Bank between 1948-1967 (Figure 1). Despite the formal removal of this boundary in the Six Day War of June 1967, it has continued to function as an important administrative divide between Israel and the Occupied Territories. This *Briefing* examines the changing functional characteristics of the 'green line' boundary during the past forty years. During this period, the boundary has passed through a number of phases: from an imposed sealed boundary to one which has been removed but nevertheless retains certain boundary characteristics, to one which may be reimposed at a future date under the terms of a permanent territorial solution. As such, the 'green line' constitutes a boundary in 'flux', whose formal and functional definitions are undergoing constant change and will continue to do so until a permanent and agreed process of delimitation is completed.

**Figure 1:** ***The 'Green Line' Boundary***




*Source: Newman, 1994b*

The recognition of the West Bank as a separate territorial entity in the Declaration of Principles is itself conditioned by the pre-existing boundary. Yet this same boundary was only in existence for a period of nineteen years, as compared to the twenty eight year period which has passed since the 1967 War. It nevertheless remains strongly imprinted on the mental images of Israelis, Palestinians and the international community as constituting the territorial demarcator between the two peoples and their respective territories.

The 'green line' was never a perfect boundary, particularly as it related to the geo-ethnic patterns of Arab-Palestinian settlements on both sides of the line. Since the Six Day War of 1967 and the 'opening' of the boundary, many additional changes have taken place in close proximity to the 'green line'. These changes are presented here as background material for understanding the negotiating stances of both sides in their move towards final boundary demarcation. Scenarios for the future functional characteristics of a reimposed international boundary are discussed, although this can be no more than speculative at this stage of the process.

The study also touches on the role of the 'green line' within Jerusalem, probably the single most complex and, at this stage, seemingly insoluble aspect of the conflict. The history of the 'green line' in Jerusalem closely mirrors the functional changes which have taken place along the remainder of the course of the boundary. While both sides to the conflict see Jerusalem as the political and administrative centre of their respective state/autonomous entities, neither side supports the idea of a city physically redivided.

## 2. The Course of the Boundary

The 'green line' runs for approximately 310km (Figure 1). The lowest point of the border is -392 metres on the shores of the Dead Sea, and the highest point is 820 metres in Jerusalem. Due to its' circuitous nature, the boundary is far longer than the spatial extent of the West Bank would lead the observer to suppose. From north-south, the West Bank runs for no more than 130km, while from west to east the region does not extend beyond 55km. These dimensions are important if one is to understand why the negotiations concerning any future re-demarcation of the boundary between Israel and a separate Palestinian entity are likely to focus around small micro-territories, no more than a few square kilometres each. Without this appreciation of geographic scale, it is difficult to come to terms with the relevant boundary issues at stake.

The course of the 'green line' boundary consists of two sections, bissected by the Jerusalem corridor. The first of these begins in the north east in the northern section of the Jordan Valley, running to the north-west for just over 40km, before turning to the south along the southern edge of Wadi Arrah as far as the outer edges of the coastal plain. From there, the line continues to the south, parallel to the foothills, until it reaches the Ayalon Valley and Latrun region in the centre of the country. From this area, which constituted 'no-man's' land until 1967, the boundary turns to the east towards Jerusalem, creating the northern boundary of the Jerusalem corridor. From Jerusalem, the course of the boundary doubles back to the west creating the southern perimeter of the corridor, until once again it turns south parallel to the foothills of the Judean and Hebron uplands. At its' southernmost point, the boundary reaches the new Israeli settlement of Metar some 20km to the north of Beer Sheba, at which point the line turns in an east north east direction, descending from a height of 900 metres at Yattir to below sea level at the Dead Sea, just north of En Gedi. The course of the boundary continues into the Dead Sea until it reaches the median line between Israel and Jordan.

The north-east and south-east extremities of the boundary meet the Israel-Jordan boundary at the north and south ends of the Jordan Valley respectively. The intervening section of the Jordan Valley boundary has not been subject to the Israel-Jordan negotiations which were part of the recent peace agreement between the two countries. Jordan sees this stretch of boundary as being subject to negotiations between itself and a future Palestinian entity, with which it will

share a joint boundary. A detailed discussion of the Israel-Jordan boundary agreement is beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth noting however the successful outcome of the Israel-Jordan negotiations in those areas to the south and north of the West Bank stretching as far as the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria boundaries respectively (Roberts, 1995). The final boundary demarcation included an Israeli agreement to return small parcels of land along this boundary to Jordan, but to continue to cultivate them under a 'lease back' scheme from the Jordanian government. The originality of this agreement lends hope to what may be achieved in the boundary negotiations with both the Palestinians and Syria.

## 3. Boundary Demarcation: The Evolution of the 'Green Line'

Despite the relatively short time-period involved, we can define four distinct periods in which the 'green line' boundary has undergone change, either physically or functionally, during the past fifty years (Table 1). Prior to 1949, Palestine west of the River Jordan was a single administrative and political unit under the administration of the British Mandate. Historical Palestine had included territories to the east of the River Jordan, but the creation of a separate political entity in Trans-Jordan in 1921 resulted in the River Jordan becoming transformed into a line of political division. The developing conflict between Arabs and Jews in western Palestine during the 1920's and 1930's, resulted in a number of proposals for partition, the most notable of these being the Peel Commission in 1936 and the Woodhead Commission in 1937 (Figures 2a and 2b) (Galnoor, 1991; Katz, 1994). The concept of Palestine west of the Jordan River undergoing partition dates from this period and caused much heated debate within the Zionist movement at the time (Haim, 1978). This has now become the normal way by which maps of Israel-Palestine are perceived despite the fact that the history of the idea goes back no further than sixty years.

**Table 1:** ***Phases of Change in the 'Green Line' Boundary***

| **Period** | **Status** | **Functional Characteristics** *Separation* *Contact* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-1948 | Absence of boundary | | Regional integration |
| 1948-67 | Armistice line Sealed boundary | Spatial reorientation Frontierisation | |
| 1967-87 | Boundary removal Administrative boundary | Municipal boundaries Non-annexation | Palestinian labour Settler migration |
| Post-1987 | Administrative boundary Curfews and road blocks | Geography of fear | |

# Figure 2: *Partition Proposals for Palestine*



The lines of division proposed by both Commissions aimed at achieving as high a degree as possible of geo-ethnic homogeneity and separation. Then, as now, the concept of a binational entity within which both Jews and Arab would share power in some form of participatory democracy or federal entity was unacceptable to both sides. Each desired its' own sovereignty within the framework of a nation dominated state in which the respective national groups constituted the dominant power - both demographically and politically. Neither the recommendations of the Peel or Woodhead Commissions were ever implemented, while the outbreak of World War II laid the issue to rest for the best part of a decade. During the interim period, settlement planning was aimed at ensuring Jewish control of parts of the territory awarded by the British commissions to the Arab entity (Reichmann, 1990). The issue of partition returned with a vengeance following the end of World War II, resulting eventually in the British decision to return the Palestine mandate to the United Nations. Based on the changing settlement and demographic realities, the Jewish Agency proposed their own partition plan (Figure 2c). The United Nations Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) proposed a new partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab entities, a proposal which was accepted by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1947. The United Nations Proposal also aimed at achieving ethno-territorial homogeneity and, as such, recommended a line of partition which would have resulted, if implemented, in non-contiguous territories for each of the states (Figure 2d).

Both the United Nations and previous partition proposals were significantly different to the eventual line that emerged in the aftermath of Israel's War of Independence in 1948-49. The UN Partition Proposal gave more territory to the Arab sovereign entity, including many of the Arab population centres, such as Ramla, Lydda, Tayibe and most of the Galilee region, all of which were later incorporated as part of Israel following the Rhodes Armistice agreements of 1949, drawn up under the auspices of United Nations mediator Ralph Bunche. This new boundary largely reflected the ceasefire lines of 1949 which, in turn, reflected the geographical location of Jewish settlements. With the exception of a few small village communities in the Etzion region to the south of Jerusalem, pre-State Zionist colonisation had focused on the plains rather than the mountains. This was due to both the lack of available land for agricultural cultivation in the mountains, coupled with the existence of the densely populated upland areas of Arab settlement.

The first stage of Israel's War of Independence was intended to ensure military control over all regions of Jewish settlement. As such, the Israeli army did not, at that time, advance further into the upland regions of the West Bank (Figure 3). When it was proposed by the then military commander, Yigal Allon, to take advantage of the situation and to advance east as far as the Jordan River, the leadership of the time decided that it was of greater importance to advance southwards and capture the Negev, as this was perceived as being of crucial importance for Israel's future development as well as providing a sea outlet at Aqaba-Elat to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the few months immediately prior to the armistice agreement, Israel tried to push the boundary with Jordan eastwards, especially in the Hebron foothill area which was less densely populated than areas to the north (Morris, 1990).

**Figure 3:** ***The Israeli War of Independence, 1948-49 and the Demarcation of the 'Green Line'***



The armistice agreement with Jordan, signed on 3 April, 1949, related to the demarcation of the 'green line' and the separation of the 'West Bank' territory from Israel (Appendix I). Israel insisted on controlling key transportation routes that linked different parts of the country, even if it meant significant deviation from the ceasefire lines. This involved small territorial exchanges. The inclusion of the Wadi Arrah region, including fifteen Arab villages, within Israel was agreed to by the Jordanians so that Israel would not reopen negotiations over parts of Samaria (Pappe, 1992). Control of this area, including some strategic locations in the surrounding foothills, ensured Israeli control over the road linking the towns of Afula in the east to Hadera in the coastal plain.

Brawer (1990) notes that the armistice agreements took no notice of physical or human geographical features along the course of the boundary.[1] He also notes the lack of professionalism shown by the negotiators in drawing up the maps which accompanied the agreement. The basis for the maps was a 1:250,000 scale, on which the border was drawn in with a coloured pencil with a thickness of one millimetre. It was called the 'green line' because that was the colour with which it was later printed on official Israeli maps.

The green line ends at the heart of the Dead Sea opposite Mitzpe Kedem, from where it turns westwards until it reaches the Hebron-Beer Sheba road, passing through the Judean desert and sections of Hebron mountains. In this region, the border consists of a number of almost straight lines, completely ignoring the trans-boundary pasture lands used for centuries by the bedouin population of this area.

From the southern part of the Hebron foothills, the border passes through the western slopes of the central uplands. Brawer (1990) notes that in this area, Israel gave up some land in favour of Jordan, in return for other land parcels it received elsewhere along the course of the border. In the Bet Guvrin area, the border turns in a north easterly direction, beginning the demarcation of the strategically important Jerusalem Corridor. In this area, the border was based on the ceasefire lines with few changes, a major exception being the rail line linking Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, which remained completely under Israeli control.

