



# DURHAM MIDDLE EAST PAPERS

NOT MORE THAN A DENT?  
LONG-TERM TRENDS IN MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY  
SINCE THE ARAB SPRING

Jan Claudius Völkel  
Durham Middle East Paper No. 97

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INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES

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LONG-TERM TRENDS IN MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY

SINCE THE ARAB SPRING

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From 2013 to 2017, he was DAAD long-term lecturer in Political Science at Cairo University. He is member of the Arab-German Young Academy of Sciences and Humanities (AGYA).

After widespread euphoria in many Arab countries in 2011, following the mass uprisings and ousters of long-term dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and later also Yemen, major concerns set in shortly later: what had looked as a blossoming and joyful spring in the early days turned into a disappointing, and often destructive resurrection of authoritarian regimes. Based on findings from the world's leading indices on democracy and political transformation, this paper analyzes the latest trends across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2011. After an empirical assessment of the most important findings, it argues that especially the prevalence of personalized leadership, combined with a lack of institutionalized political structures, has pre-vented a more positive outcome of the Arab Spring. This is partly, but not only, due to the existing fear of growing Islamization, which got further substance by the negative tendencies in Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In consequence, as long as the institutionalization of democratic structures will not happen, hope for serious and long-lasting democratization seems misguided. Current trends support these concerns, as indicators show a further sclerosis of institution-based politics in post-2011 MENA region.

**Keywords:** Arab Spring, Transformation, Middle East and North Africa, Institutionalization, Democracy, Populism

## INTRODUCTION

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As surprising the eruption of widespread mass protests in many Arab countries were back in 2011, as surprising were their outcomes. Who of those that took out to the street in Tunis, Cairo, Benghazi and elsewhere in order to protest against crusty regimes, corrupt leadership and brutal suppression, would have imagined that things could become even worse than before?

That tens of thousands of Egyptians would be jailed and punished to death, that starvation would creep into Yemen, that also Libya and Syria would collapse, that a barbarian “Islamic State” would rise in shortest time and take

“...THE COURSE OF THINGS IS MORE THAN JUST A “FAILURE” OF THE ARAB SPRING...”

control in large territories of different countries, and that after all the old regimes would turn out even stronger than before?

With the notable exception of tiny Tunisia, despotism and even barbarism have taken root in most countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Today, observers attest worse levels of democratization and rule of law than before 2011.

Findings of the “Freedom in the World” Index, the V-Dem Project or the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s “Transformation Index” show constant declines in their scores and rankings. Though results were already embarrassing for most Arab regimes before 2011, many people now remember these years as if they were the golden times.

Thus, the course of things is more than just a “failure” of the Arab Spring, in the meaning that hardly any improvements were realized. It has triggered a terrible, if not terrifying backlash for citizen’s political and socioeconomic reality. This backlash has played out not only in existing authoritarian settings, but even in formerly democratic Turkey, the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has embarked a path of massive interference in people’s individual liberties.

This paper argues that a core problem of the so far largely failed democratization attempts across the MENA region results from the lack of civil institutions in most countries. While in the monarchies, particularly the rich ones on the Arab peninsula, the personalized leadership cult has kept political institutions such as political parties and parliaments, but also constitutional courts at the very margin of the system, the Arab republics, in particular Algeria, Egypt, Syria or Sudan, are run by regimes which are largely recruited from the state security institutions. It is largely the generals from the army, police forces and security services (Mukhabarat) who decide about politics, economics, and social life of citizens. External control, which would provoke transparency and responsibility, is excluded in such systems.

The only positive exception is Tunisia, which to the surprise of many has transformed from a formerly hard-line dictatorship under President Zine Abidine Ben Ali (in office from 1987 until 2011) to a remarkably progressive democracy. Today, despite major problems particularly in its economy, Tunisia can be rightly called the only Arab democracy, sided at best by Lebanon – though the latter has massively lost of its former democratic qualities since 2011 as well. Yet, even Tunisia is proof to this paper’s argument that a lack of institutionalized structures hinders the further prospects of democratization in the MEN region.

“TODAY, DESPITE MAJOR PROBLEMS PARTICULARLY IN ITS ECONOMY, TUNISIA CAN BE RIGHTLY CALLED THE ONLY ARAB DEMOCRACY...”

### Transformation in the MENA Region since 2011: What do the Numbers say?

All leading indices on political and economic transformation show worrying declines of democratic achievements in the MENA region. The “Freedom in the World” index of the US-based organization Freedom House lists in its 2018 edition only two MENA countries as “free”, namely Israel (with an aggregated score of 79 out of 100) and Tunisia (with a score of 70). Four countries qualify as

“partly free”, yet already with a large score difference, namely Lebanon (43), Morocco (39), Jordan (37) and Kuwait (36); the remaining countries and territories are perceived as “not free”, which includes now even Turkey (32). Besides, Algeria (35), Iraq (31), Egypt (26), Qatar (24), Oman (23), Iran (17), United Arab Emirates (17), Yemen (13), Bahrain (12), Libya (9), Sudan (8), Syria (-1) are in the lowest category, as well as Palestine with its two sub-territories West Bank (28) and the Gaza Strip (12; see Table 2 further down for details).

