Staff profile

Prof. Angel Hernando-Veciana has held academic positions in Universidad de Alicante (assistant professor), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (assistant and associate professor) and University College London (funded by a Marie Curie postdoc from the European Commission).

His work on mechanism design, information economics and auction theory has been published in the top journals of economic theory: Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior and Economics Letters.

His work has contributed to the understanding of the implications of bidders’ asymmetries in auctions, competition among auctioneers, and more recently to the design of interest benchmarks like the LIBOR and mechanisms to allocate refugees.

He has also been principal researcher of several research projects funded by the Spanish government and private institutions and has played a leading role in the production of online courses.

• Auction Theory
• Information Economics
• Mechanism Design
• Microeconomic Theory

Chapter in book

• Hernando-Veciana, A. (2018). Auctions. In L. Corchon, & M. Marini (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II (318-337). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789.00020

Journal Article

• Hagen, M., & Hernando-Veciana, A. (2021). Multidimensional Bargaining and Posted Prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 196, Article 105317. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317
• Hernando-Veciana, A., & Tröge, M. (2020). Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in Libor Submissions. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(6), 2585-2621. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz101
• Hernando-Veciana, A., & Michelucci, F. (2018). Inefficient Rushes in Auctions. Theoretical Economics, 13(1), 273-306. https://doi.org/10.3982/te2513
• Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2017). On the efficiency of the first price auction. Economics Letters, 156, 159-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003
• Beker, P. F., & Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2015). The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints. Journal of Economic Theory, 155, 234-261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.013
• Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2014). On the optimality of not allocating. Economics Letters, 125(2), 233-235. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016
• Börgers, T., Hernando-Veciana, A., & Krähmer, D. (2013). When are signals complements or substitutes?. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(1), 165-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.012
• Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2012). Comment on: “Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences”. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 235-239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.008
• Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2011). Second best efficiency and the English auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 496-506. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003
• Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Tröge, M. (2011). The insider's curse. Games and Economic Behavior, 71(2), 339-350. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.007
• Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2009). Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids. Games and Economic Behavior, 65(2), 372-405. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.015
• Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2006). On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry. Review of Economic Design, 10(1), 53-61. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0001-4
• Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2005). Competition among auctioneers in large markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 121(1), 107-127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.001
• Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2004). Successful uninformed bidding. Games and Economic Behavior, 48(1), 29-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002