From Jerusalem to Sha'ar Hagai, there were two main factors in the boundary demarcation: the positions of the two sides following the ceasefire, and the control over the main road linking Jerusalem to the coastal plain. Between the village of Katana and Budrus, there were two lines, enclosing an area of no man's land. The width of this zone was between 500 metres to three kilometres. This area remained unpopulated. The two sides had been unable to reach an agreement over this area since it lay between the opposing military positions and was transversed by both major routes leading from Jerusalem to the coast.

From this area northwards, along the eastern margins of the Sharon coastal region, the roads and railway were a major factor determining the course of the line. Israel received small land parcels as a means of maintaining control over the major transportation arteries through the coastal plain. In two areas, the boundary was demarcated within the coastal plain, so as to allow the Palestinian towns of Qalqiliyah and Tulkarem to remain in the Jordanian controlled West Bank. In these two areas, the border cut across the road and rail network, necessitating the construction of bypass connections on the Israeli side of the boundary. This was the main area in which Arab villages were cut off from their lands. Because of topographic and climatic

[1] Much of the description in this section of the *Briefing* is drawn from Professor Brawer's Hebrew text *The Boundaries of Israel.*

conditions, the villages were mostly located in the foothills with their lands lying to the west in the coastal plain.

In the northern section, the border runs parallel to the Iron Valley, as far as the Arab town of Um el Fahm and from there on to the Jezreel valley. In this region, the Jordanians withdrew from a small strip of land, enabling Israel to retain control over the main highway between the coastal plain and the Jezreel valley. As a result, some Arab villages, including Um el Fahm, remained under Israeli control. From here the border turns in an easterly and south easterly direction along the western slopes of the Gilboa mountains before descending into the Jordan Valley. The three kilometres here in which the border runs along the course of the Bezeq stream is the only place along the whole border in which the line follows a clearly delineated geographical feature. The border reaches the Jordan River at a point -252 metres below sea level, where it rejoins the line separating Palestine and Transjordan which had been determined in 1922 and which has now been formally agreed to as part of the Israel-Jordan Peace Agreements (Roberts, 1995).

Following the general demarcation of the boundary, joint military committees spent months working out the precise course of the line. They agreed to implement small local changes in order to better meet the needs of the local population. Fences were erected and patrol roads constructed. In some cases, the precise marking of the boundary only took place some years later, in which case there arose disputes as to the original delimitation.

In the Gilboa region, minor changes were introduced. In the villages of Jilaboun and Paqu'a, where the original demarcation cut the villages in two or from their fields, the line was redrawn to the east, so as to allow the villages to retain control of their fields. In the Iron Valley, similar micro changes were made in both directions. While this made for a better functional border, it resulted in a curved line, as contrasted with the straight line which had originally been drawn up in the ceasefire agreements. Another example was in the village of Barta'ah, in which part was left in Israel, the rest in the West Bank, but in which the village well was on the Israeli side. Changes had to be made to enable the villagers access to this critical source of water. Changes were only made where they were not considered as detrimental to military or transportational concerns. Brawer documents a case where an orchard was cut into two, but in which part of the orchard commanded a high point. Because of its perceived strategic value, the original delimitation remained unchanged, resulting in the loss of half of the orchard to its owner.

### 3.1 The Impact of the Green Line Boundary, 1949-1967

The demarcation of the 'green line' in the Armistice Agreements at Rhodes resulted in a great deal of economic and settlement dislocation, especially for the Palestinian-Arab inhabitants of the region. What had previously been a single functional and cultural space suddenly found itself divided between two separate political entities. Villages found themselves cut off from their fields, while many residents of the settlements in the West Bank found themselves cut off from their former places of employment in Jaffa and other Arab centres in the coastal plain (Brawer, 1990; Morris, 1993). According to Morris (1993), the Armistice Agreement left eighty villages (one in five) without part of their lands, while another twenty villages were seriously damaged. Of these the 'green line' cut the land belonging to 63 Arab villages and townships located east of the line, and a further eight villages to the west of the boundary (Brawer, 1990). The demarcation of the line roughly parallel to the foothills often meant that while the villages themselves were located in the eastern hilly slopes, their fields were located in

the coastal plain along the western (Israeli) side of the boundary (Falah, 1991). Thus, the fields that were lost were often the most fertile, while the alternative lands in the West Bank were often rocky and mountainous.

Not only did the existing Arab settlement pattern become divided into two sections, but the nature of the sealed boundary between Israel and Jordan meant that contact between the two sides was prevented causing both physical and emotional dislocation. Residents of neighbouring settlements became either citizens of Israel or residents of the Jordanian controlled West Bank. The major Arab-Palestinian urban centres which found themselves physically separated from each other were Tayibe and Tireh (within Israel) and Tulkarem and Qalqiliyah (within the West Bank) in the Triangle Region, and Um el Fahem (Israel) and Jenin (West Bank) in the north-western section of the boundary (Figure 4).

The effect of the sealed boundary during the short period of its existence was impressive. In his study of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the Arab-Palestinian communities on each side of the green line immediately after the opening of the boundary in 1967, Brawer (1984) found that the boundary had had a major impact on the differential social and economic development of these villages and towns. Those communities which had remained on the Israeli side of the boundary displayed a generally higher level of socio-economic and educational characteristics than their counterparts just a few kilometres away on the other side of the line. This was due both to the fact that the Arab settlements within Israel had benefited, if only partially, from the economic and infrastructural development which took place during the first two decades of Israeli statehood, as well as their location on the margins of the country's metropolitan and economic core.

These locational characteristics, which prior to 1948 had been of importance for all of the Arab settlement sectors including those which suddenly found themselves on the Jordanian side of the boundary and cut off from their former sources of employment, account for higher levels of employment within the Arab-Palestinian communities within Israel. For their part, not only were the Palestinian settlements in the West Bank now cut off from their former sources of employment, but they now found themselves located at both the geographic and political periphery of Jordan, the economic core lying far to the east in Amman. These Palestinian communities became caught up in a cycle of double-peripherality, resulting in a substantial out-migration of residents, many of whom found employment in the oil-rich economies of the Gulf states.

Brawer notes the dimensions of outmigration of working age men from the Palestinian villages located within the five kilometre strip to the east of the 'green line'. This was due both to the lack of economic opportunities as a result of the closed boundary, as well as the violent incidents and retaliations that occurred across the boundary following 1948.

## Figure 4: *The 'Little Triangle' Region*




The 'green line' boundary was transformed into a line of heightened tension during its' nineteen years of existence. This was particularly the case during the period immediately following the imposition of the boundary in 1949 and through until 1956. According to Morris (1993), some 10-15,000 cases of 'infiltration' over the boundary were reported for each year until 1952, with the number falling to 4-5,000 by the mid-1950's. In the earliest stage, this high rate of infiltration is attributed both to military incursions as well as to refugees returning to retrieve their abandoned crops and attempting to cultivate some of their lands. The Israeli military implemented severe policies for dealing with this infiltration, resulting in the establishment of a special Border Guards in 1953. Government policy aimed at clearing Arab lands in close

**Figure 5:** ***Priority Regions of Jewish Settlement, 1948-1951***




proximity to the boundary, coupled with the establishment of Jewish settlements in empty boundary zones also helped to reduce the level of trans-boundary movement. By the end of 1949, 117 new settlements had been founded to fill the territorial vacuum created by the Palestinian refugee outflow, many of them in close proximity to the new borders and in the areas originally awarded to the Arab state under the United Nations Partition Proposal and which were now part of the State of Israel (Figure 5) (Reichmann, 1990). Of the five strategic regions of settlement activity noted by Reichmann, three of them - in the Jezreel Valley, the coastal plain and the Jerusalem Corridor - were intended to *"ensure both latitudinal and longitudinal territorial continuity"* in the Partition Proposal areas which were now inside Israel (Reichmann, 1990: 327-330).

The concept by which the founding of settlements contributed to the security of the boundary continued through the 1950's. The Lachish settlement region part of which was in close proximity to the southern section of the 'green line' was intended to seal the boundary in this area. In addition, border areas were mined, barbed wire fences constructed, while new settlements had brightly lit perimeter roads, all of which were aimed at reducing the rate of cross-boundary infiltration. However, the infiltration which did continue was less socially or economically motivated and became largely associated with terrorist and intelligence activities within Israel. This, in turn, led to Israeli retaliation and raids across the boundary. Morris (1990) documents 228 border incidents (including the border with Gaza) between 1948-1956, culminating in the notorious retaliatory raid into Kefar Kassem, a Palestinian border village, in 1956. This resulted in the deaths of 47 villagers, causing reverberations in both Israel and throughout the Arab world. During the following ten years, up until the Six Day War in 1967, border incidents were few and far between.

## 4. The Six Day War: Opening a Sealed Boundary

Following the Six Day War of June 1967, Israel occupied the whole of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories. From having been a sealed boundary, the 'green line' was transformed into an internal administrative boundary. A new boundary was created along the Jordan River, later becoming the focus for Israeli settlement activity in an attempt to create a 'defensible' line of military and civilian encampments (Allon, 1976; Newman, 1989). Under the policy of the then Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, a policy of 'open bridges' between the occupied West Bank and the state of Jordan was put into effect for the Palestinian population. Not only did this allow movement of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan by way of two bridges over the Jordan River - Allenby and Damia - but, more importantly, also facilitated the movement of agricultural produce from the West Bank into Jordan and from there to the rest of the Arab world. In this way, the cheaper producer costs in the agricultural sector of the West Bank were prevented from crossing the 'green line' and undercutting the highly protected Israeli agricultural economy.

This was the first of many paradoxes regarding Israeli policy concerning the 'green line' over the subsequent twenty-five years. On the one hand, Israel aspired to the 'opening' of the boundary, while at the same time hindering movement of both goods and people across this line. Thus, despite the open boundaries, Israel was able to maintain its' artificially highly priced economy and avoid the sort of competition which would have resulted from truly open boundaries and free trans-boundary movement of goods. This resulted in a true geographic paradox: a militarily 'closed' boundary with Jordan was 'opened' for economic transactions as a means of 'closing' an 'open' boundary (the post-1967 'green line') to these same goods!

While limits were put on the movement of goods originating in the West Bank coming into Israel, the same was not true for the movement of Israeli goods into the West Bank. In many cases, Israeli producers were able to off-load surplus goods in the West Bank and Gaza. Many Palestinian critics of Israeli policy have argued that the military administration were loathe to issue permits which would allow the West Bank inhabitants to set up their own local factories or any other form of manufacturing base which would compete with the offloading of goods from the Israeli workplace. This resulted in a form of neo-colonial duality, by which the West Bank economy was conditioned to meeting the surplus needs of the Israeli economy.

The opening of the boundary also resulted in a partial reorientation of economic flows and transportation links. Between 1948-1967, movement had taken place separately within each territorial entity: north-south in Israel, and east-west within the West Bank from the green line boundary into Jordan. The opening of the boundary brought about a renewed east-west movement between the metropolitan core along the Mediterranean coast and through to the Jordan River. Movement took place in both directions, Palestinian labour into the Israeli marketplace, as contrasted with Israeli movement into the West Bank. This latter consisted of the founding of settlements, construction of major infrastructure and the deployment of military installations, resulting in the *de facto* annexation of the region.