Country	2011			2012			2013			2014			2015			2016			2017			2018		
	P	C	S	P	C	S	P	C	S	P	C	S	P	C	S	P	C	S	P	C	S	P	C	S
AL	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N
BA	6	5	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N
EG	6	5	N	6	5	N	5	5	P	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	6	N
GZ	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N
IN	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N
IQ	5	6	N	5	6	N	6	6	N	5	6	N	6	6	N	5	6	N	5	6	N	5	6	N
IS	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	3	F
JO	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	5	5	P	5	5	P
KU	4	5	P	4	5	P	5	5	P	5	5	P	5	5	P	5	5	P	5	5	P	5	5	P
LE	5	3	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	6	4	P
LI	7	7	N	7	6	N	4	5	P	4	5	P	6	6	N	6	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N
MO	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	4	P	5	5	P
OM	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N
QA	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N
SA	7	6	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N
SU	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N
SY	7	6	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N
TN	7	5	N	7	5	N	3	4	P	3	4	P	3	3	P	1	3	F	1	3	F	2	3	F
TR	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	4	P	3	4	P	3	4	P	3	4	P	4	5	P	5	6	N
UA	6	5	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	7	6	N
WB	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	7	5	N	7	5	N
YE	6	5	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	6	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N
Ø	5.63	5.05	N	5.63	5.27	N	5.36	5.23	N	5.41	5.23	N	5.59	5.23	N	5.5	5.23	N	5.59	5.27	N	5.77	5.45	N
	5.34			5.45			5.30			5.32			5.41			5.37			5.43			5.61		

Table 1: The MENA countries in the “Freedom in the World” rankings since 2011 (main results)

Table 1 shows the “Freedom in the World” index’s categorization of “Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties” on a ranking from 1 (very good) to 7 (very bad), and offers some interesting findings to begin with. Firstly, and most importantly, the number of countries that deteriorated from the 2011 edition (which assesses the year 2010) until the 2018 edition (which assesses the year 2017) clearly outnumbers countries with respective improvements.

Only Jordan, Libya and particularly Tunisia fared better in 2018 than in 2011. No change has been identified for Algeria, Iran, Oman, Qatar and Sudan, the 13 others – Bahrain, Egypt, Gaza, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the West Bank and Yemen – all received lower scores in 2018 than in 2011. Israel is the only country that constantly received the label “free” (the category for aggregated P and C scores ranging from 1.0 to 2.5), though with a slight decline in the latest scores. Besides, Tunisia is the second “free” country, enjoying this assessment since the 2016 ranking.

Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco were the only “partly free” countries (for aggregated scores between 3.0 and 5.0) in the 2018 assessment, while Turkey lost this status for the very first time now and is since listed

Table 1

P = Political Rights, C = Civil Liberties, S = Status.  
 AL = Algeria, BA = Bahrain, EG = Egypt, GZ = Gaza, IN = Iran, IQ = Iraq, IS = Israel, JO = Jordan, KU = Kuwait, LE = Lebanon, LI = Libya, MO = Morocco, OM = Oman, QA = Qatar, SA = Saudi Arabia, SU = Sudan, SY = Syria, TN = Tunisia, TR = Turkey, UA = United Arab Emirates, WB = West Bank, YE = Yemen.

Red coloured text indicates “not free countries”, purple coloured text indicates “partly free countries”, and green coloured text indicates “free countries”.

Green-shaded fields indicate each country’s best scores, orange-shaded fields each country’s worst scores.

among the “not free” countries (scores from 5.5 to 7.0). Turkey is also the country with the strongest deterioration in its aggregated assessments (from 3.0 in 2011 down to 5.5 in 2018, thus -2.5), while Tunisia is the best-improver from 6.0 in 2011 to 2.5 in 2018, thus +4.5.

The region as a whole received its best scores in the 2013 index (referring to the year 2012, directly after the Arab Spring), with 5.36 on political liberties and 5.23 on civil rights, in sum 5.30; however, even this would have placed the region rather in the “not free” category, illustrating the region’s overall low democratic levels even in its best times. The region’s worst scores were reached in 2018 with quite a clear difference to 2013: 5.61 as aggregated score in 2018.

Secondly, the 2011 uprisings brought some improvements in political rights (from 5.63 in 2011 to 5.36 in 2013), but not so in civil liberties (from 5.05 in 2011 to 5.23 in 2013ff.). Thus, democratic aspects such as electoral processes, pluralism, citizen’s participation and functioning governments slightly improved, yet freedom of expression or belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and individual rights retracted. Yet, both categories received their worst scores in 2018, when political rights scores were – for the first time – worse than in 2011. However, losses were related in particular to the field of civil liberties (-0.40), and not so much to political rights (-0.14). Yet, when taking the best year of each sub-field as starting point (2013 for political rights, 2011 for civil liberties), the developments of political rights (-0.41) were indeed as severe as the ones of civil liberties (-0.40).

Figure 1 (displaying all MENA countries) and Figure 2 (displaying for better readability only “relevant” MENA countries, i.e. those with score changes of more than 5.0 points) indicating “Freedom in the World’s” aggregated scores reveal further findings. The region’s overall scores have been in decline since the 2013 ranking indeed, reaching now numbers well below 2011 (from 30.68 in 2011 through 32.59 in 2013 to 27.18 in 2018).

Tunisia, as second finding, reached almost the scores of all-time leader Israel in the rankings from 2015 through 2017, until President Béji Caïd Essebsi’s increasingly authoritarian policies led to a sharper differentiation again. Thus, Israel, which itself experienced a minimal but constant downturn, remained the most democratic country in the region.

### Figures 1 & 2

Shown are the aggregated scores of all indicators in the “Freedom in the World” index of all MENA countries (Figure 1), or those MENA countries that experienced changes of >5.0 points (Figure 2).

