Staff profile

Bibhas Saha is an applied micro-economist specializing in the area of betting markets, corruption, privatization and development economics. He has published in journals like Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Economics Letters, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Comparative Economics, Economica, Review of Development Economics, and Journal of Economics among others.

After obtaining PhD in Economics from the University of Southern California, USA in 1990, he joined the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India. There he worked on several applications of the incentive theory and information economics, which included bargaining with endogenous side choice, countervailing incentives in bureaucratic corruption and trade union bargaining.

Later from 2005 to 2014 he worked at the School of Economics at the University of East Anglia. His recent work is mostly devoted to studying fixed odds betting markets in the presence of match-fixing risk. His research has shown that the risk of match-fixing can substantially alter the nature of betting competition and lead to unpredictable outcomes. He also studies problems of education, child labour and microfinance in developing countries.

Mini Biography

Bibhas Saha joined Durham Business School in August 2014 as Reader in Economics. Prior to that, he worked at the University of East Anglia and Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India. His research interests are betting markets, corruption, mixed oligopoly and development economics.

• Betting Markets
• Corruption
• Mixed Oligopoly
• Development Economics

Authored book

• Advanced Microeconomics: Theory, Applications and New Developments
  
  Saha, B. (2024). Advanced Microeconomics: Theory, Applications and New Developments. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003226994

Chapter in book

• Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour
  
  Saha, B. (2019). Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour. In S. Bandyopadhya & M. Dutta (Eds.), Opportunities and challenges in development : essays for Sarmila Banerjee. (pp. 357-366). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9981-7
• Failing to Learn: India's Schools and Teachers
  
  Saha, B., & Saha, S. (2018). Failing to Learn: India’s Schools and Teachers. In R. Prasad, C. Rowley, & A. Banerjee (Eds.), Changing the Indian economy : renewal, reform and revival. (pp. 55-75). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-102005-0.00004-6
• From rigidity to flexibility
  
  Saha, B. (2015). From rigidity to flexibility. In K. Ramaswamy (Ed.), Labour, employment and economic growth in India. (pp. 221-238). Cambridge University Press.
• Labour markets: Balancing freedom and protection
  
  Saha, B., & Pal, R. (2014). Labour markets: Balancing freedom and protection. In A. Goyal (Ed.), Handbook of the Indian economy in the 21st century : understanding the inherent dynamism.. Oxford University Press.
• Industrial Labour: Five Essays on the Industrial Development in India.
  
  Saha, B. (2003). Industrial Labour: Five Essays on the Industrial Development in India. In Block 10, Units 30-34.. Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi.
• Clean development mechanism: issues and options.
  
  Saha, B., Babu, P., & Kavi Kumar, K. (2003). Clean development mechanism: issues and options. In M. Toman, U. Chakravorty, & S. Gupta (Eds.), India and Global Climate Change Perspectives on Economics and Policy from a Developing Country, Resources for the Future Press, Resources for the Future.. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, also Oxford University Press, 2004, New Delhi.
• Severance pay, wage effects and entry deterrence.
  
  Saha, B. (2000). Severance pay, wage effects and entry deterrence. In G. Gupta, M. Gupta, & B. Moitra (Eds.), Issues in Development Economics, Orient Longman, Hyderabad. (pp. 1-19).
• Strike threats and wage settlements.
  
  Saha, B., & Ghosh, S. (2000). Strike threats and wage settlements. In G. Gupta, M. Gupta, & B. Moitra (Eds.), Issues in Development Economics, Orient Longman, Hyderabad. (pp. 20-36).
• Human Capital, Employment and Worker Well-being in India.
  
  Saha, B., & Jayati, S. (2000). Human Capital, Employment and Worker Well-being in India. In S. Gangopadhyay & W. Wadhwa (Eds.), Economic Reforms for the Poor’ (pp. 197-232). Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi.
• Joint implementation: A bargaining approach.
  
  Saha, B., & Babu, P. (1997). Joint implementation: A bargaining approach. In J. Parikh, R. Culpeper, D. Runnalls, & J. Painuly (Eds.), Climate change and North-South Cooperation: Indo-Canadian Cooperation in Joint Implementation. (pp. 232-255). Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, New Delhi.
• Layoff compensation and entry deterrence.
  
  Saha, B., & Sen, A. (1996). Layoff compensation and entry deterrence. In A. Sen, A. Banerjee, & B. Chatterjee (Eds.), Economic Theory, Trade and Quantitative Economics. (pp. 108-122). University of Calcutta.
• Forming or reforming the exit policy.
  