Trans-frontier commuting of Palestinians seeking employment within the Israeli metropolitan core became an important component of the West Bank economy. During the 1980's, it was estimated that approximately 120,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip worked within Israel (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1987; Portugali, 1989). While the official figures of registered labour were lower, surveys estimated that the real number was much higher. Formal registration of workers required their employers to pay minimum social benefits, thus raising the cost of labour. Throughout the late 1970's and 1980's it was common to see the informal development of labour markets at select crossroad locations in or around the vicinity of the old 'green line' boundary each morning. Israeli employers in search of temporary labour, usually on construction sites or in the cleaning industry, would arrive at these *ad hoc* labour markets to seek labour on a daily, or at the best weekly, basis. While Israeli law insisted that Palestinians returned to their homes within the Occupied Territories at the end of the work day, it became common practice for many of the workers to remain within Israel during the week, returning to their homes only for the weekend.

The actual number of Palestinian workers crossing the line has fluctuated over time. Fluctuations have been a function of the changing political situation rather than one of demand and supply within the Israeli market place. In the aftermath of the *Intifada*, the Israeli authorities adopted more stringent codes concerning the free trans-boundary movement of labour. Passes and identity cards were issued to workers, and these had to be shown at road blocks and check posts which were often set up along, or in the vicinity of, the 'green line'. The uncertainty which accompanied the frequent closure of the Occupied Territories coupled with the occasional withdrawal of labour as an act of protest, led many Israeli employers to petition the government to allow them to import cheap labour from elsewhere - this despite the relatively high unemployment both in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Temporary licences for the import of labour became increasingly common during the early 1990's, resulting in a downward turn in the numbers of Palestinian crossing daily into Israel to find work.

The paradoxical outcome of the opening of the Israeli marketplace for Palestinian employment was that it encouraged young, able bodied, Palestinians to remain within the West Bank rather than leave to seek employment elsewhere. Prior to 1967, there had been significant outflow of Palestinians within the working age groups, especially to the Gulf countries, in an attempt to better their employment opportunities. Jordan had not invested significantly in the West Bank economy, while there were no immediate employment alternatives within the close geographic proximity. Despite the asymmetrical nature of the economic relations between Israel and the Occupied Territories, employment within Israel did enable many Palestinians to remain within their villages and towns and thus contribute significantly to the rapid rate of demographic growth within the Palestinian population - a factor which worked against Israel's continued retention of these territories.

The 'opening' of the boundary also underwent cartographic institutionalisation. The last official Israeli map on which the 'green line' appears as a political boundary is the settlement map which was produced to show the results of the 1961 Census of Population. Since 1967, Israeli governments have attempted to formally 'erase' the green line boundary. The boundary has not appeared on official maps issued by the Surveyors Department, nor does it appear in school text books, other than to depict a 'historical' situation which had existed for a relatively short time period (Newman, 1991; Bar Gal, 1991 and 1993; Lustick, 1994)

This policy of territorial socialisation was implemented as a means of creating mental images of homeland maps which focus on the area of mandate Palestine as a territorial whole. There is a certain amount of symmetry between Israeli and Palestinian processes of cartographic and territorial socialisation. Palestinian homeland images are also replete with maps of the whole of Palestine, lacking any boundary of partition. This is indicative of the fact that the true territorial conflict is over the **whole** of the area between the Mediterranean and the River Jordan. Partition, along the 'green line' or elsewhere is only a pragmatic solution to the present conflict situation. It does not, nor can it ever, solve the innermost aspirations o f each national group to rule over all of the territory within a demographic framework which has been ethnically cleansed of the other group (Falah and Newman, 1995).

Despite the maintenance of the 'green line' as an administrative boundary (see below), the actual course of the line underwent some minor changes in the post-1967 period. Prior to the

**Figure 6:** ***'No-man's Land' and the Jerusalem - Tel Aviv Highway***



Six Day war, there had been a number of micro-territories which had constituted 'no-mans' land between the Israeli and Jordanian front lines. The most significant of these was located in the centre of the country, in close vicinity to Israel's international airport (Figure 6). These 'neutral' micro-territories were incorporated into Israel in the aftermath of 1967 and have been considered as part of the sovereign territory of the State. Immediately following the 1967 War, the Jewish National Fund undertook planting projects in these 'no-man's' land areas so that the Arab population would be prevented from expanding on to these areas (Cohen, 1994). Near Latrun, the planting of 'Canada Park' stretched from the 'no-man's' zone over the boundary into the West Bank. The major highway which was constructed to provide a more efficient link between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv during the 1970's, traverses through part of this 'no-man's' territory. This amendment of the boundary was, in effect, a *de facto* annexation which was not accompanied by any formal government decision (as had been the case with the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and the extension of civilian law in the Golan Heights in 1982 (Yishai, 1985).

## 5. Open or Closed Boundary?: The 'Green Line' between 1967-1994

Despite the formal removal of the 'green line' boundary over twenty-eight years ago, this line remains strongly imprinted on the mental maps held by both Israelis and Palestinians. For the former, the image of the West Bank as a separate territory has left its mark despite the strong processes of political socialisation discussed above. This has been due to some of the paradoxical outcomes of Israeli government policy, which have resulted in the opposite outcome to that desired by its policy-makers. For the Palestinians, the 'green line' represents the realistic boundary of the maximal territorial extent of any future Palestinian autonomous or sovereign territory. It is a territory which has existed in the past and therefore has a concrete image for the future.

### 5.1 The 'Green Line' as an administrative boundary

Paradoxically, no single element of Israeli policy has done more for the 'green line' than the policy of non-annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Unlike the cases of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, no Israeli government - even the right-wing and irredentist Likud governments of the 1980's - has attempted to formally extend Israeli civilian control (a euphemism for annexation) to these territories. This was not due to any lack of desire on their part but rather to the realistic assessment of the demographic problem which would result out of annexation.

In order to preserve the political character of a democratic society, Israel would feel obligated to grant equal civilian rights to all the residents of any annexed territories, as indeed had been the case with the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem and the Druze inhabitants of the Golan Heights. Given the relative population balances between Jews and Arabs throughout Israel and the Occupied Territories, coupled with the much faster growth rates of the Palestinian populations, it was feared that Israel would soon lose its basic *raison d'etre* - a Jewish majority - were full civilian rights to be granted to the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

**Figure 7:** ***Administrative Boundaries of the Regional Councils***




The alternatives - second class citizenship without full voting rights, possibly akin to institutionalised discrimination, or the adoption of the extremist 'expulsion' and 'transfer' policies of the Kach and Moledet political parties, were clearly unacceptable to the majority of the Israeli populace. Faced with this no-win situation, Israeli governments found it preferable to leave best alone and not to formally annex these regions.

The West Bank and Gaza Strip thus remained separate administrative territories. Under annexation, Israel would have provided itself with the internal justification for the re-demarcation of boundaries, not taking into account the existing administrative divisions. But

given a policy of non-annexation and a *de facto* recognition of the separate legal status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as occupied territories, the 'green line' boundary remained an important administrative barrier for both Israeli and Palestinian populations. In effect, the continued publication of administrative maps by the Israeli Government meant that there are in fact official maps which show the 'green line', providing one knows how to follow the course of the neighbouring administrative units (Figure 7). The boundaries of the local government units, especially the rural Regional Councils, correspond precisely with the course of the 'green line' (Benveniste, 1984; Benveniste and Khayat, 1988; Newman and Orgad, 1991). But because of its unique political status, the 'green line' was more than simply an administrative boundary beyond which the basic rules and regulations are the same. The status of the West Bank as Occupied Territories means that different laws, rules and regulations apply to residents of this region, as compared to those which apply within the territory of pre-1967 Israel. Arab citizens of Israel are subject to Israeli law, while their West Bank Palestinian counterparts are subject to a combination of Jordanian civilian law and Israeli military law (Benveniste, 1989).

By this logic, Israeli settlers in the West Bank should also be subject to different laws than those applying to their counterparts within Israel. On paper, they too are subject to the authority of the Israeli Military Administration. However, in practice this is translated *de facto* into similar administrative practices as those within Israel, only that they are given the final authority of the Military Administration. Local government authorities have been set up in the West Bank to cater to the municipal needs of the Israeli settlements. Rural authorities cover large territorial tracts encompassing many small villages and settlements in an attempt to reach regional thresholds which will enable a cost-effective system of public service provision. All Israeli settlements in the West Bank - regardless of their location relative to major metropolitan centres within Israel proper - have to be affiliated to these Councils. In functional terms, it would have made much more sense for some of those communities to be affiliated to existing Regional Councils within Israel, i.e. across the 'green line'. Their affiliation to local government authorities, whose administrative centre is located at great distances to the east and in the interior of the West Bank, does not make for efficient provision of municipal services. As such, the impact of the 'non-existent' boundary has important functional implications for Israeli citizens. But while the 'green line' is no more than an administrative boundary for Israelis, for Palestinians it is the line which separates sovereign Israel from occupied West Bank, and the respective differences in laws in each of these territories.

## 5.2 Israeli settlement policy

Israeli settlement policy beyond the 'green line' has demonstrated, in retrospect, the profound impact of a sealed boundary in influencing the formation and development of human landscapes. Prior to 1967, the existence of the boundary was responsible for the spatial channelling of Israel's metropolitan growth. The metropolitan sprawl grew along the coastal plain to the north and south, while to the east it was limited by the existence of the political boundary (Figure 8a). Had there not been a boundary at this location, it is highly probable that

**Figure 8:** ***The Impact of the 'Green Line' on Israeli Settlement Patterns***




**Figure 8b:** ***Post-1967-The line of Economic Discontinuity in the Urban land Market***



the metropolitan sprawl would also have moved in an easterly direction, into those areas which later became the focus for much of Israel's West Bank settlement policy.

In the post-1967 period, this boundary restriction on eastwards growth was partially removed. Most of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank have been founded as dormitory communities for the Israeli metropolitan centres, in relatively close proximity to the 'green line' boundary. This has been termed elsewhere as 'suburban colonisation' in the sense that many of the settlers were persuaded to relocate in the West Bank as a result of the proximity of these locations to the Israeli urban centres (Newman, 1991a and 1992; Efrat, 1994; Rowley, 1990). But the administrative nature of the boundary continued to play an important role in determining the nature of this settlement activity. Reichmann (1986) has shown that the economic benefits offered to settlers beyond the 'green line', but only a short distance from their previous residence within the metropolitan hinterland, transformed the 'non-existent' 'green line' into a boundary *of "economic discontinuity"*, by which the normal distance decay factor of the land market within suburban and exurban areas underwent a sharp drop rather than a gradual decline (Figure 8b). Thus, relocation just beyond the 'green line' was, for many of the settlers, an optimal point of residence, maximising both the distance/proximity to workplace and the low price factor of the house. In this region, settlers were able to relocate to the geographic centre of the country, but at the same time receive government benefits and cheap land prices which are normally reserved for residents of peripheral regions as part of a policy aimed at population redistribution away from the core into the periphery.