AL = Algeria, BA = Bahrain, EG = Egypt, GZ = Gaza, IN = Iran, IQ = Iraq, IS = Israel, JO = Jordan, KU = Kuwait, LE = Lebanon, LI = Libya, MO = Morocco, OM = Oman, QA = Qatar, SA = Saudi Arabia, SU = Sudan, SY = Syria, TN = Tunisia, TR = Turkey, UA = United Arab Emirates, WB = West Bank, YE = Yemen.




Figure 1: All MENA countries’ aggregated scores in the “Freedom in the World” index




Figure 2: “Relevant” MENA countries’ aggregated scores in the “Freedom in the World” index

Surprising is in addition that Libya reached higher scores in 2013 and 2014 than Egypt and even Kuwait (43/41 for Libya, 41/31 for Egypt, 41/39 for Kuwait in both respective years).

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	+/-	11>18
AL	36	35	35	34	34	35	35	35	2	-1
BA	30	20	18	16	15	14	12	12	18	-18
EG	25	35	41	31	26	27	26	26	16	+1
GZ	18	19	19	15	15	12	12	12	7	-6
IN	17	16	16	17	17	17	17	18	2	+1
IQ	25	25	24	25	24	27	27	31	7	+6
IS	83	81	81	81	80	80	80	79	4	-4
JO	34	35	34	35	36	36	37	37	3	+3
KU	44	44	41	39	37	36	36	36	8	-8
LE	52	51	49	48	44	43	44	43	9	-9
LI	8	17	43	41	23	20	13	9	35	+1
MO	42	43	43	42	42	41	41	39	4	-3
OM	27	27	26	26	26	25	25	23	4	-4
QA	28	28	28	28	28	27	26	24	4	-4
SA	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	5	-5
SU	11	6	7	7	6	6	6	8	5	-3
SY	9	6	5	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	10	-10
TN	23	58	59	63	79	79	78	70	56	+47
TR	63	63	61	60	55	53	38	32	31	-31
UA	27	24	22	21	21	20	20	17	10	-10
WB	32	31	30	32	32	30	28	28	4	-4
YE	29	23	25	26	25	17	14	13	16	-16
Ø	30.68	31.68	32.59	31.68	30.59	29.72	28.36	27.18	5.41	-3.5

Table 2: The aggregated scores of all MENA countries in the “Freedom in the World” index

### Table 2

Table 2: Green-shaded values show a country's best ranking, orange-shaded values a country's worst ranking.

While the +/- column indicates the difference between each country's best and worst scores, the 11>18 column shows the net development from the 2011 edition (measuring the situation in 2010) to the 2018 edition (measuring the situation in 2017).

In this column, red numbers indicate deteriorations of at least 10 points, green numbers improvements of at least 10 points.

Table 2 shows the underlying data of the “Freedom in the World” index for Figures 1 and 2. In analogy to the status categories of Table 1 (free, partly free, not free), the numerical data here show the same trend: most countries fared better in the direct aftermath of the Arab Spring than in the more recent years – note especially the sharp decline of Turkey. The opposite is true for Tunisia as only country with a palpable improvement, while Egypt

and Libya strongly improved from 2011 to 2013, but then lost most of their gains, so that the situation in 2018 is comparable with 2011. The Gothenburg-based “Varieties of Democracy” project (V-Dem) with its five sub-indices

“Liberal Democracy”, “Deliberative Democracy”, “Egalitarian Democracy”, “Electoral Democracy” and “Participatory Democracy” comes to similar results. As V-Dem rankings are done on a scale from 0.01 to 1.00, “relevant changes” are attested in the following Tables 3-7 to countries with an overall improvement or deterioration of at least 0.05 points. Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen are the ones which experienced such changes in all five indices (only

Tunisia to the better); Bahrain, Gaza and Iraq in two indices, Lebanon in one index. Tunisia is by far the biggest improver, with a significant change from 2011 to 2017 of more than 0.1 points in every single sub-index. In contrast, the Turkish government has been initiated the worst setbacks, making the country the biggest loser in each indicator. Likewise, Turkey is the only country which significantly deteriorated in every sub-index.

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	+/-	11>17
AL	0.27	0.2	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.08	+0.01
BA	0.14	0.1	0.1	0.11	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.09	-0.09
EG	0.2	0.22	0.15	0.15	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.14	-0.11
GZ	0.13	0.13	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.07	0.07	-0.06
IN	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.2	0.2	0.17	0.18	0.03	0.0
IQ	0.38	0.38	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.26	0.12	-0.12
IS	0.59	0.56	0.58	0.58	0.56	0.57	0.54	0.05	-0.05
JO	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.21	0.02	-0.02
KU	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.26	0.03	-0.03
LE	0.36	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.41	0.41	0.36	0.05	0.0
LI	0.16	0.26	0.4	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.25	0.24	+0.09
MO	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.33	+0.02
OM	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.02	+0.01
QA	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.01	+0.01
SA	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.02	+0.02
SU	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.03	+0.03
SY	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.0
TN	0.25	0.63	0.67	0.66	0.65	0.69	0.64	0.44	+0.39
TR	0.38	0.36	0.27	0.22	0.21	0.14	0.15	0.24	-0.23
UA	0.12	0.13	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	-
WB	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.22	0.2	0.24	0.05	-0.01
YE	0.21	0.35	0.31	0.13	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.33	-0.19
Ø	0.21	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.2	0.04	-0.01

Table 3: Data of V-Dem's “Deliberative Democracy” index

### Tables 3-7

Tables 3-7: Green-shaded values show a country's best ranking, orange-shaded values a country's worst ranking.