  Saha, B. (1995). Forming or reforming the exit policy. In K. Parikh (Ed.), The mid-year review of the economy, 1994-95. (pp. 200-222). India International Centre and Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.
• Exit policy: problems and options.
  
  Saha, B. (1992). Exit policy: problems and options. In Indian Merchants’ Chamber and Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research. (pp. 91-108).

Journal Article

• Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation
  
  Mukherjee, A., & Saha, B. (in press). Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
• Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace
  
  Roy, J., & Saha, B. (2025). Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace. Games and Economic Behavior, 152, 113-132. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.004
• Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games
  
  Chowdhury, S. M., Young Jeon, J., & Saha, B. (2023). Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 107, Article 102087. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102087
• Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy
  
  Bag, P. K., Saha, B., & Sikdar, S. (2021). Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy. Social Choice and Welfare, 56(1), 173-203. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01275-x
• Trade in the Time of the COVID-19 Outbreak
  
  Kumar De, U., & Saha, B. (2020). Trade in the Time of the COVID-19 Outbreak. Journal of Development Policy Review (JDPR), 1(1 & 2), 1-9.
• Credit Where Credit's Due: The Enabling Effects of Empowerment in Indian Microfinance
  
  Saha, B., & Sangwan, N. (2019). Credit Where Credit’s Due: The Enabling Effects of Empowerment in Indian Microfinance. World Development, 122, 537-551. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.06.009
• Goal Setting as a Motivator for Student Performance: Evidence from Lab Experiments
  
  Saha, B., & Roy, S. (2019). Goal Setting as a Motivator for Student Performance: Evidence from Lab Experiments. Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice, 19(3), 153-165.
• Enhancing Excellence: Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal
  
  Pal, S., & Saha, B. (2019). Enhancing Excellence: Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal. Journal of Development Studies, 55(5), 765-785. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2018.1464142
• Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game
  
  Chowdhury, S., Jeon, J., & Saha, B. (2017). Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game. Southern Economic Journal, 84(2), 474-483. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12223
• Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining
  
  Chatterjee, I., & Saha, B. (2017). Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining. Managerial and Decision Economics, 38(4), 607-621. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2807
• Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market
  
  Bag, P., & Saha, B. (2017). Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market. The Economic Journal, 127(601), 624-652. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12483
• Entry Threats and Inefficiency in `Efficient Bargaining'
  
  Pal, R., & Saha, B. (2016). Entry Threats and Inefficiency in `Efficient Bargaining’. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 63(3), 258-277. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12091
• Match-Fixing in a Monopoly Betting Market
  
  Bag, P., & Saha, B. (2016). Match-Fixing in a Monopoly Betting Market. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 26(1), 257-289. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12172
• Privatization, underpricing and welfare in the presence of foreign competition
  
  Ghosh, A., Mitra, M., & Saha, B. (2015). Privatization, underpricing and welfare in the presence of foreign competition. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 17(3), 433-460. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12095
• Pollution Tax, Partial Privatization and Environment
  
  Pal, R., & Saha, B. (2015). Pollution Tax, Partial Privatization and Environment. Resource and Energy Economics, 40, 19-35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2015.01.004
• Mixed duopoly and environment.
  
  Saha, B., & Pal, R. (2014). Mixed duopoly and environment. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 16(1), 96-118. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12056
• Trade openness, labour institutions and flexibilisation: Theory and evidence from India.
  
  Saha, B., Sen, K., & Maiti, D. (2013). Trade openness, labour institutions and flexibilisation: Theory and evidence from India. Labour Economics, 24, 180-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2013.08.008
• Bilateral Delegation in Wage and Employment Bargaining in Monopoly
  
  Chatterjee, I., & Saha, B. (2013). Bilateral Delegation in Wage and Employment Bargaining in Monopoly. Economics Letters, 120(2), 280-283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009
• State ownership, credit risk and bank competition: a mixed oligopoly approach.
  
  Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2013). State ownership, credit risk and bank competition: a mixed oligopoly approach. Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, 6(1), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1080/17520843.2011.641719
• Institutions or geography: Which matters most in economic development?
  
  Saha, B. (2013). Institutions or geography: Which matters most in economic development?. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 25(1-2), 69-89. https://doi.org/10.1177/0260107914524668
• Does privatization improve the environment? Revisiting the monopoly case.
  