Settlement planning in Israel has undergone many changes during the past twenty years. There has been a noticeable shift from agricultural based cooperative and collective villages to rurban and dormitory communities located within the metropolitan hinterlands of Israel's major cities. But even these rurban communities have largely been founded and established as public sector projects whose construction and infrastructure have been provided by central government (Newman and Applebaum, 1989). Since the early 1980's, new communities have been founded based on private sector and private household investment. A study of these 'private sector' communities shows that, unlike the government financed settlements, they were mostly located in close proximity to the 'green line', the majority within the pre-1967 boundaries (Figure 9). Where these communities have been founded within the West Bank, they closely hug the old 'green line' boundary. Clearly, settlers who have decided to invest large sums of their own private capital are less prepared to take the risk of future evacuation in the wake of a peace settlement which may require territorial withdrawal on the part of Israel. Their location in such close proximity to the 'green line' holds hope that they will not have to be relocated in the wake of boundary redemarcation.

In June 1991, the Likud government announced the implementation of a new settlement project, known as the *cochavim* (literal translation: 'stars') plan (Figure 10). This project was to consist of the founding of seven major new Israeli communities in close proximity to the 'green line' boundary and, in some cases, actually crossing the boundary itself. One of the stated objectives of the government at the time was the obliteration of any remnant of a boundary (Adiv and Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 1993; Newman, 1994a). The implementation of this plan was also seen as a way of establishing wedges of Jewish settlement along the old boundary, especially in areas where the spontaneous development of Palestinian settlements on each side of the boundary would have eventually coalesced into each other. In many ways, this is no different to government policy along the 'green line' in the post-1948 period (Reichmann, 1990; Falah, 1991; Morris, 1990). From an Israeli perspective, the unrestricted growth of the Arab-Palestinian settlements would have brought about the physical linking of West Bank

**Figure 9:** ***Boundary Locations of the 'Private Sector' Settlements***




Palestinian towns with those of Israeli Arabs. It would also have resulted in the obliteration of the 'green line' but in such a way as to favour the Palestinian claim for extra territory within the pre-1967 state. Thus, the question of 'whose' settlements would result in the disappearance of the old boundary played a critical role in the promotion of Israeli settlement on the one hand, while preventing Palestinian settlement coalescence on the other.

## Figure 10: *The 'Star' Settlement Plan and Highway 6*




The announcement of the new settlement plan coincided with the influx of Russian immigrants, as a result of which the government undertook mass construction activity throughout the country. The 'star' settlement policy was presented as being necessary for immigrant absorption, and not just for the politico-territorial purposes associated with boundary change. The 'star' plan was never actually implemented. The rapid construction within existing urban communities coupled with a sudden downturn in the numbers of Russian immigrants made the immediacy of such a plan unnecessary. Before the plan could be implemented, the 1992 general elections brought the Labour party back to power. Under the new Rabin administration, settlement and infrastructural resources were redirected out of the West Bank and related activities, and into Israel's peripheral Galilee and Negev regions.

The 'star' settlement plan was also accompanied with the decision to prepare plans for a new cross-country highway from north to south, known as Highway 6 (Figure 10). This highway would run parallel to the 'green line', but never actually cross into the West Bank. This route was, and remains, a necessity for Israel's overcrowded roads, especially in the metropolitan centre of the country. At the time, the political interpretation of this plan was contradictory. The decision to locate the route entirely within Israel's sovereign territory, although in some cases only a few kilometres from the 'green line' would appear to have strengthened, rather than weakened, the concept of the boundary.

An alternative view was that the government would not construct such an important highway in close proximity to a future political boundary, but only in the 'centre' of the country. The logic of this argument was that the construction of the highway signalled an intent not to return to the pre-1967 boundaries. Following the change in government in 1992, and the decision to reallocate public sector resources away from the West Bank and Gaza and into infrastructural projects within Israel, work began on the detailed planning of those parts of Highway 6 considered as most important for relieving the traffic congestion of central Israel. These sections coincided with those areas in closest proximity to the 'green line'.

### 5.3 The *Intifada* - creating a boundary of fear

If the 'green line' was ever in danger of disappearing, then the events of the *Intifada* served to bring this boundary back into focus. While violent incidents were diffused beyond the boundary and into Israel proper, the core areas of the *Intifada* were in the Occupied Territories. To a certain extent, much of the social and institutional infrastructure for an autonomous, if not independent, region was prepared during the main Intifada years, from 1987-1992 (McColl and Newman, 1992). For both Israelis and Palestinians, the territorial limits of the West Bank and Gaza Strip became much more tangible in terms of a line which they would not (Israelis) or could not (Palestinians) cross. Even prior to 1987, the 'fear' attributes associated with the boundary had refocussed. Incidents of hand grenades and stone throwing at Israeli cars had resulted in the government decision to remove some olive groves in the vicinity of the 'green line', especially where they provided cover for assailants. Notable cases took place in the Qalqiliyah region and also along the rail line in Jerusalem where it passes below the Palestinian village of Beit Jalla (Cohen, 1994).

For the Israelis, the *Intifada* brought about an increased geography of fear in terms of the areas to which they were prepared to travel freely. Prior to the onset of the *Intifada*, it was common for most Israelis to travel through the West Bank, as a means of shortening their journey from the north or south of the country respectively to the Jerusalem area. Many Israelis also travelled to the shops and markets of the West Bank towns - especially Qalqiliyah and East Jerusalem - in order to find bargains or to carry out shopping on the Jewish Sabbath (Saturday) when all shops are closed within the Israeli-Jewish sector. As travel became increasingly fraught with danger, Israelis who had no business in the West Bank ceased travelling there altogether.

The invisible line beyond which it was dangerous to travel underwent a process of cognitive territorial demarcation. The line did not have to be drawn on a map for travellers to know where it was safe to proceed. Travellers would opt for longer routes in order to circumvent the West Bank, rather than face the dangers of travelling through a hostile - perceived as separate -

region. Figure 11 demonstrates this with respect to a large Israeli suburban community, Metar, located just south of the 'green line'. Until 1978, it was common practice for the residents of this community, as for residents of the Beer Sheba region altogether, to travel to Jerusalem in a direct south-north route passing through the West Bank and the towns of Hebron and Bethlehem. Following the onset of the *Intifada*, residents preferred to opt for the longer route (a distance of 120km instead of 70km) to Jerusalem, which completely bypassed the West Bank (Figure 11). The taxi company which plied this route also ceased to operate, while most travellers by public transport preferred to frequent the buses which did not go through the West Bank, even if this took slightly longer and was more costly.

While Israelis chose to change their travel patterns, for many of the Palestinians the changes were forced upon them. It had already been customary for the Occupied Territories to be 'closed' to Palestinian travel on major occasions, such as the Jewish Festivals, Independence Day and so on. Following incidents of violence and terrorism, especially within the pre-1967 Israel boundaries, the Palestinians were often forced to remain within the West Bank and Gaza as a means of collective economic punishment. The line beyond which the local population could not cross was the old boundary, thus enforcing the concept of territorial separation

In an attempt to bolster security, Palestinians eligible to work within Israel were issued with identity cards and these were often checked at points along the road leading from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel, at - or close to - the point of the old boundary. Even prior to the

**Figure 11:** ***The Geography of Fear: By-passing the 'Green Line'***



implementation of the Gaza autonomy in 1994, the Erez Crossing Point located at the north of the Gaza Strip resembled as tightly a controlled border crossing as one would see between most countries.

Following the implementation of autonomy, the Gaza and West Bank crossings have become even more difficult to cross for Palestinians. Acts of terrorism inside Israel, most notably the bus bombing in Tel Aviv in October 1994 and double suicide bombing at Bet Lid in January 1995, resulted in the temporary sealing of the boundaries and the replacement of some Palestinian workers in Israel with imported foreign labour from elsewhere. Herein lies another paradox of Israeli policy - the hard-line right-wing governments, who oppose any notion of territorial concessions, argued for more stringent punishments and curfews following incidents of violence. The implementation of these hard-line policies only served to emphasise the territorial separation rather than promote the notion of a single unified territory under Israeli control. For the Palestinians, it is equally paradoxical. They have protested to Israel about the closing of the boundary and the resultant lack of economic subsistence. Yet it is the Palestinians who most desire the recognition of a separate political and territorial entity.

## 5.4 Popular images of the boundary

The most commonly formed spatial and territorial images, especially inasmuch as they affect people who are not inhabitants of the region, are derived from the media (Newman, 1991b). Since 1967, the world press and telecommunications have continued to show Israel and the West Bank as separated by a boundary. Maps of the region which do not emanate from Israel itself also depict the West Bank and Gaza as separate territorial units. This acts as a counter process of political and cartographic socialisation to those discussed above which focussed on a single, undivided territory.

In the preparation of this study, a survey concerning the 'green line' boundary was sent out on a number of e-mail lists to which this author subscribed. Readers were asked to respond as to whether they visualised the map of Israel with or without a separate West Bank territory and, if affirmative, to what they attributed this image of territorial separation. The numerous responses are best summed up by the following statement made by one of the writers who testifies to the effect that he has never visited Israel or the West Bank:

> *"Whether it is listed formally as a separate territory or not makes no difference if people continue referring to it that way. I see very little difference between calling a portion of Israel the West Bank and calling a portion of the United States New England. You never see it referred to as New England on any maps, but everyone knows what you are talking about".*

These contrasting images are further depicted in an official postage stamp issued by the Israeli government (Figure 12). A blown up version of this stamp displays two maps of Israel. The main part of the stamp shows a map of Greater Israel, including the Occupied Territories with no boundary separating the two. At the bottom of the official stamp is another, smaller, map which clearly shows the territorial separation between Israel and the West Bank. Whether this is case of sloppy cartography on the part of the graphic designer, or a case of governmental carto-schizophrenia, is unclear. What is clear however are the two, competing, versions of the

**Figure 12:** ***Israeli Postage Stamp Depicting the Contradictory Nature of Boundaries***




map of Israel - one with a boundary, one without - which many Israelis carry around with them in their heads.[2]

The political caricatures which are published in the daily newspapers often make use of maps, real and imagined, as commentary on current events. As can be seen in Figure 13, these caricatures often portray the West Bank and Gaza Strip separated from Israel by a boundary. The first set of caricatures show the 'green line' boundary as one which separates Israel from some form of 'frontier' territory within which emanates violent activity. The second set of caricatures shows the contradictory nature of the map, through which violent activities are diffused beyond the 'green line' boundary into Israel itself. The uncertainty as to where the boundary is, and what impact it has on preventing the diffusion of violence into Israel proper raises the image of a line which 'should' be in place but which can be breached. These images are very powerful in the formation of the mental maps carried around by each and every member of the population. Whether they personally believe in the need for eventual territorial compromise or not, the presence of a boundary and hence separate territorial entities is part of that map image.

