

## The WEU's Security Role in Post-Cold War Europe

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The fall of the Berlin wall marked the end of a period of confrontation, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of communism and ultimately the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. The impact was especially to be felt in the field of collective defence and security. No longer did the threat of massive surprise attack make collective defence the overriding dimension of transatlantic relations. This meant that American-European relations would call for even more care in the future, as the defence dimension would no longer serve as a blanket to smother problems smouldering in other fields. The profound geopolitical upheavals since 1989 have brought about dynamic change in the existing European security structures, including a new definition of the Western European Union's role and place in the emerging European security architecture.

Europe is in the throes of a process of further integration. The Maastricht Treaty attempted to define a common objective for the more distant future: a European Union with both an Economic and Monetary Union and a European defence policy which might in time lead to a common European defence. Its implementation is to be reviewed in 1996. In the meantime, WEU, as an integral part of the process of unification, is to formulate and implement decisions having defence implications. At Maastricht, European leaders recognised that a community of more than 350 million citizens needed an autonomous defence while admitting that even a fully-fledged European Union would still need the Atlantic Alliance to deter remaining nuclear capabilities to the East and to serve as a forum of consultation on security issues of common interest to the North American allies. In terms of defence, the Maastricht Treaty did not go as far as some might have wished. Subsequent developments have shown that for some people even this modest result was a bridge too far. It could be wondered whether it would not have been preferable to attempt to define the final goal of integration and to depart from the past practice of making progress step by step without having to agree on an ultimate objective. It is difficult to be cut-and-dried on this issue because,

as integration proceeds, the need for an overriding political rationale increases.

The European Union will provide for convergence between economic and security and defence policies in an era where Clausewitz has made his comeback, to the extent that the use of military capabilities is an extension of foreign policy by other means if and when action outside Europe is contemplated in the pursuit of objectives wider than the mere protection of national independence and territorial integrity. In this context, the European Union with its common foreign and security policy will offer advantages over the Alliance, which might find it difficult to establish the same degree of convergence in all areas of policy. Transatlantic relations have both cooperative and competitive aspects, and interests may indeed diverge outside the area of collective defence. Hence the vital importance of the forthcoming Alliance Summit in January 1994 whose aim will be the clarification and adaptation of many fundamental aspects of the transatlantic relationship.

The transfer of the WEU Council and its Secretariat from London to Brussels and their integration last January with a Planning Cell in new headquarters illustrate the will to make WEU play a key role in constructing a European defence. WEU had to be close to the European Institutions and NATO in order to optimise cooperative relations with both. Its presence in Brussels also illustrates Europe's willingness to shoulder more responsibility for its security. WEU is currently developing new structures for an enhanced operational role which will be instrumental in dealing with the crises on our doorstep, should the member States decide on military intervention.

WEU's present agenda was set at the Maastricht Summit and expanded in the Petersberg and Rome Ministerial Declarations of 19 June and 20 November 1992. At that last meeting, the enlargement of the Organisation to a tenth member, Greece, was sanctioned and observer status offered to two EC countries, Denmark and Ireland. Finally, three European Alliance members -

Iceland, Norway and Turkey - have become associate members participating fully in all WEU activities. WEU now embraces all the countries of the European Community and all European allies. Having them all around the table in WEU gives credibility to the European pillar of the Alliance and makes for greater efficiency. It was a pre-condition to enable useful work to be done on how that pillar could function within the Alliance as well as on how WEU could interface with the European institutions. WEU's reactivation phase is now over, an undeniable success story in the process of European integration. WEU can now be said to reflect the growing cohesion among Europeans within a revitalised Alliance.