  Saha, B. (2012). Does privatization improve the environment? Revisiting the monopoly case. Economics Letters, 115(1), 97-99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.017
• Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds.
  
  Saha, B., & Kanti Bag, P. (2011). Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 318-344. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.001
• Academic specialization and returns to education: Evidence from India.
  
  Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2011). Academic specialization and returns to education: Evidence from India. Journal of Education and Work, 24(5), 501-520. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080.2011.573775
• Mixed Ownership, Managerial Incentives and Bank Competition.
  
  Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2011). Mixed Ownership, Managerial Incentives and Bank Competition. Bulletin of Economic Research, 63(4), 385-403. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00354.x
• Interest rate discrimination, tenancy and cost sharing.
  
  Saha, B., & Sharma, T. (2011). Interest rate discrimination, tenancy and cost sharing. Indian Growth and Development Review, 4(2), 153-165. https://doi.org/10.1108/17538251111172050
• Private tutoring, school education and government policy.
  
  Saha, B., & Saha, S. (2009). Private tutoring, school education and government policy. Review of Market Integration, 1(3), 375-408. https://doi.org/10.1177/097492921000100305
• Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products.
  
  Saha, B. (2009). Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products. Journal of Economics, 98(1), 25-43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0075-x
• Spatial competition in a mixed duopoly with one partially privatized firm.
  
  Saha, B., & Kumar, A. (2008). Spatial competition in a mixed duopoly with one partially privatized firm. Journal of Comparative Economics, 36(2), 326-341. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2007.03.001
• The redistributive role of managerial incentives in a mixed duopoly.
  
  Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2008). The redistributive role of managerial incentives in a mixed duopoly. Economics Bulletin, 12(27), 1-10.
• Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence: A Reassessment of Limit Pricing.
  
  Saha, B., & Pal, R. (2008). Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence: A Reassessment of Limit Pricing. Journal of Economics, 95(2), 121-147. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0030-2
• Labour institutions in India and China: A tale of two nations.
  
  Saha, B. (2006). Labour institutions in India and China: A tale of two nations. Journal of South Asian Development, 1(2), 179-205. https://doi.org/10.1177/097317410600100202
• Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs.
  
  Saha, B., & Thampy, T. (2006). Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60(2), 182-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.05.004
• Wage commitment, signalling and entry deterrence or accommodation.
  
  Saha, B., & Pal, R. (2006). Wage commitment, signalling and entry deterrence or accommodation. LABOUR, 20(4), 625-650.
• Divestment and bank competition.
  
  Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2004). Divestment and bank competition. Journal of Economics, 81(3), 223-247.
• Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment.
  
  Saha, B. (2003). Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(4, November), 893-897.
• Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy.
  
  Saha, B. (2001). Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy. Journal of Development Economics, 65(1), 113-133.
• Schooling, informal experience and formal sector earnings.
  
  Saha, B., & Sarkar, S. (1999). Schooling, informal experience and formal sector earnings. Review of Development Economics, 3(2), 187-199.
• Job security, wage bargaining and duopoly outcomes.
  
  Saha, B., & Majumdar, S. (1998). Job security, wage bargaining and duopoly outcomes. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 7(4), 389-403.
• Efficient emission reduction through joint implementation.
  
  Saha, B., & Babu, P. (1996). Efficient emission reduction through joint implementation. Environment and Development Economics, 1, 445-464.
• Side choice and bargaining with asymmetric information.
  
  Saha, B. (1995). Side choice and bargaining with asymmetric information. Economics, 62, 521-539.
• Industrial disputes in India: an empirical analysis.
  
  Saha, B., & Pan, I. (1994). Industrial disputes in India: an empirical analysis. Economic and Political Weekly., 29(18), 1081-1087.
• Implicit contracts under job-security regulations.
  
  Saha, B. (1993). Implicit contracts under job-security regulations. Keio Economic Studies, xxx(1), 53-64.
• Trade Union Bargaining, Privatization and Adjustment Measures.
  
  Saha, B., & Sen, A. (1992). Trade Union Bargaining, Privatization and Adjustment Measures. Keio Economic Studies, xxix(2), 15-23.
• Product innovation and stability of collusion.
  
  Saha, B. (n.d.). Product innovation and stability of collusion. Economics Bulletin. Advance online publication.
• School dropout and informal apprenticeship.
  
  Saha, B., Dasgupta, P., & Sensarma, R. (n.d.). School dropout and informal apprenticeship. India Macroeconomics Annual, 88-125.