[2] A note of caution to the reader: the letters BIG which appear at the bottom of the stamp do not refer to a "big Israel", nor are they the initials of Israel's founder Prime Minister, Ben Gurion. The stamp was issued as part of the national effort to purchase Israel Government Bonds - hence the letters BIG.

## Figure 13: *Caricature Images of the 'Green Line'*




Sergeant X has been sentenced to jail for refusing to serve in the territories.







From Shilo, Ma'ariv

## 6. The 'Green Line' and the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process

The formation of an autonomous or independent Palestinian territory in the wake of the gradual implementation of the Israel-Palestinian peace process will refocus attention on an eventual return to the 'green line' boundary. While this may not have been an ideal line of demarcation for either Israel or the West Bank, it is generally perceived as constituting a political boundary between the two entities, if only because it existed for a short period of time.

Yet a return to the 'green line' is problematic for both sides, not least as a result of the many landscape changes which have taken place along the course of the line during the past twenty-five years. Heller (1983) notes that while the intrinsic rationale for the 'green line', based on geo-ethnic, topographic and settlement factors, may be weak, there is no other *"obvious"* place for a future boundary simply because of its existence. As such, a return to, or around, the 'green line' is almost a *"pre-determined"* outcome (Heller, 1983). The DOP, by recognising the West Bank as constituting the territorial entity over which final negotiations will take place, has also - perhaps inadvertently - served notice that the 'green line' is a default boundary for future discussions (Falah and Newman, 1995; Brawer, 1994).

Past proposals for redemarcation of the boundary have focussed on the issues of security and/or geo-ethnicity. Recent studies (Barzilai and Peleg, 1994; Falah and Newman, 1995) have emphasised the need to focus on the ethnic dimension as being as, if not more, important than the territorial and strategic considerations in the demarcation process. Barzilai and Peleg (1994: 69) argue that *"the overall tendancy among Israeli political elites is to support greater separation between Israelis and Palestinians"* and thisnotion has been strengthened in the light of recent events (see postscript) The past proposals have recommended some form of Israeli annexation of parts of the western margins of the West Bank region. In addition to its main proposals concerning Israeli control of the Jordan valley and the creation of an autonomous Palestinian territory linked to Jordan, the Allon Plan included proposals for the annexation of parts of the western margins of the West Bank into Israel (Figure 14a) (Allon, 1976; Harris, 1978). Heller (1983) has suggested the inclusion of two areas within Israel, one in the Latrun salient and the other in the Beisan Valley to the north (Figure 14b). The former would allow Israel to formally retain control of the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway and would broaden the Jerusalem corridor, while the latter would facilitate Israeli security concerns in the north of the Jordan Valley (Heller, 1983: 141). At the same time, there would be a minor transfer of territory in the north of the Jerusalem region to the Palestinian state. Cohen (1986) has suggested the transfer of a number of micro-territories into Israel, both along the green line and the Jordan Valley (Figure 14c), similar in some respects to the Allon Plan. Newman (1992) has proposed micro-territorial exchange in four areas around the 'green line' based on geo-ethnic considerations and a desire to reach as high a degree of ethno-territorial homogeneity as is possible. A recent proposal by the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies suggests moving the boundary to the east so as to include many Israeli settlements as well as other territorial adjustments in the northeast and northwest of the region (Alpher, 1994) (Figure 14d). In examining the possibilities for limited boundary re-demarcation in greater detail, four key factors are taken into account in the following discussion:

## Figure 14: *Previous Proposals for 'Green Line' Redemarcation*



## 6.1 Strategic and security considerations

For Israel, a return to the 'green line' is perceived by many as constituting a strategic threat. This argument is based on a combination of three factors: the location of Israel's major population centres along the narrow coastal plain around the Tel Aviv metropolitan region; the proximity of the 'green line' boundary to many of these population centres; and the rising landscape elevations as one moves from the coastal plain in an easterly direction into the West Bank (Figure 15).

Prior to 1967, Israelis lived in fear of the threat that could emerge from the West Bank, should the Jordanian army decide to attack Israel in the centre of the country. Along the narrow coastal plain north of Tel Aviv, the fifteen kilometres between the 'green line' and the Mediterranean Sea could have been traversed within hours, thus effectively cutting the country into two. Since 1967, the metropolitan area of central Israel has expanded to cover almost the entire area between Tel Aviv in the south, Netanya some 30 kms north and Kefar Saba virtually touching the Green Line. Thus, the perceived strategic threat of giving back the upland locations to any foreign army is even greater than that which existed prior to 1967.

This argument was central to the security doctrine of the 1970's and the early 1980's, focussing on issues of terrain/topography, the use of the area as an early warning zone and as a land buffer against the infiltration of terrorism into Israel itself (Shalev, 1982; Heller, 1983; Horowitz, 1975). To a great extent, the strategic significance of the 'green line' in this small micro area belittles the argument that has recently been expounded as part of the regional and global security debate, namely that in an era of ballistic missiles land boundaries lose their significance. While the role of land boundaries has clearly undergone a change, it still takes a determined land invasion of a country to completely subdue it, even if ballistic missiles have prepared the path through mass destruction of cities and settlements. Nowhere is the significance of land boundaries clearer than in Israel where at least three of its boundaries - those with Syria and Lebanon as well as the 'green line' - retain major strategic and security significance.

**Figure 15:** ***Cross-section of Israel and the West Bank - Stategic Elevations***



## Figure 16: *Perceived Strategic Threats: Maps Used in Election Campaigns*




Maps depicting the strategic implications of a return to the 'green line' boundary have been used very effectively both by the Israeli Foreign Ministry in their dissemination of information, as well as by the right-wing parties in the election campaigns (Figure 16). Residents of the Tel Aviv metropolitan region are often taken on trips into the western foothills of the West Bank, some 20-30 kilometres distant. From an Israeli settlement located on the top of a hill, they are shown the view into metropolitan Israel, often into their own neighbourhoods. As such, they receive a dual message: Israeli settlements occupy sites of strategic importance for Israel's security, and that a return of these sites to Palestinian or Jordanian control physically threatens Israel's existence. These are very powerful pre-election messages, not least because the scale of the maps is accurate and does not require distortion for the point to get across.

The strategic significance of the 'green line' cannot be discussed in a geographical vacuum. Account also has to be taken of two additional factors. If a West Bank Palestinian state were to be a demilitarised zone and/or the boundary along the Jordan River were to remain under Israeli or multi-national control, then the 'green line' would not constitute such a perceived

Israeli or multi-national control, then the 'green line' would not constitute such a perceived strategic threat. Moreover, the nature of economic relations between any two future political entities would also be of crucial importance. An open boundary, over which economic links are maintained, would be perceived as posing a far smaller strategic threat than would a sealed boundary, beyond which is located the 'enemy'. As such, the strategic argument, while impressive in terms of geographic scale and proximity, does not necessarily represent the political scenario which will come about as a result of the formation of a separate Palestinian state.

Recent events have highlighted another aspect of the strategic/security argument. The desire to implement a policy of 'separation' between Israelis and Palestinians has resulted from the problems encountered by the importation of violence and terrorism from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel. However, the sealing of the boundary has significant economic implications for both Palestinians and Israelis (see below). It is also questionable as to the extent to which the 'green line' boundary could indeed be hermetically sealed to prevent the 'infiltration' of more radical groups intent on performing acts of violence aimed at destroying the peace process. Israel finds itself in a dilemma with respect to this situation. As of 1995, the official Israeli negotiating stance did not, as yet, recognise the inevitability of the establishment of a separate Palestinian state over and beyond the granting of autonomy (Falah and Newman, 1995). Physically separating the Gaza Strip and West Bank from Israel in order to meet short-term security objectives, threatened to weaken the long-term negotiating objective. In practical terms, physical separation, increased 'border' checks and patrols only served to strengthen the concept of a separate Palestinian state.

## 6.2 Location of the water aquifer

The control and exploitation of the scarce water supplies within this region is a critical and sensitive issue (Kahan, 1987; Elmusa, 1993; Kliot, 1994; Lonnergan and Brooks, 1994). Even given zero population growth, the demand for domestic water consumption is growing rapidly. Taking into account the realities of population growth - in Israel through mass immigration, amongst the Palestinians as a result of high natural growth rates - the existing water supplies are insufficient. These problems are exacerbated when taking account of the non-cooperative nature of water resource management by all of the countries in the region. The Peace Agreement with Jordan, including proposals for joint management of some water resources, is a first and healthy indication that this critical issue can be partially resolved.

Underlying much of central Israel and the West Bank are three underground water aquifers, two of which are common to both regions - the mountain aquifer and the Shchem-Gilboa aquifer (Figure 17a). This provides much of the essential water resources for both Israeli and Palestinian populations. According to Kliot (1994), between a quarter to a third of Israel's annual water supplies originate from the West Bank aquifers. The western, or Yarqon-Taninim aquifer, has always flowed naturally towards the Mediterranean Sea, part of it feeding the Yarqon river in the vicinity of Tel Aviv-Jaffa on the coastal plain. The northeastern basin of the mountain aquifer also drains naturally into Israeli territory and is mostly utilised by Israeli farmers. The eastern basin drains naturally into the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea. Prior to 1967, this water was used by Palestinian farmers, while a part of it went unutilised. Since 1967, Israel has dug wells into these sources, much of which have subsequently been used to supply fresh water to Israeli settlements (Assaf et al, 1993: 26). In years of drought,

## Figure 17: *Factors Influencing the Redemarcation of the 'Green Line'*



the coastal (western) aquifer level often decreases to critical levels - its proximity to the coast and the possibility of an infiltration by saline water makes this aquifer particularly vulnerable. In years of high rainfall, the Israeli authorities pump water out of the Sea of Galilee in the north, through the national water carrier, in an attempt to replenish the dwindling level of the aquifer.

Despite the fact that formulas for water sharing between separate Israeli and Palestinian entitie s have been worked out (Kally, 1992; Elmusa, 1993; Kliot, 1994), neither Israel or the Palestinians are likely to agree to relinquish control over this critical resource. It has been argued that Israel has exploited the water resources of the West Bank for its own settlements, while refusing to allow the Palestinian community to dig new wells and lay pipelines for their own burgeoning settlements (Dillman, 1989; Nijim, 1990). Israel responds that a water aquifer has no boundary separating the Israeli part from that of the West Bank, and that the aquifer constitutes an important resource for its own population. The major portion of the recharge area of the western mountain aquifer is in the occupied territories (Assaf et al, 1993). At the same time, a major part of the storage area of the aquifer lies to the west of the green line inside Israel. The same situation is to be found in the northeastern aquifer, but not the eastern aquifer in which both recharge and storage areas are located entirely within the West Bank. Elmusa (1993) argues that Israel's insistence to a water allocation based on prior use irreconcilably conflicts with the Palestinian claim based on the natural attributes of the water sources. Whatever the outcome, the physical control of a particular area near the boundary is less important to each side than is the ability to reach an equitable solution concerning the amount of water to be used by the protagonists.