The gradual marshalling of the instruments of a future common European defence will, once the Maastricht Treaty has been ratified, be underpinned by the definition of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), giving an integrated Europe the conceptual framework for the development of its security and defence dimension without which it would be unbalanced and incomplete. The Declarations adopted in the margins of the Maastricht Summit set out a three-stage process for WEU's development. The first stage makes WEU *"an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance"*. A second stage will be *"the eventual framing of a common [European] defence policy which might"*, in a third stage, *"lead to a common defence"*. Work on the implementation of the measures listed in the Declarations of Petersberg and Rome, whose aim is to strengthen WEU's operational role, will benefit from the expertise of the Planning Cell and the experience gained in the Gulf and Yugoslav crises.

Pending the European Union's acquisition of legal personality, WEU enjoys a measure of autonomy in its initiatives and actions. Its responsibility is to anticipate the conceptual framework for the creation of the instruments of a common European defence and tackle key issues of European security. Among the main challenges facing WEU in Brussels is its contribution to a renewed Alliance within the framework of a new Euro-Atlantic pact. The European pillar is essential to the survival of the Alliance. It is inconceivable for the United States to allow its troops to be stationed in Europe indefinitely unless tasks are redistributed in a way that demonstrates to American public opinion and Congress that responsibilities are being equitably

shared. Europeans must spell out which measures they are prepared to take to ensure that the US maintains a significant military presence. To be an ally implies above all mutual obligations of solidarity and relationships founded on mutual trust. For the WEU States, the security guarantees and defence commitments in the Brussels and Washington Treaties are complementary and cannot be invoked in the event of a dispute between them. The enlarged WEU is in a position to formulate coherent and non-exclusive European positions so that they may be introduced into the Alliance's political consultation process for further elaboration.

One of the pressing problems facing the Alliance is to adapt the integrated military structure. Discussions within WEU on units answerable to the Organisation should contribute to the formulation of new arrangements that will put the participation of all European allies on the same footing. The recent decisions on relations between NATO's military structure and the future European corps - scheduled to be operational in 1995 - are therefore of major importance in this respect. In the context of the emerging twin-pillar Atlantic Alliance, all principles underpinning the transatlantic link in the post-Cold War period must be reaffirmed as part of a new Euro-Atlantic pact or covenant. Such a pact could define the main functions and responsibilities incumbent upon both parties and identify the ways in which they complement each other and the fields in which they specialise, as well as spelling out the mechanisms for reinforcement or repositioning. US functions of particular importance to Europe would be the reinforcement capability, the nuclear function, strategic lift, real-time intelligence and high-tech elements of command and control. Such a mutual definition of functions and complementarity would be of special importance at a time where we have to plan for operations by *ad hoc* coalitions rather than actions by all the members of either NATO or WEU. The keywords for the relations between the European defence structures and the Alliance are solidarity and complementarity, transparency and reciprocity. What was necessary in the context of the debate on burden-sharing is all the more vital when Europe faces the prospect of power-sharing following the planned reduction in the US commitment. As an illustration, WEU's Permanent Council meets on Tuesday mornings so that on the following morning the NATO Permanent Representative of the country having the WEU Presidency can report to the North Atlantic Council. Thus, thanks to a

constant two-way flow of information, all sides should be prepared to listen to sound arguments and adjust their positions accordingly before final decisions are taken in the Alliance context. The GATT syndrome of virtually immutable positions and mandates should clearly be avoided.

WEU is indeed developing structures which will be both complementary to, and compatible with, the Alliance structures and future European political planning and decision-making. The practical arrangements are being worked out in detail between the competent Alliance and WEU bodies in Brussels, according to their specific needs. WEU's activities are not restricted by geographical boundaries imposed by treaty. During two Gulf crises, WEU demonstrated its capability to act as an effective European forum for political concertation and practical cooperation. Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty offers the opportunity for the Council of WEU to consult on any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, "*in whatever area this threat should arise*". WEU's competence thus provides a framework for both concerted actions by Europeans and *ad hoc* cooperation between European and North American allies.