While the +/- column indicates the difference between each country's best and worst scores, the 11>17 column shows the net development from the 2011 edition (measuring the situation in 2011) to the 2017 edition (measuring the situation in 2017). In this column, red numbers indicate deteriorations of at least 0.1 points, green numbers improvements of at least 0.1 points.



	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	+/-	11>17
AL	0.26	0.24	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.05	+0.03
BA	0.14	0.13	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	-
EG	0.09	0.16	0.11	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.1	-0.02
GZ	0.17	0.17	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.06	-0.05
IN	0.17	0.18	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.19	0.17	0.03	0.0
IQ	0.3	0.29	0.23	0.21	0.2	0.22	0.19	0.11	-0.19
IS	0.57	0.55	0.56	0.56	0.55	0.56	0.53	0.04	-0.04
JO	0.2	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.02	-0.01
KU	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.01	0.0
LE	0.34	0.34	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.3	0.04	-0.04
LI	0.18	0.24	0.34	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.2	0.16	+0.02
MO	0.19	0.2	0.19	0.2	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.04	+0.03
OM	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.02	+0.02
QA	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.01	-0.01
SA	0.1	0.11	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.01	0.0
SU	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.1	0.02	+0.02
SY	0.11	0.1	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.03	-0.02
TN	0.26	0.55	0.6	0.58	0.57	0.61	0.56	0.35	+0.3
TR	0.41	0.38	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.21	0.19	0.22	-0.22
UA	0.15	0.17	-	0.18	0.19	0.19	-	0.04	-
WB	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.04	+0.04
YE	0.13	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.12	-0.09
∅	0.21	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.02	0.0

Table 4: Data of V-Dem's "Egalitarian Democracy" index

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	+/-	11>17
AL	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.02	+0.02
BA	0.09	0.07	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	-
EG	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.13	0.13	0.07	+0.04
GZ	0.1	0.11	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.04	-0.02
IN	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.02	+0.1
IQ	0.3	0.3	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.3	0.29	0.03	-0.01
IS	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.59	0.58	0.03	0.0
JO	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.2	0.24	0.04	+0.03
KU	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.01	-0.01
LE	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.04	+0.03
LI	0.06	0.19	0.32	0.2	0.2	0.19	0.19	0.26	+0.13
MO	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.03	+0.03
OM	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.01	+0.01
QA	0.11	0.1	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.03	-0.03
SA	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.0
SU	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.04	+0.04
SY	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.02
TN	0.18	0.56	0.6	0.6	0.61	0.67	0.62	0.43	+0.44
TR	0.43	0.42	0.34	0.31	0.27	0.24	0.12	0.31	-0.31
UA	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.11	0.11	-	0.02	-
WB	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.05	+0.05
YE	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.15	-0.11
∅	0.18	0.2	0.21	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.03	+0.02

Table 6: Data of V-Dem's "Liberal Democracy" index

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	+/-	11>17
AL	0.35	0.33	0.36	0.34	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.03	0.0
BA	0.21	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.08	-0.08
EG	0.16	0.29	0.23	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.11	+0.05
GZ	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.04	-0.03
IN	0.17	0.2	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.05	+0.05
IQ	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.44	0.43	0.46	0.4	0.07	-0.07
IS	0.71	0.68	0.7	0.71	0.7	0.71	0.69	0.03	-0.02
JO	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.02	0.0
KU	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.01	-0.01
LE	0.51	0.53	0.53	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.51	0.03	0.0
LI	0.13	0.28	0.51	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.27	0.38	+0.14
MO	0.3	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.3	0.02	0.0
OM	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.02	+0.02
QA	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.0	0.0
SA	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.0
SU	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.03	+0.04
SY	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.02	-0.01
TN	0.23	0.7	0.74	0.72	0.72	0.76	0.7	0.53	+0.47
TR	0.58	0.57	0.5	0.47	0.42	0.41	0.34	0.24	-0.24
UA	0.09	0.12	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	-
WB	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.25	0.03	+0.02
YE	0.09	0.36	0.36	0.32	0.13	0.12	0.1	0.37	+0.01
∅	0.27	0.3	0.32	0.3	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.05	+0.01

Table 5: Data of V-Dem's "Electoral Democracy" index

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	+/-	11>17
AL	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.04	-0.02
BA	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	-0.03
EG	0.12	0.17	0.13	0.11	0.1	0.09	0.1	0.08	-0.02
GZ	0.11	0.11	0.1	0.1	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.03	-0.03
IN	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.09	0.03	+0.02
IQ	0.29	0.28	0.3	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.25	0.05	-0.04
IS	0.45	0.43	0.45	0.45	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.02	0.0
JO	0.1	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.02	+0.02
KU	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.03	-0.02
LE	0.26	0.27	0.3	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.28	0.06	+0.02
LI	0.1	0.2	0.31	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.21	+0.07
MO	0.19	0.2	0.2	0.21	0.2	0.23	0.22	0.04	+0.03
OM	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.04	+0.04
QA	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.01
SA	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.0
SU	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.02	+0.01
SY	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.02	+0.01
TN	0.15	0.38	0.4	0.39	0.38	0.39	0.4	0.25	+0.25
TR	0.34	0.33	0.29	0.29	0.26	0.23	0.21	0.13	-0.23
UA	0.04	0.05	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	-
WB	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.02	-0.01
YE	0.2	0.18	0.17	0.13	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.14	-0.14
∅	0.15	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.03	0.0