## 6.3 Israeli settlements

Of the approximate 110,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza (excluding East Jerusalem), it is estimated that some 65% of them reside within relative close proximity to the old 'green line' boundary (Figure 17b). These areas constitute the suburban hinterland of both the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem metropolitan regions, to which many of the settlers were drawn by the substantial economic benefits offered to them by the right-wing governments during the first half of the 1980's (Newman, 1991a, 1992; Portugali, 1991). For its part, Israel would be able to partially avoid the sensitive issue of settlement evacuation were it to redemarcate the boundary to include this section of the settler population. Herein lies the geographic paradox. The remaining 30-35% of the settlers, scattered throughout the interior uplands of the West Bank, contain a far larger proportion of the radical activists. Unlike the majority of the settlers located within the 'suburban' belt, these latter groups are more likely to resist any government attempts to forcibly evacuate them in the wake of a full peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Many of the settlements located close to the former boundary are unlikely to offer such resistance and would probably evacuate of their own free will given adequate economic compensation. Yet it is precisely this region in which boundary redemarcation could take place.

Other micro-regions of Israeli settlement are also in close proximity to the 'green line'. These areas include Gush Etzion to the south of Bethlehem, the only area of pre-1948 Jewish settlement in what later became the West Bank. These settlements were evacuated prior to the partition and were the first settlements to be reestablished in the West Bank following 1967.

There is general concensus within Israel that past settlement and proven Jewish land ownership within the Gush Etzion region means that this region will be included within Israel under whatever final territorial arrangement is agreed upon by the two sides. A new highway linking this area to Jerusalem, bypassing the Palestinian township of Bethlehem, is under construction, emphasising the Israeli government's determination to hold on to this micro region in the future.

In the south-west of the region are a group of Israeli settlements, located just beyond the boundary in the Yatta region not far from the main highway to the Israeli town of Arad. In the extreme north of the West Bank are a few settlements in the Jenin region, although these are located in a more densely populated Palestinian region than either the Gush Etzion or Yatta settlements. In Northern Samaria, the largest Jewish settlement, Shaqed has 115 families. In the whole area there are only 400 Israeli families, with a wide geographical spread and this micro region is a likely candidate to experience settlement evacuation under a future agreement based on territorial compromise. Finally, there is the problem of the agricultural settlements along the Jordan Valley. While the settlements in this region control a large area of land, owing to their agricultural pursuits, they form only a small minority of the overall settler population, some 2,000 people altogether. Moreover, they were founded as part of the Labour Government Allon Plan of the early 1970s and do not display a strong religious or historical attachment to the land (Harris, 1978; Newman, 1989, 1992). Should Israel insist on retaining control of the Jordan River as a border of defence, these settlement would have a role to play. Should Israel return to the 'green line' or thereabouts as a boundary of total separation, then the Jordan Valley settlements would have to be evacuated.

From both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, the settlement issue is critical. For Palestinians, it is unthinkable to allow any Israeli settlements to remain in the West Bank, assuming on their part that the whole of this region will eventually become a Palestinian state. For Israelis, a political scenario which would involve the forceful evacuation of settlements is likely to result in physical violence and even bloodshed between Israelis. The evacuation of the Yamit settlements as part of the Camp David peace accords resulted in disturbing scenes for a country who strongly value the concept of 'national unity' on foreign and security affairs. The West Bank has far stronger emotional and historical attachments for many of the settlers than did Northern Sinai and, as such, the expected opposition - even on the part of a 10-15% minority of the settlers - would be traumatic. The option of redemarcating the boundary to include approximately 65% of the settlers (Newman, 1992; Alpher, 1994) would only partially solve the problem for Israel, but would continue to be unacceptable to the Palestinians who would see their 'small' state becoming even 'smaller' (Newman and Falah, 1995).

## 6.4 Summary

The three factors display a strong geographic coincidence in the western margins of the West Bank in the region lying to the north of Jerusalem (Newman, 1994b, 1994c). This area contains the major strategic elevations, the critical areas of the water aquifer, as well as approximately 65% of the Israeli settlers. Clearly for Israel this is a critical region to hold on to. It is to be expected therefore that an Israeli proposal for redemarcation will consist of a line running from Jerusalem in a north north-westerly direction to meet the old 'green line' boundary in the Wadi Arah region and a smaller area encompassing the Gush Etzion settlements to the south of Bethlehem (Figure 17c). However, this is no more than a statement of intentions. The drawing of a straight line in this way would encompass too much of the

limited territory available for a West Bank state, while ignoring some of the micro-elements in the local landscape. Most notably, the basic geo-ethnic considerations relating to Palestinian settlement patterns are not taken into account.

## 6.5 Palestinian settlement patterns

While the factors discussed thus far make a strong case for Israeli redemarcation, account must also be taken of the changing patterns of Palestinian settlement. Spontaneous growth during the past twenty-five years has brought much of the Palestinian settlement on either side of the 'green line' in even closer proximity to each other than was previously the case. Moreover, the opening of the boundaries in 1967 has resulted in the renewed contact between West Bank Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel, through the diffusion of ideas and political awareness across the former boundary (Rouhana, 1990). Arab citizens of Israel have come to increasingly identify themselves as Palestinians and, while they would not necessarily be prepared to leave their homes and relocate to a Palestinian state in the West Bank, their future status is intricately bound up with that of the West Bank and Gaza (Dakkak, 1983; Flores, 1983).

There are two major regions of cross-boundary Palestinian settlement (Figure 17d). The first, and most important, of these is in the area of Israel known as the 'Triangle' in which the two major Arab townships of Tayibe and Tireh are to be found at only a short distance from the major Palestinian towns of Tulkarem and Qalqiliyah (see Figure 4). It is precisely this region which constitutes the critical area for Israel, noted in the preceding paragraphs. One of the stated objectives of the Likud government's 'star settlement plan' (see section 5.2) was to create Israeli settlements along the 'green line' which would form territorial wedges in between the Palestinian settlements on either side of the line, thus preventing their eventual coalescence into a single contiguous Arab residential territory.

The second region of cross-boundary Palestinian settlement is in the north of the West Bank, where the major Israeli Arab residential concentrations along the Wadi Arah route are in close proximity to the Jenin area within the West Bank. Here too, Israeli settlements have been founded during the past two decades, but have attracted relatively few settlers in comparison with the western suburban belt. The point to make here is that a request for boundary redemarcation is equally legitimate for both sides to the conflict. Were Israel to insist on moving the boundary eastwards in order to incorporate the strategic and settlement locations, the Palestinians could equally argue for a *quid pro quo* elsewhere in the region. Such a demand would be anathema to Israeli leaders who view the whole territorial debate as applying only to that region formerly constituting the West Bank. Boundary spillover into pre-1967 Israel is clearly not on the agenda at this stage. As such, the geo-ethnic incompatibility of any future boundary *vis a vis* the location of Arab-Palestinian inhabitants of Israel will remain on the political agenda long beyond the formal implementation of a full peace agreement with the Palestinians.

The southern section of the 'green line' also displays some cross-boundary Arab settlement patterns, although this is not as marked as in the other two areas. On the Israeli side of the boundary, there are the bedouin townships which have been founded during the past twenty years. On the West Bank side of the boundary, there is a single major Palestinian township - Dahariyah. This area is a transition zone between the respective Bedouin and Palestinian ecumenes. This is indicative of the transition from a more fertile region in the centre of the West Bank to a semi-arid region in the south. Notwithstanding this fact, the nature of cross-

boundary relations is still relatively intensive. This consists of family relations in both areas including intermarriage, the marketing of commodities, hiring of herdsmen and also the smuggling of stolen goods, especially cars (Meir, 1994).

## 7. Functional Characteristics of a Future Boundary

While it is highly speculative at this stage, it is important to consider the functional scenarios for a future boundary separating an Israeli and Palestinian sovereign entity, be it along the 'green line' or along an alternative route. Two contrasting scenarios present themselves:

One possibility is that the new boundary would remain open, enabling the transfer of goods and people from one side to the other. The economic significance of such an arrangement would be the continued employment of Palestinian workers within the Israeli market place, albeit in menial and underpaid jobs. Goods would also be enabled to pass through the boundary, but this would likely become a two way process, rather than the unidirectional movement of surplus goods from Israel into the West Bank as occurs at present. The existence of an international boundary would necessitate greater reciprocity in the transfer of goods, either through the mutual removal of any customs duties or, alternately, the imposition of tariffs. Tariffs are more likely to be requested by Israel, owing to the higher producer costs, both in agriculture and industry, which exist in this western economy.

Without tariffs, goods originating in the West Bank or neighbouring countries are likely to undercut the Israeli producers in the market place. Even today, there are many cases of agricultural produce being smuggled into Israel, mostly by market vendors. The maintenance of open boundaries has a certain economic logic, inasmuch as it would prevent any short-term major dislocation for the fledgling Palestinian economy. But it would result in the retention of an asymmetric pattern of economic relations which favours the dominant Israeli economy. From a politico-economic perspective, the maintenance of the existing functional situation would be perceived by the Palestinians as constituting a form of neo-colonial set of relations, which would ensure the continued dependency of the Palestinian economy on Israel.

Alternatively, for political reasons, a new Palestinian state could decide to immediately close the boundary between itself and Israel. Political pride would dictate the desire to demonstrate Palestinian sovereignty, best characterised by total non-dependency on the former occupying power. While this scenario has a certain political logic, it would result in a number of major functional problems, mostly affecting the Palestinian economy. In the first place, the Palestinians at present employed in Israel would have to seek work elsewhere. The Palestinian entity would have enough problems creating an industrial and employment infrastructure for the existing unemployed and possibly even for a limited number of returning refugees. To add a further 100,000 unemployed workers to this already difficult task would cause major economic dislocation and possibly political frustration on the part of the workers themselves.

A second problem concerns the nature of the West Bank as a landlocked state. Closed boundaries with Israel would only serve to exacerbate this problem, even allowing for an agreed land route linking the West Bank to the Gaza Strip and an alternative outlet to the Mediterranean Sea and from there to Europe (Newman, 1994b). The nature of such a link under conditions of a closed boundary would be even more problematic. Who would control such a route? Would it be a closed highway, or would Israel retain the right to check all passing vehicles? (Newman and Falah, 1995). A closed boundary would also mean that the functional

links which have reemerged between West Bank Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel, especially in the Triangle Region in close proximity to the old 'green line', would again be destroyed, causing much family and personal dislocation. The closing of the boundary would have a similar effect on a uni-functional region as it did in 1949. This has already become abundantly clear since 1991, with a gradual decrease in the number of Palestinian workers in Israel to around 40,000. The sealing of boundaries following the suicide bombings inside Israel has resulted in even greater economic hardships for the Palestinian population, resulting in intense pressure brought to bear by the Palestinians for their immediate reopening.