#### **Current developments within WEU focus on four areas:**

Firstly, military units answerable to WEU. These units will be made available by member States "*from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces*". In Rome in November 1992, WEU Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers stressed the importance of developing its operational capabilities, so that a more effective contribution could be made to humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking in coordination with NATO and the CSCE. Member States are designating which units they would be willing to make available. Such units answerable to WEU could be organised on a multinational and multiservice basis.

Secondly, a WEU Planning Cell was created on 1 October 1992, under the Council's authority. It has gradually become operational since April 1993. Under the Council's guidance, the Planning Cell may prepare contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices, as well as recommendations for command, control and communication arrangements, including standing

operating procedures for the headquarters that might be selected. It is also the Planning Cell's responsibility to keep an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be made available to WEU for specific operations. The Planning Cell participates as appropriate in all WEU's current activities and studies. It is fully associated with the work of the Defence Representatives Group and is working on studies on the formation of multinational units, the protection of safe areas, the rotation of units, evacuation procedures, etc. The Planning Cell will also take forward work on the Franco-Italo-Spanish proposal for European air-maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean. In carrying out its duties, the Planning Cell liaises with national and international planning staffs, and where appropriate, they adapt their planning to WEU's requirements.

Thirdly, WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff will meet twice a year before the regular Ministerial Councils, as well as on an *ad hoc* basis whenever necessary. Delegations of WEU member States are reinforced by military delegates who provide advice for the Council and relay the views of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to the Planning Cell, as well as monitoring its professional standards. Under national regulations, military delegates represent their Ministries of Defence and/or their Chiefs of Defence Staff.

Fourthly, there will be closer military cooperation among WEU member States, notably in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance. Among the proposals in WEU's Maastricht Declaration to be examined further, the most timely deals with the strengthening of European cooperation on defence. Investment in adapting WEU member countries' armed forces will still be costly, since future risks may take many forms and are so unpredictable. They will call for a wide range of surveillance, deterrence and reaction resources to be available immediately and at all times, and the development of these resources entails sophisticated technological and industrial expertise. One of the most immediate of these risks is the proliferation of ballistic weapons. Last April, the WEU Parliamentary Assembly held a seminar on the anti-missile defence of Europe, at which the extent of the experience and expertise available to Europe for the creation of an alert and surveillance system and for the development of appropriate methods of protection clearly emerged. The foreseeable costs of such an enterprise would make it a test of the ability of Europeans to devise

new ways of cooperating, sharing tasks and pooling resources.

Individually, WEU member States no longer have the financial capability to acquire all the necessary assets for deterrence within the European continent or for force projection outside Europe. Other examples of the urgent need for cooperation - the only way of coping with the steady shrinkage in national defence budgets - are in the fields of space, strategic air and maritime transport, logistics outside Europe and telecommunications. At their meeting in Bonn on 4 December 1992, the Defence Ministers of the thirteen countries in the Independent European Programme Group took the decision to transfer the IEPG's functions to WEU. Some of the practical arrangements for this transfer were approved in Rome on 19 May 1993 at the WEU Ministerial Council. For example, a new structure was set up within WEU, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), which inherits the work formerly done by IEPG. An agreement was reached whereby one WEU observer country, Denmark, and two associate countries, Norway and Turkey, could continue to play a full part in its activities. This institutional arrangement should help to achieve the objective laid down in the 1984 Rome Declaration, namely to provide political impetus for European cooperation in the field of armaments. The objective was restated in the WEU Declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty, which mentions the creation of a European armaments agency. Instances could be cited of the missions that might be assigned to this agency, or the more limited missions that might be performed in the meantime by WEU: provision of assistance to the Presidency of WEAG, support for the implementation of the EUCLID technology programme, the development of standardisation, joint management of test facilities, the conduct of programmes on a cooperative basis and the creation of common pools of equipment. The existence of a forum within WEU where these questions can be discussed is a notable step forward.