Table 7: Data of V-Dem's "Participatory Democracy" index

According to V-Dem, the MENA region has realized improvement from 2011 to 2017 only in the area of “Liberal Democracy” (Table 6), though of a meager +0.02 only. This results partly from the 0.01 improvement in the “electoral democracy” index (Table 5), as V-Dem defines liberal democracy “as the existence of electoral democracy in combination with three additional components: rule of law ensuring respect for civil liberties, and constraints on the executive by the judiciary, as well as by the legislature”.<sup>1</sup> However, these improvements fully result from the early increases after the Arab Spring; since 2014, the average score for the whole region has remained stable at 0.20. Above all, these initial improvements were largely resulting from the massive hike in Tunisia (from 0.18 to 0.6), followed with a large distance by Libya (from 0.06 to 0.32). Over the whole period, especially Turkey and Yemen recorded major deteriorations.

Irrespective the marginal differences in the region’s overall trends, all five V-Dem indices show similar development patterns: from very low levels in 2011, some improvements had been realized in the following two years (highlighted through the majority of green-shaded fields in the centre of each country’s timeline), but then a negative trend set in, leading the regional assessments to almost the same level in 2017 as in 2011. Thus, while in difference to “Freedom in the World” (and also the

BTI, see below) V-DEM attests similar scores for the MENA region in 2017 as in 2011, it is clear that if Tunisia was not part of the region, the average scores would be significantly worse.

Two more findings from the V-Dem indices are of particular interest: firstly, Tunisia outperforms Turkey in every category since 2012, thus similar like the picture painted in the “Freedom of the World” index (from 2014 on, referring to the year 2013). In the “Liberal Democracy”, “Deliberative Democracy”, “Egalitarian Democracy” and “Electoral Democracy” indices, Tunisia even bypasses Israel and is thus the most democratic country of the whole region, which is not the case in the “Freedom of the World” index.

Secondly, Egypt turns out better in the 2017 “Electoral Democracy” and “Liberal Democracy” indices than in 2011; this is in stark contrast to the “Freedom in the World” index and also the BTI, in which Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ranks clearly below Mubarak’s Egypt.

The BTI, a bi-annual assessment of non-consolidated democracies by the German Bertelsmann Foundation, does not consider Israel (which is nevertheless included in the BTI’s sister project, the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) and also not Palestine (as it is no consolidated state). Each BTI measures the state of political and economic transformation of 31st January the year before: The

BTI 2012, for instance, measured the situation on 31st January 2011, which was literally at the peak of the Arab Spring protests (with Ben Ali already gone and Mubarak about being pushed out).<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, the most recent BTI 2018 refers to the state of

transformation on 31st January 2017. BTI scores are listed on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good). In the BTI’s “Democracy Status” sub-index, the MENA countries have made the following developments (see Figures 3, 4 and Table 8):




Figure 3: All MENA countries in the BTI’s “Democracy Status” index

Countries with significant changes (of at least 1 point between the respective best and worst achievements) are Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen (they are separately displayed in Figure 4).

Tunisia is the only country that realized significant improvements, sided by Algeria and Jordan with less significant improvements; all other countries, however, deteriorated. Also here, Turkey is the worst decliner, followed by Yemen and Syria.




Figure 4: MENA countries with relevant changes in the BTI's "Democracy Status" index




Figure 5: BTI indicator "Stateness" for relevant MENA countries

Regarding the region-wide developments, the BTI also attest a (though limited) improvement from 2012 to 2014, followed by a steady decline of democracy ever since. However, in contrast to V-Dem, but similar to Freedom House, the measured retraction is strong: a decline of 11.86 percent compared to the 2012 score, similar to the decline of 11.41 percent that the "Freedom in the World" index shows from 2011 to 2017. Also in contrast to "V-Dem", the BTI shows (partly) strong regional declines in all of its five democracy sub-indicators, i.e. Stateness (-1.1), Political Participation (-0.3), Rule of Law (-0.7), Stability of Democratic Institutions (-0.3) and Political and Social Integration (-0.2, see for illustration Figures 5-9, showing

the "relevant countries" for better readability). Thus, the BTI identifies as strongest declines in the MENA region since the Arab Spring the areas of "Stateness" and "Rule of Law". While the former analyzes the degree of the executive's control over, and presence in the country's whole territory (and hence also deals with questions of security), the latter focuses on power-sharing arrangements between the different political and judicial powers. We will see that this strongly supports the two main arguments of this paper, namely that on overemphasis of governmental leadership (usually expressed in one strong man at the top of the state) and a lack of institutionalization are dominant barriers for successful democratization in the MENA region.