While it is impossible to predict the nature of the boundary at this stage, the final decision concerning the 'opening' or 'closing' of the border rests with the Palestinians. Clearly, Israel has no interest in closing the boundary, especially because of the economic access an open boundary provides to the West Bank and other Arab markets. For the Palestinians, they will have to decide between short-term economic benefit and political pride and expediency. But should the boundary be closed, it could well take on all the aspects of a sealed boundary with few, if any, crossing points, the build-up of cross boundary military installations and the physical division of what remains a very small piece of real estate. This would not serve the cause of political stability which would be expected in the aftermath of the implementation of a final territorial solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

## 8. The 'Green Line' and Jerusalem

Jerusalem remains the most problematic of all the issues to be solved between Israel and the Palestinians. In terms of the boundary, the case of Jerusalem mirrors the stages of the 'green line' discussed above. According to Katz (1993), the Jewish Agency had formulated a plan for the partition of Jerusalem as early as 1937 based on the prospect of open boundaries and free movement between the two parts of the city, but that this had been rejected by a sceptical Woodhead Commission. The United Nations Partition Resolution recommended that Jerusalem be a *corpus seperatum* under international administration (Figure 18). Following the 1948 War of Independence, Jerusalem was physically divided between east (Palestinian) and west (Jewish-Israeli), with the Old City becoming part of the city controlled by the Jordanian administration (Figure 19).

The physical division of Jerusalem in 1948 resulted in significant dislocation for some population groups. Since the Old City was captured by the Jordanian Legion, Jews were no longer able to reside within the ancient walls. The Jewish Quarter of the Old City was evacuated of its inhabitants, with a transfer of the residents to the western part of the city. For the Arab inhabitants, the most significant dislocation took place in the village of Beit Safafa, in the southern section of the city (Figure 19). The new boundary cut the village into two, one part becoming integrated into the West Bank, the other section remaining under Israeli control within the municipal limits of West Jerusalem. The railway line, all of which remained on the Israeli side of the boundary, became the line of separation within the village. While no Jews resided in the eastern section of the city, a small number of Arabs remained within the western section of the city. In only one neighbourhood, Abu Tor, was there a significant mixing of Arab and Jewish populations, with the formerly Arab neighbourhood experiencing an influx of Jewish inhabitants (Romann and Weingrod, 1991).

**Figure 18:** ***The 'Corpus Seperatum': The United Nations Proposal for a Single City of Jerusalem***




Another geographic quirk to have affected Jerusalem was the existence of an Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus in the north of the city (Figure 19). This area had been the location of the Hebrew University and the first Hadassah Hospital prior to 1948. The area remained under Israeli control following the division of the city, but was surrounded entirely by the eastern section of the city. For a period of nineteen years, a limited number of Israeli personnel were allowed to travel in convoys to Mount Scopus in order to maintain a presence. The institutions were relocated to the western part of the city. Following the removal of the boundary in 1967, the Israeli government rebuilt both the University and the Hospital on Mount Scopus, thus duplicating the existing institutions within the western part of the city.

Overall, the development of Jerusalem during the nineteen year period of division was influenced by contrasting forces. The city, which until 1948 had been at the geographic (although not necessarily economic or political) centre of Palestine, now found itself located at the geographic periphery of two separate political entities. Internal infrastructural networks were reorientated from the boundary in each direction. Both parts of the city had to compete with alternative metropolitan centres - West Jerusalem with the growing economic and social core of Tel Aviv, East Jerusalem with Amman. Thus, despite the development of West Jerusalem as Israel's capital and the construction of government and other public institutions, the city's population declined from 10 to 7.5% of the national (Israeli) population between 1948-1967 (Cohen, 1977: 65-71).

The physical division of the city had a profound impact on the planning and development of the city. The area on both sides of the sealed boundary remained largely undeveloped in an urban frontier zone, despite the fact that much of the boundary run through the heart of the city. The planning and development which took place at the time related only to one half of the city. City planners in West (Jewish) Jerusalem prepared a blueprint for development in the early 1960's which envisaged the city growing in the one available direction - westwards - during the ensuing two decades. Major government institutions - such as the Parliament, Israel Museum, and government offices were constructed in the west of the city. The major Hadassah hospital was built on the western outskirts of the city, in a location which was as yet beyond the residential pale of the city but which was expected to be an integral part of the city within the next two decades (Figure 19).

Within Jerusalem there were two exclaves, Mt. Scopus under Israeli control, and Armon Hanatziv under UN control. Part of the boundary runs right through what had been the central business district (CBD) - which had been used by both Arabs and Jews. As a result, separate CBD's were developed on both sides. A section of the pipe which provided most of the city's water passed through Jordanian territory in the Ayalon valley. This was cut by the Jordanians and new pipes from the coastal plain had to be laid. The Eastern part of the city received their water from the Judean Desert and Hebron mountain sources. The only border crossing along the course of the 'green line' was in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem border consisted of two parallel lines, between which there was a no-man's land with a width ranging from tens to hundreds of metres. This area remained desolate and was not divided in the armistice agreements. Each side could only enter this area by prior agreement with the other side.

This constrained development affected the Palestinian sector as well. Prior to the 1967 War, Palestinian villages and neighbourhoods in the Jordanian half of the city were prevented from expanding towards the boundary. The existence of a well defined 'no-man's land' on each side and the laying of minefields prevented this taking place, while following the removal of the boundary the Israeli government and city planners issued very few building permits on the western sides of these same villages. Cohen (1993) documents this process for village of Sue Baher at the southern tip of Jerusalem, and Beit Iksa and Beit Surik at the north-western edges of the city (Figure 19) (Cohen, 1993: 135-165). He further notes how government sponsored programmes of afforestation, both prior to and in the post 1967 periods, were used to make political statements along and across the boundary. Prior to 1967, orchards were planted near the border in the western part of the city on the direct instructions of Prime Minister Ben Gurion, who saw the trees as a symbol and a message across the fence (Cohen, 1993: 137).

The June 1967 War and the subsequent 'opening' of the boundary changed the planning scenarios and plans for the city. The municipal boundaries were expanded to encompass approximately 110,000 dunams, of which 40,000 dunams were in West Jerusalem and 70,000 dunams in East Jerusalem and the surrounding area. Shortly after the 1967 War, the Israeli government passed a law annexing East Jerusalem to Israel and, by definition, extending civilian law to the whole municipal area. All Israeli governments since 1967 have invested substantial resources in the founding of Jewish residential neighbourhoods in the eastern section of the city. The first of these neighbourhoods were the Ramat Eshkol and French Hill neighbourhoods in the vicinity of what had been the boundary. During the 1970's large scale construction took place in three major locations - Ramot in the north-west of the city, Giloh to the south of the city constituting a wedge between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and East Talpiot to the east of the city (Figure 19). As in settlement policies elsewhere along the 'green line',

**Figure 19:** ***Jerusalem: Points of Reference***




these neighbourhoods were also planned to breach the spatial continuity of Arab-Palestinian settlements surrounding Jerusalem to the north, east and south.

By the early 1990's over 120,000 Israelis lived in these neighbourhoods. In September 1993, a new neighbourhood to the south of Jerusalem was approved, linking the existing Jewish neighbourhoods of Talpiot (West Jerusalem) and East Talpiot (East Jerusalem), on both sides of the former boundary. While the neighbourhoods themselves remain highly segregated, they are located in such a way as to make the physical redivision of Jerusalem between a Jewish west and a Palestinian east virtually impossible, unless the wholesale evacuation of these neighbourhoods was to take place. This latter scenario is, from an Israeli perspective, unthinkable. Road construction linking the different parts of Jerusalem and its hinterland continues, with parts of Road No.1 actually following the course of the 'green line'.

In the post-1967 period, certain areas of afforestation have straddled the boundary on both sides, especially in those areas which enables Israel to widen the area of access to Jerusalem from the coastal plain (Cohen, 1993: 151). Planting trees is an important symbolic element in the desire to control territory for both Arabs and Jews. This policy has been used in a number

of micro-areas along the 'green line' boundary as a means of erasing the former line. In the 1980's, following a number of legal disputes, the Jewish National Fund limited themselves to planting projects which reached the 'green line' but did not go beyond (Cohen, 1994). But this did not necessarily apply to Jerusalem, which Israeli politicians and planners alike saw as a physically united city never to be re-divided. Much of the previous 'frontier' zone underwent development, most notably the area immediately adjacent to the walls of the Old City. This has become the focus for parks, tended open spaces and the more recent construction of luxury dwelling units (Figure 19).

While many of the infrastructural networks were unified over time and the transition frontier zone was developed into residential areas and parks, the city remained divided in many other important respects. Romann and Weingrod (1991) have described the continued nature of residential segregation between East and West Jerusalem. They have shown how Jews and Palestinians continue to *"live together separately"* in two distinct political and cultural entities with well defined ethnic boundaries, despite the formal 'unification' of the city during the post-1967 period. Even within the Abu Tor neighbourhood, which was divided in 1948 and reunited in 1967 following the populating of much of the western section of the neighbourhood with Jewish residents, there continue to be *"firm and unbending ethnic boundaries"*. The *de facto* separation is probably best brought out in Romann's (1989) study of Jerusalem schoolchildren, born and educated in a post-1967 single city. Both Jewish and Palestinian teenagers displayed a remarkable lack of knowledge concerning the basic geography and sites of the 'other' half of the city, despite the fact that they were free to roam in any part of the city they chose. In particular, the mutual geographies of fear expressed by both groups was indicative of the strong sense of division and separation which continues to pervade city life, despite the absence of any formal or physical boundary.

The future of Jerusalem under a peace agreement is the most acute problem to be solved. For its part, Israel refuses to acknowledge the redivision of the city or any political solution which would necessitate the giving up of sovereignty over any part of the city. For the Palestinians, Jerusalem is the most important administrative and political centre which would serve as a capital city for any future sovereign political entity. The Palestinians refuse to acknowledge any alternative to Jerusalem as the major spatial focus for administration. In his study of the major infrastructural systems in the city - water, sewage and electricity - Dumper (1993) argues that it is not an impossible task to reseparate the two parts of the city. However, while neither side is prepared to accept the concept of the city being physically redivided again, it would be possible to create some form of functional separation between the two populations. This would necessitate the decentralisation of city government to the neighbourhood level, with only few powers remaining for a city-wide government, mostly relating to the joint maintenance of physical and infrastructural networks (Kollek, 1988). Neither side accepts the notion of international administration which would wrest the control away from the local populations.