Since its reactivation, WEU has been a forum for consultations on arms control issues. It discussed practical arrangements among member States for implementing the CFE Treaty verification regime. A Verification Experts Groups is working on the opening of national inspection teams and the creation of multinational inspection teams with the participation of inspectors from countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the training

of CFE inspectors. The search for cost-effective ways of implementing the "Open Skies" Treaty is also on WEU's agenda. Surveillance, intelligence-gathering and earth observation are now of paramount importance. This had led WEU member States to create a Satellite Centre in Torrejón, near Madrid. It was formally inaugurated on 28 April 1993. In its initial experimental phase, the Centre will train analysts in the interpretation of satellite imagery. The Centre will receive its instructions from the Council. Its work will be assessed towards the end of a three-year period and its future development then reviewed. Europeans have also recognised the need to study the development of autonomous space-based means of arms control verification and crisis monitoring. Space cooperation in the field of security under WEU auspices is another example of the gradual emergence of the Organisation's operational capability.

Together with other mutually supporting security organisations, WEU is conducting a dialogue with the new democracies of Central Europe on the requirements of a future pan-European security architecture. The WEU Council launched this dialogue with newly democratic Central European States in the spirit of the Charter of Paris in April 1990. The focus of this pan-European dialogue is the Forum of Consultation which is being developed as an instrument of preventive diplomacy through political dialogue and cooperation among WEU member States and their partners in Central Europe. Its first meeting took place on 14 October 1992. WEU member States consider that the twice-yearly meetings of the Forum of Consultation and the annual Ministerial meeting have a dual objective: to explain WEU's role, objectives and activities in the evolving framework of European security architecture on the one hand and, on the other, to understand more fully the security concerns of Central European countries. A Counsellors' Group - senior representatives of the WEU countries' delegations and the Embassy Counsellors of Central European countries - was set up by the Forum of Consultation, at a Ministerial level meeting in Rome on 20 May 1993. This Group will meet at least three or four times a year. In its future work, the Forum will place the emphasis on formulating mechanisms for consultation on crisis situations, with a view to developing cooperation on conflict prevention and crisis management. It will also review peacekeeping methods in the light of experience acquired by individual countries.

The conversion of defence industries and the verification of the implementation of arms control treaties, especially those concerning conventional forces and Open Skies, are good examples of issues on which thoughts could be pooled within the Forum of Consultation. The development of forms of association between the European Community and the countries of Central Europe makes this approach - the first step towards political cooperation with the future European Union - all the more effective. The offer by the WEU Ministers, meeting in Luxembourg on 5 April 1993, to provide practical civil assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, thereby strengthening their resources in enforcing the Danube embargo against Serbia, was very favourably received. This has been organised on the basis of Memoranda of Understanding signed in Rome with the three riparian States, and the first river operations began in June, with Italy assuming responsibility for on the spot coordination. With about ten fast patrol boats, the 270 or so specialists seconded by WEU member States to monitor river traffic are cooperating closely with the European Community and the CSCE in the implementation of their mission. They are working in liaison with the assistance missions on the implementation of sanctions in the area, and their effectiveness has been universally recognised. Their action on the Danube is a good example of the type of cooperation that might be developed between WEU and its consultation partners.

An important aspect of WEU's growing operational role is its contribution to peace operations. In the absence of the reference framework that the CFSP will provide, any role for WEU in peacekeeping and even more in the restoration of peace would be inconceivable today unless WEU has a mandate from the UN Security Council or the CSCE. Since, however, its member States are foremost amongst the countries engaged in the UN operations, WEU is examining the present and future implications of any contribution it may make to the sort of peacekeeping operations that could be envisaged. Four types of peacekeeping are possible: the preventive deployment of forces; the enforcement of economic sanctions with the support of military assets; the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection of safe areas with the aid of armed forces; and the implementation of an approved peace plan with recourse to force against any parties failing to comply with its clauses. WEU member States

could first be called upon to act with the Alliance, as has already happened with the embargo enforcement operations in the Adriatic. On 8 June last, the Councils of WEU and NATO met to approve a concept of a combined operation for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 820. This agreement established a unified command codenamed "*SHARP GUARD*". The WEU and NATO Councils exert joint political control. Their guidelines are translated into military instructions through the appropriate bodies of the two Organisations, cooperating within a joint *ad hoc* headquarters, "*MILCOM ADRIATIC*". The effort to achieve complementarity between WEU and NATO has thus given birth to a genuine partnership, whose effectiveness I saw in person when I visited the headquarters of Allied Forces Southern Europe in late July. The concern for the effectiveness and flexibility of procedures has belied all those who complained of duplication between the Alliance and its European pillar.