Figure 6: BTI indicator "Political Participation" for relevant MENA countries




Figure 7: BTI indicator "Rule of Law" for relevant MENA countries




Figure 9: BTI Indicator "Political and Social Inclusion" for relevant MENA countries




Figure 8: BTI indicator "Stability of Democratic Institutions" for relevant MENA countries

	2012	2014	2016	2018	+/-	12>18
AL	4.3	4.8	4.8	4.75	0.5	+0.45
BA	4.35	3.65	3.48	3.23	1.12	-1.12
EG	4.08	4.92	3.93	3.7	1.22	-0.38
IN	3.25	3.13	2.97	2.92	0.33	-0.33
IQ	4.4	4.1	3.45	3.6	0.95	-0.8
JO	3.92	4.1	4.03	4.37	0.45	+0.45
KU	4.95	4.7	4.38	4.5	0.57	-0.45
LE	6.15	6.0	5.7	4.87	1.28	-1.28
LI	3.1	4.13	2.38	2.57	1.75	-0.53
MO	3.9	4.0	3.83	3.8	0.2	-0.1
OM	3.88	3.32	3.22	3.00	0.88	-0.88
QA	4.08	4.00	3.83	3.73	0.35	-0.35
SA	2.77	2.73	2.52	2.57	0.25	-0.2
SU	2.87	2.45	2.48	2.23	0.64	-0.64
SY	3.18	2.03	1.7	1.75	1.43	-1.43
TN	3.85	5.8	6.3	6.5	2.65	+2.65
TR	7.65	7.55	7.25	5.55	2.1	-2.1
UA	4.17	3.95	3.95	4.0	0.22	-0.17
YE	3.7	3.27	2.82	1.80	1.9	-1.9
∅	4.13	4.14	3.84	3.65	-0.49	0.48

Table 8: The MENA countries in the BTI's "Democracy Status" index

**Table 8**

Table 8: Green-shaded values show a country's best ranking, orange-shaded values a country's worst ranking.

While the +/- column indicates the difference between each country's best and worst scores, the 12>18 column shows the net development from the BTI 2012 edition (measuring the situation in 2011) to the BTI 2018 edition (measuring the situation in 2017). In this column, red numbers indicate deteriorations of at least 1.0 points, green numbers improvements of at least 1.0 points.

In sum, despite minor differences, especially concerning the comparatively moderate assessment of V-Dem in comparison with Freedom House and the BTI, all three indices show similar findings regarding a) Tunisia's strong improvement, b) Turkey's strong decline (both countries literally swapped sides), and c) significant declines in Egypt and Yemen (for Egypt not so much in V-Dem, for the BTI also in Bahrain, Lebanon, Libya and Syria). The whole region is in stag-nation at best, if not in ongoing decline. And not to be forgotten: if Tunisia was not part of the region, the aggregated MENA scores would rank much worse in all three indices.

### ***Reasons for the success in Tunisia and failure elsewhere***

The quantitative data of the three indices show that the positive developments in the democracy levels of the MENA countries were indeed only a small "dent" shortly after 2011. With the exception of Tunisia, no country could realize significant improvements until more recently, and in many countries, short-term improvements were soon absorbed by consecutive steps of autocratization by the old regimes<sup>3</sup>, if they not drowned in civil wars like Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen.

The strongest hook for an explanation of the largely failed democratization offers the BTI, with its strong evidence for lowered Stateness and Rule of Law. It convincingly leads to the seminal argument Ellen Lust made when discussing reasons for the MENA region's exceptionalism regarding resistance to democratization: According to her, the MENA region remained largely authoritarian not so much because of the (often presumed) overabundance of natural resources, an assumed incompatibility of Islam with democracy, paternalistic societal structures and lack of education or technical innovation. Instead, she saw it resulting from a "legacy of fear" that the incumbent regimes perfectly sowed and likewise exploited: by permanently branding political Islam as a terrorist threat that seeks to destabilize the state and the nation, the autocratic regimes divided the opposition into Islamists and Secularists which both started to oppose each other, instead of working together against the regime.<sup>4</sup>

For secular-socialist regimes like in Nasserist Egypt or Bourguiba's Tunisia, this was an urgent as well as welcomed task: the latent threat of Islamism was stigmatized as existential threat, especially since the Islamist Revolution in Iran in 1979 had overturned the secular Shah regime, and after Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat got killed by an Islamist cell within the Egyptian army on 6 October 1981. That eventually al-Qaeda rose out of opposition against the Saudi monarchy and their alliance with the USA in the fight against Saddam Hussein, just strengthened the overall perception.

Being particularly followed in the secular republics, this divide-et-impera strategy sadly led as sad climax to the army's interference in Algeria after the Islamists' victory in the general elections 1989, being the beginning of a devastating civil war in the 1990s. Here, like in Egypt and Tunisia, the presidential regimes followed a strategy of exclusion of the Islamists' official representatives (such as expressed in the ban of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Ennahda party) with concomitant usurpation of parts of their contents, to prevent any Islamist uprisings from the beginning. In the monarchies, where the rulers to large extent derived legitimacy from their direct lineage to the Prophet Mohammed, such as in Jordan and Morocco, political Islam was not per se treated as something "alien" to the country: here, the royal courts were rather following the strategy of suppressing potential Islamist opposition through coopting their main representatives and including them into the ruling structures.<sup>5</sup>

## **“...THE REGIMES STARTED TO SET-UP FACADE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS...”**

Whatever the strategy, the consequence was just the same: free and fair elections cannot be afforded, as a likely Islamist takeover would throw the countries into turmoil. This message was not limited to the own people: it was increasingly used also as argument for external donors, who increasingly demanded democratic reforms since the 1990s. Yet, in order to quell external criticism of the horrendous human rights abuses within the MENA countries, the regimes started to set-up façade democratic institutions, such as parliaments constituted upon apparently meaningful elections, or opposition parties that were supposed to spread the flavor of democratizing Arab regimes.<sup>6</sup>

In consequence, Arab states were mainly marked by a) a strong regime built around a charismatic head, whether president, king or revolutionary leader, b) as a consequence thereof, weak political institutions, that were mainly held just for show in order to please external donors, but without any meaningful relevance to the internal policy making, including the (usually infant)

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opposition, and c) political Islam as incorporation of the state’s biggest security threat, while at the same time regimes coopted religious principles in order to keep Islamist resistance low and gain the support of pious citizens. The message in the end was clear: the strong, leader-centered regime is needed in order to prevent an Islamist takeover. A dictator saves us from collapse.