## 9. Concluding Comments

The nature of the autonomy, as implemented in the spring of 1994, was limited both in its territorial extent and in the degree of authority granted to the Palestinian authority. Notwithstanding this, many of the important symbols of statehood were taken on by the Palestinians, including joint control of border transit to Jordan and Egypt, the operation of an independent police force within the autonomy areas, as well as the unhindered use of the Palestinian flag and the formulation of both Palestinian travel documents and stamps. At the

time of final revision of this paper, the question of the boundary had become even more critical following the calls for 'separation' on the part of Israeli leaders in the wake of the suicide bombings by Islamic Fundamentalists within Israel. The question of boundary demarcation and the functional nature of a future boundary have become transformed into an applied debate concerning the geopolitical future of this region.

Whether or not a boundary will be formally demarcated between Israel and a future sovereign Palestinian entity is largely dependent on Israel finally agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state, or in other words the repartition of Israel/Palestine. While the official Israeli negotiating stance continues to reject the notion of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state, it is difficult for neutral observers to see the continuation of the current process leading anywhere else. In such an eventuality, the course of the boundary is likely to follow closely the 'green line' boundary which separated Israel from the West Bank between 1948-1967. However, the possibility of territorial redemarcation in Israel's favour should not be ruled out. Were this to be the outstanding issue preventing the final signing of a full peace agreement, it is possible that the Palestinians would accept some territorial attrition rather than risk the non-establishment of a sovereign state.

This discussion of the changing functional characteristics of the 'green line' boundary during the past forty five years has raised a number of questions concerning the way in which we are accustomed to studying boundaries. The impact of a sealed boundary on micro-landscape change in a relatively short period of time has been apparent from the nineteen year experience between 1949-1967. The paradoxes which have been inherent in the Israeli 'opening' of the boundary, as contrasted with the implications of Israeli policy on the ground have served to strengthen, rather than weaken, the perceived presence of a boundary. The contrasting images of boundary as depicted not only in formal maps but also in popular images in caricatures and stamps are indicative of the perceived presence of a line of separation.

Finally, the importance of understanding the changing landscape and geo-ethnic realities of the boundary-frontier region, and the way in which each side to a conflict prioritises these different components in its attempts at demarcating a future boundary which will be equally acceptable in a process of conflict resolution. This short boundary, the idea of which has been in existence for less than fifty years and which existed as a formal political boundary for less than twenty years, has been shown to be rich in the diversity of problems and issues raised, some of the more unconventional attributes of which may be applied in the study of other equally dynamic boundary situations.

## 10. Postscript: Reestablishing a Boundary - Towards Separation

In the aftermath of the suicide bombings by Islamic Fundamentalist groups in Israel in early 1995, the question of the boundary took on new significance. The immediate reaction of the Rabin government was to close the territories for an indefinite period of time as a means of preventing further bombers slipping into Israel as part of the daily Palestinian workforce. The economic hardship caused to the remaining 40,000 Palestinian workers resulted in protests on the part of the PLO who demanded the immediate reopening of the boundary. For Israel, the closing of the boundary was perceived as the only way in which the peace process could be saved in the short term, as public opinion within Israel began to lose faith in the continuation of a process which did not result in any improvement in the level of personal security and a reduction in violence. For the Palestinians, the peace process would be detrimentally affected

by a closing of the boundary which would cause further economic hardship, leading to increased political frustration on the part of the Palestinian public who had not witnessed any improvement in their political or economic situation. This, in turn, would result in increased support for the anti-peace process forces, most notably the Islamic Hamas and Jihad movements.

Within Israel, the government began to openly debate the need for *"separation"* of Palestinians and Israelis, a euphemism for the establishment of a clearly demarcated boundary. In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, Israeli officials went as far as to talk of the erection of fences and walls between the two territories, including the use of police dogs to patrol the crossing points, an association reminiscent of the most sealed of boundaries such as that between East and West Germany prior to the crumbling of the 'iron curtain'. The question of a future boundary now became an issue of public debate and was firmly on the political agenda. The government established a select group of ministers and officials to recommend practical ways of implementing 'separation', including the demarcation of relevant territories and exclaves, and the means of policing and patrolling the separation. Movement of Palestinian workers from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel would be cut to the minimum, replaced by a further influx of cheap labour from other countries.

Two governmental committees were set up to work out the details and implications of the implementation of 'separation'. While the 'security' committee recommended a high level of physical separation along the course of the green line, their proposals were rejected by the 'economic' committee on the grounds that the cost, both infrastructural and operational, were too high. The security proposals included the establishment of a 212 mile long security strip, ranging in width from one mile to several hundred feet (Landau, 1995). The strip would follow the course of the 'green line', with the exception of two area - Jerusalem and the Gush Etzion region. In these areas, the strip would be located to the east of the old boundary. Only nineteen miles of the strip would actually have border fences, the rest of the strip being patrolled by the Israeli army on the eastern (West Bank) side and the border police on the western (Israeli) side. A limited number of crossing points would be determined, through which all traffic desiring to cross from the West Bank into Israel would have to pass. In early April 1995, the Erez crossing into the Gaza Strip was reinforced by the redeployment of 500 soldiers equipped with sophisticated equipment to detect weapons and explosive materials in vehicles crossing into Israel. In addition, all commodities arriving in trucks had to be unloaded and transferred to Israeli vehicles for onward shipment into Israel.

The estimated cost for the implementation of the project was expected to run to over US$125 million, with an annual operational cost of approximately US$50 million per annum. These figures were subsequently disputed by the 'economic' committe, who argued that the actual cost for total separation would be as high as two billion dollars, with operational costs of US$150 million per annum (Ashat, 1995). They proposed two alternative plans which would simply augment the existing levels of surveillance and would undertake spot checks of documents and increase the frequency of road blocks along, or around, the green line. Implementation costs for these alternatives were expected to range from a high of US$300 million to a low of only US$10 million. As a means of relating to the perceived security threat of continued 'open' boundaries, while at the same time attempting to cut the cost for the Israeli economy, more limited measures were proposed. These included transit points for workers along the 'green line', from which they would be transferred into Israel in Israeli vehicles, or the establishment of a large retail market for goods and produce at one of the major crossing points to which both Israelis and Palestinians could come without having to cross into the territory of

the 'other' group. The construction of new industrial zones at selected sites within the West Bank and Gaza Strip was also perceived as a means of creating employment opportunities within the Occupied Territories and thus preventing movement of Palestinian labour into Israel itself. Thus, the economic and security objectives were intricately interwoven with each other, both influencing the eventual adoption of a clear policy on the part of the Israeli government.

In effect, the peace process underwent a transition from one which had originally been perceived as the creation of separate political entities between which there would be an economic marriage, facilitated by open boundaries, to one which accepted the hard reality that Israelis and Palestinians would undergo territorial separation, followed by a divorce. This changing territorial context highlighted even further the need for boundary demarcation which would be adapted to the geo-ethnic realities of both Palestinians and Israelis.

# Appendix I

## *General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan, 3 April 1949*

*Article V*

1. The Armistice Demarcation Lines for all sectors other than the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on the maps in Annex I to this Agreement, and shall be defined as follows:
   *(a)* In the sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall follow the truce lines as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;
   *(b)* In the Jerusalem sector, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall correspond to the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area;
   *(c)* In the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on Map 1 and marked B in Annex I to this Agreement;
   *(d)* In the sector from a point on the Dead Sea (MR 1925-0958) to the southernmost tip of Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be determined by existing military positions as surveyed in March 1949 by United Nations observers, and shall run from north to south as delineated on Map 1 in Annex I to this Agreement.

*Article VI*

1. It is agreed that the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom shall replace the forces of Iraq in the sector now held by the latter forces, the intention of the Government of Iraq in this regard having been communicated to the Acting Mediator in the message of 20 March from the Foreign Minister or Iraq authorizing the delegation of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom to negotiate for the Iraqi forces and stating that those forces would be withdrawn.
2. The Armistice Demarcation Line for the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on Map 1 in Annex I to this Agreement and marked A.
3. The Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall be established in stages as follows, pending which the existing military lines may be maintained:
   *(a)* In the area west of the road from Baqa to Jaljulia, and thence to the east of Kafr Qasim: within five weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;
   *(b)* In the area of Wadi Ara north of the line from Baqa to Zubeiba: within seven weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;

   In all other areas of the Iraqi sector: within fifteen weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed.
4. The Armistice Demarcation Line in the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, referred to in paragraph *(c)* of Article V of this Agreement and marked B on Map 1 in Annex I, which involves substantial deviation from the existing military lines in favour of the

forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, is designated to offset the modifications of the existing military lines in the Iraqi sector set forth in paragraph 3 of this article.

5. In compensation for the road acquired between Tulkarem and Qalqiliya, the Government of Israel agrees to pay to the Government of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom the cost of constructing twenty kilometres of first-class new road.
6. Wherever villages may be affected by the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, the inhabitants of such villages shall be entitled to maintain, and shall be protected in, their full rights of residence, property and freedom. In the event any of the inhabitants should decide to leave their villages, they shall be entitled to take with them their livestock and other movable property, and to receive without delay full compensation for the land which they have left. It shall be prohibited for Israeli forces to enter or to be stationed in such villages, in which locally recruited Arab police shall be organized and stationed for internal security purposes.
7. The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom accepts responsibility for all Iraqi forces in Palestine.
8. The provisions of this article shall not be interpreted as prejudicing, in any sense, an ultimate political settlement between the Parties to this Agreement.
9. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defended in Articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto.
10. Except where otherwise provided, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be established, including such withdrawal of forces as may be necessary for this purpose, within ten days from the date on which this Agreement is signed.
11. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this article and in Article V shall be subject to such rectification as may be agreed upon by the Parties to this Agreement, and all such rectifications shall have the same force and effect as if they had been incorporated in full in this General Armistice Agreement.

*Article VII*

1. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shall be limited to defensive forces only in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where geographical considerations make this impractical, as at the southern-most tip of Palestine and the coastal strip. Defensive forces permissible in each sector shall be as defined in Annex II to this Agreement. In the sector now held Iraqi forces, calculations on the reduction of forces shall include the number of Iraqi forces in this sector.
2. Reduction of forces to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be completed within ten days of the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this Agreement. In the same way the removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party, shall be completed within the same period.
3. The strength of the forces which may be maintained by the Parties on each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be subject to periodical review with a view toward further reduction of such forces by mutual agreement of the Parties.

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[3] With the exceptions of Brawer (1990b) and Ashat (1995) the references cited in this study are all in English. Additional references of relevance are to be found in both Hebrew and Arabic. In many cases, these contain detailed documentary material. Owing both to the lack of space and the fact that this publication is aimed at an English reading audience, these additional references have not been cited here.

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