Apart from the case of member States acting on their own account, there are two cases in which there might be a WEU commitment. The first would be if WEU were to provide the command and control structures and most of the forces with additional contributions from other States, and this would call for *ad hoc* coordination. The second would be to use WEU to set up an operation and arrange for the rotation of forces and equipment. WEU will have to give careful thought to the different types of operation that might be envisaged under the operational control of the United Nations and pre-arrange the passing of information to the UN on the status of these forces, including planning factors. Given the difficulties now encountered by the United Nations in the execution of its missions and the risk of its decision-making mechanisms being blocked, the future European Union must be in a position to intervene on its own account, both within its own continental area and anywhere else where its vital interests or its nationals are under grave threat.

Since June 1991, WEU has closely monitored the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. To date, WEU's implementation of UNSC resolutions on economic sanctions in the Adriatic and on the Danube has been successful. UNPROFOR II has been made possible by contingents provided by six WEU countries and two other NATO countries. Finally, WEU member States are also prepared to study the possibility of, and the requirements, for promoting safe areas for humanitarian purposes. For

instance, the WEU Council forwarded a military protection plan for Sarajevo to the UN Secretariat-General. The Yugoslav conflict shows that, despite partial accommodations and limited reforms, Europeans have not yet been able to construct a security and defence system with their allies in North America that is suited to the changing situation in Europe and the world. As far as Europeans are concerned, the pooling of resources for forecasting, analysis and planning has undoubtedly been inadequate, and there has been a weakness in the common mechanisms for crisis management and the mobilisation of resources to help with the formulation and then the support of active diplomacy by the Twelve in the Balkans. These shortcomings demonstrate the need to shorten the deadlines as much as possible in order to accelerate the rate at which a European defence is constructed.

In a highly unstable new era world, Europe needs to achieve union more rapidly than ever. An essential element of this union is a common defence identity within a new Euro-Atlantic framework. WEU is the nucleus from which this identity can take shape and become a reality. A peculiar characteristic of the European integration process is that progress can be achieved despite partners not agreeing in detail on the final objective. The goals of a monetary union and a common defence need to be clearly and convincingly spelled out, especially at a time of economic difficulty and shrinking defence budgets. Another matter of concern for European countries will be how to maintain support for sophisticated military capabilities if it becomes increasingly clear that these forces are unlikely ever to be used, either for collective defence, because our countries no longer feel threatened, or for enforcement action, because the necessary legitimacy of their deployment will be difficult to establish. Not far from the EC's

shores and borders, volatile situations abound which could erupt into crises difficult to contain. WEU is working to meet those challenges and prepare coordinated responses to the worst-case scenarios. This is not the time for great architectural designs. Things are moving far too fast in the post-Cold War world. In every crisis the Europeans will have to define their political objectives and strive to maximise their chances of reaching them. Europe's credibility is at stake. So are the Helsinki principles of the CSCE which served us so well in bringing about democratic change in Eastern Europe.

After two years in which its agenda has been to some extent overloaded with institutional and procedural issues, WEU is now in a position to give detailed consideration to issues vital to Europe's security, such as its defence structures and capabilities, defence specialisation or the harmonisation of defence policies. In a fundamentally altered security environment and one in which national defence budgets are tighter than ever, Europe must pool its resources and use them more effectively. WEU is there to help shape the political and military structures needed to create the European Union and strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.

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