Staff profile

For up-to-date info on my publications and teaching please visit my personal website (not the list below).

Authored book

• The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry
  Cowie, C. (2019). The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429468117
• Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument from Analogy
  Cowie, C. (2019). Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument from Analogy. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.001.0001

Book review

• Joyce, Richard. Morality: From Error to Fiction. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024. Pp. 256. £77 (hardcover)
  Cowie, C. (in press). Joyce, Richard. Morality: From Error to Fiction. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024. Pp. 256. £77 (hardcover). Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy,

Chapter in book

• Introduction
  Cowie, C., & Rowland, R. (2020). Introduction. In Companions in guilt : arguments in metaethics (1-16). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429454677-1
• Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Ethics and Mathematics
  Cowie, C. (2019). Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Ethics and Mathematics. In Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge
• The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics
  Cowie, C. (2018). The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics. In J. Suikkanen, & A. Kauppinen (Eds.), Methodology and moral philosophy (127-147). Routledge
• Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity
  Cowie, C., & Greenberg, A. (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In C. Kyriacou, & R. McKenna (Eds.), Metaepistemology : realism and anti-realism (173-196). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8

Edited book

• Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics
  Cowie, C., & Rowland, R. (Eds.). (2019). Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge

Journal Article

• Methodological Conservatism in the Assessment of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena
  Cowie, C. (in press). Methodological Conservatism in the Assessment of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena. Ergo,
• A New Case for Moral Skepticism: The Argument from Paradox 1
  Cowie, C. (in press). A New Case for Moral Skepticism: The Argument from Paradox 1. Journal of Philosophy,
• Optimism in the Search for Extraterrestrial Life? A Philosophical Perspective
  Cowie, C. (online). Optimism in the Search for Extraterrestrial Life? A Philosophical Perspective. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
• New Work on Biosignatures
  Cowie, C. (2023). New Work on Biosignatures. Mind, 133(530), 452-471. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad050
• Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory
  Cowie, C. (2023). Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory. Journal of Philosophy, 120(9), 457-483. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2023120927
• What are Paradoxes?
  Cowie, C. (2023). What are Paradoxes?. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 9(1), 154-171. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.48
• Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence
  Cowie, C. (2023). Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence. Philosophical Quarterly, 73(1), 64-83. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac009
• Confidence of Life Detection: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
  Vickers, P., Cowie, C., Dick, S. J., Gillen, C., Jeancolas, C., Rothschild, L. J., & McMahon, S. (2023). Confidence of Life Detection: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Astrobiology, 23(11), https://doi.org/10.1089/ast.2022.0084
• A new argument for moral error theory
  Cowie, C. (2022). A new argument for moral error theory. Noûs, 56(2), 276-294. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357
• The 'Oumuamua Controversy: A Philosophical Perspective
  Cowie, C. (2021). The 'Oumuamua Controversy: A Philosophical Perspective. Nature Astronomy, 5, 526-527. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41550-021-01387-z
• Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?
  Cowie, C. (2020). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies, 177(6), 1685-1702. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6
• Companions in Guilt Arguments
  Cowie, C. (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass, 13(11), Article e12528. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12528
• Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing
  Schleicher, J., Schaafsma, M., Burgess, N. D., Sandbrook, C., Danks, F., Cowie, C., & Vira, B. (2018). Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing. Sustainable Development, 26(1), 83-98. https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.1692
• Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?
  Cowie, C. (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies, 174(12), 3021-3039. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0844-7
• Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh
  Greenberg, A., & Cowie, C. (2017). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1), 128 - 145. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12158
• Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies
  Cowie, C. (2016). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(1), 115-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1026269
• Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits
  Cowie, C. (2016). Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(3), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9680-7
• Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study
  Cowie, C. (2015). Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. Metaphilosophy, 46(4-5), 605-619. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12159
• In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.
  Cowie, C. (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese, 191(16), 4003-4017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0510-6
• A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists
  Cowie, C. (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica, 91(4), 661-679. https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2014.91.4.3
• Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work.
  Cowie, C. (2014). Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. Philosophical Quarterly, 64(256), 407-422. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu028
• Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement.
  Cowie, C. (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis, 79(1), 191-209. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9485-9