This triangular, mutually reinforcing power scheme successfully simulated stability, and Western criticism was minimal when secular Fatah insisted of staying in power after Islamist Hamas had won the general elections in Palestine in 2006, or when Mubarak squeezed the thumb-screws again after an unprecedented success of Muslim Brothers in the 2005 elections, leading to largely flawed parliamentary elections in 2010 which Holger Albrecht called “a telling example of the regime’s arrogance towards its people”<sup>7</sup> – yet which eventually became one of the last straws leading to the mass uprisings few weeks after.

However, the Arab Spring has not wiped out those blaming and shaming games, but rather intensified them. The state collapses of Libya, Syria, Yemen and partly Iraq played well into the hands of the authoritarian regimes: If we want our country

endure, they argued, we must not allow for an Islamist takeover. If that was not enough, the refugee crisis that evolved in 2015 was the last ace missing in the hands of MENA’s dictators. Now, the last criticism from Europe of the unbearable human rights standards in most South and East Mediterranean states eventually vanished.<sup>8</sup>

The regime of President al-Sisi in Egypt has been one of the front runners, but the same can be said about Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and others: Europe feels too strongly dependent on their cooperation in the fight against Islamist terrorism and in keeping migrants away from Europe. This is a carte blanche for the Southern regimes’ enormous power abuse and mismanagement.

The “EU-Turkey Statement” from March 2016 has been the most visible outflow of these stability-oriented priorities.<sup>9</sup> Now that Europe depends on Erdoğan’s willingness to keep refugees in Turkey, the EU does not dare responding appropriately to his intensifying attacks against fundamental rights and freedoms of the Turkish citizens.

Yet, despite the strategies being the same, Turkey is insofar an exception as the fear of Islamism seemed to be overcome under Erdoğan, but regrettably, it even seems to be over-twisted with increasing discrimination of, and pressure against opponents to Erdoğan’s Islamist power execution. The decade-long suppression of political Islam under the banner of Kemalism clearly seems ended since the Islamist AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) controls parliament and state presidency. However, Erdoğan uses the strategy of spreading fear in the same way as the region’s secular dictators, painting either the Kurds, the Gülen movement or the West (think of his Nazi accusation against Dutch or German diplomats) as threat to the state’s stability. The regime’s “witch hunt”, as the BTI 2018 Turkey report names it, “serves to mobilize and indoctrinate its own followers as well as to exclude all political competitors”.<sup>10</sup>

Yet, under the banner of anti-terror measures, civil rights of secularist citizens have been massively reduced in Turkey, and personal freedoms dramatically limited, especially since the failed coup attempt in summer 2016. Tens of thousands of public employers, teachers, doctors, professors, soldiers, journalists and police officers have been removed from their jobs, many of them handed down harsh imprisonments. However, what is as bad is the progressive erosion of institutionalized political power structures while a concomitant extension of personalized power in the hands of the state president: the first direct presidential elections in the country’s history in August 2014 brought

not only the easy transition of Erdoğan from the prime minister's office (which he had held since 2003) to the presidency. He is now the strongest Turkish president ever since Mustapha Kemal Atatürk. At the same time, parliament seems to be outmanoeuvred: When the general elections in early 2015 brought an end to the absolute majority of AKP, consecutive coalition negotiations were run in a half-hearted manner, leading to Erdoğan's call of snap elections within few months. The Kurdish-oriented HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, Democratic People's Party), strongly discriminated during the electoral campaigning, could not repeat its strong showing, and AKP regained its absolute majority in parliament. The formerly governing Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People's Party) has become too weak to even be a meaningful opposition force. Thus, in combination with the internal strengthening of the radical forces within AKP, and the sidelining of rather moderate representatives like former state president Abdullah Gül, the ascent of Erdoğan to a "leader of the centenary" until the Turkish Republic's 100th anniversary in 2023 looks predetermined.

Thus, MENA leaders use the same populist strategies: they all pretend to be the only persons who can protect "their people" from an existential threat that is either coming from outside (i.e., the EU, Israel, or the Islamic State) or from within (i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood, or any oppositionists who publicly criticizes the government). By this, they make their supporters believe that without them, the country would be lost.

So, how is that different in Tunisia, which also has had to find its way since 2011 from a decade-long personalized dictatorship? Indeed, critics have rightly pointed out that much of the post-2011 developments was mainly decided by Béji Caïd Essebsi (interim prime minister in 2013 and state president since 2014) and Rachid Ghannouchi (leader of the Islamist Ennahda party), often dubbed as the "two sheikhs". Especially Essebsi, who during his election into the state's highest office was hailed "as a leader who could restore haibat al-dawla (the prestige of the state)"<sup>11</sup>, tried repeatedly to extend his influence "over the Parliament, which has been seen by some experts as a dangerous return to nepotistic practices".<sup>12</sup> Thus, the risk of a backsliding into person-centered politics is real also in Tunisia.

However, despite certain limitations, especially with regards to the still not implemented constitutional court, Tunisia enjoys a certain level of political and societal institutions that outshine all other Arab states. This begin with the influential Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), but comprises also political parties, which still play a role against all odds: Ennahda seems unmatched regarding its organizational professionalism and societal roots,

and even the repeated skinning of Nida Tounes and disintegration could be seen as an (admittedly painful) consolidation process that eventually leads to a better-established secular counterforce. However, it is clear that the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia is not finished yet: depending on how the splitting of Nidaa Tounes continues, it may also well happen that Ennahda will grow into the absolute power holder – however this will look then. Thus, if democracy in Tunisia shall have a chance, a further consolidation of political institutions and structures at all sides is imperative.

### **Conclusions**

The urgent political, social and economic problems that triggered the Arab Spring have not been solved in any of the MENA countries. In contrary, social injustice has in tendency further in-creased. Yet, instead of building democratic structures that would allow citizens to peacefully express grievances and dissatisfaction, the incumbent regimes react with ever more suppression and injustice. Except for Tunisia, not even the minimum condition for democratic polities is fulfilled, i. e., meaningful elections. Instead, clientelist networks of monarchs, generals and autocratic presidents rule those countries. Thus, it is not surprising that these rulers continue to exploit the state resources, arrest intellectuals, suppress oppositionists.

The declining assessments of the "Freedom in the World" index, V-Dem and the BTI speak volumes. Referring to the sprawling insecurity across the region, it is easy for the incumbent regimes to declare security the overarching goal. This, unfortunately, allows the quick condemnation of legitimate criticism as threat to state security.

The glorification of personal leaders, and the prevention of the emergence of democratic, institutionalized structures are main reasons why democracy in the MENA region so far has failed. Yet, in times where criticism from outside would be so important, European politicians are not only quiet, the populists among them even fuel the fire.

As I have argued elsewhere, after Orbán's plans to close down the Central European University, Trump's attacks against the media, and the UK's choice of leaving the European Union:

What can Europeans say about the lack of academic freedom in the Middle East when in their own heartland liberal universities are threatened by sudden legal action? What can Americans say about the lack of press freedom in the Middle East when 'alternative facts' become the norm in presidential speeches? What can Europeans say about the lack of regional cooperation in the Middle East when nationalism re-emerges as a dominating factor in Western discourse?<sup>13</sup>

The global rise of populist leaders also in influential states such as Brazil, Russia and the US is the rain that waters the kleptocratic MENA regimes. Trump, Putin and Bolsonaro, but also Kurz, Salvini and Orbán, will not reject but further dung authoritarianism in the Southern Mediterranean. Thus, it is to be feared that the democratization tendencies of 2011 and 2012 were indeed just a dent, while the long-term perspectives remain very much the same as before: Democracy in the MENA region will hardly prosper.

## END NOTES

- 1 Anna Lührmann, Valeriva Mechkova and Staffan I. Lindberg, "State of the World 2017 – Liberal and Electoral Democracy," in: V-Dem Institute (ed.), *Democracy for all. V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018* (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 2018), 16.
- 2 Jan Claudius Völkel, "Complex Politics in Single Numbers? The Problem of Defining and Measuring Democracy," *Middle East Critique*, 24:1, 2015, 67-81.
- 3 See on the concept of "Autocratization": Luca Tomini, *When Democracies collapse: Assessing Transitions to Non-Democratic Regimes in the Contemporary World* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 7ff.
- 4 Ellen Lust, "Missing the Third Wave: Islam, Institutions, and Democracy in the Middle East," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 46:2, 2011, 163-190, here: 186.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 173.
- 6 Francesco Cavatorta, "The Convergence of Governance: Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World and Downgrading Democracy Elsewhere?" *Middle East Critique*, 19:3, 2010, 217-232.
- 7 Holger Albrecht, "Authoritarian Transformation or Transition from Authoritarianism? Insights on Regime Change in Egypt," in: Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (eds.) *Arab Spring in Egypt* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 251-270, here 259.
- 8 Jan Claudius Völkel, "When Interior Ministers play diplomat: fatal ambiguities in Europe's securitised migration policy," in: Annette Jünemann, Nicolas Fromm and Nikolas Scherer, Ni-kolas (eds.) *Fortress Europe? Challenges and Failures of Migration and Asylum Policies* (Wiesbaden, Springer, 2017), 83-103.
- 9 Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Brad K. Blitz and Heaven Crawley, "The Politics of evidence-based Policy in Europe's 'Migration Crisis'," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, online first 30 May 2018, 8, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1468307> (5 February 2019).
- 10 Hauke Hartmann, "Peace on Earth? The Quality of Conflict Management is in Decline," BTI Blog, 16 December 2018, <https://blog.bti-project.org/2018/12/16/peace-earth-quality-conflict-management-decline> (5 February 2019).
- 11 Maha Yahya, Great Expectations in Tunisia, Carnegie Paper, 31 March 2016, 19, [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC\\_60\\_Yahya\\_Tunisia\\_Final.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_60_Yahya_Tunisia_Final.pdf) (5 February 2019); stressing in original.
- 12 Felipe Gómez Isa and Ester Muñoz Nogal, EU Promotion of Deep Democracy in the Southern Mediterranean: A Missed Opportunity? (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), 25, <http://www.fp7-frame.eu/frame-reps-12-4/> (5 February 2019).
- 13 Jan Claudius Völkel, "As Populists rise in the West, Arab Autocrats rejoice," BTI Blog, 19 May 2017, <https://blog.bti-project.org/2017/05/19/populists-rise-west-arab-autocrats-rejoice/> (5 February 2019).

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