Staff profile

Email: philip.a.goff@durham.ac.uk

Office hours:

Wednesday: 11-12. 

Thursday: 9:15-10:15, 11:15-12:15, 14:00-15:00

About me

My main research project is trying to work out how consciousness fits into our overall theory of reality. I argue that the traditional approaches of physicalism (consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes in the brain) and dualism (consciousness is separate from the body and brain) face insuperable difficulties. On the basis of this I defend a form of panpsychism, the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. It sounds a bit crazy, but I try to show that it avoids the difficulties faced by its rivals.

In my recent book Why? The Purpose of the Universe (Oxford University Press, 2023) I explore whether panpsychism can offer a kind of middle way between traditional belief in God and secular atheism.

I have also have a more general book on panpsychism aimed at a general audience – Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness (Rider in UK, Pantheon in US, 2019) – and a book on panpsychism aimed at an audence of academic philosophhers –  Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (Oxford University Press, 2017). Finally, I have co-edited a collection of essays by scientists (including Carlo Rovelli, Sean Carroll, Lee Smolin, Annaka Harris, Christof Koch, and Anil Seth), philosophers, and spiritual thinkers responding to my work: Is Consciousness Everywhere? Essays on Panpsychism.

NB I DON'T REGULARLY UPDATE THIS PAGE. PLEASE GO TO MY WEBSITE....where you can access more of my publications, articles for a general audience, and videos of interviews and conversations with scientists and philosophers: www.philipgoffphilosophy.com

Whatever Google says, I'm not 60!

Authored book

• Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
  Goff, P. (2019). Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. Rider in UK, Pantheon in US
• Consciousness and Fundamental Reality
  Goff, P. (2017). Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190677015.001.0001

Book review

• The integrated information theory: Important insights but not a complete theory of consciousness
  Goff, P. (2020). The integrated information theory: Important insights but not a complete theory of consciousness. American Journal of Psychology, 133(4), 523-526. https://doi.org/10.5406/amerjpsyc.133.4.0523

Chapter in book

• In defence of phenomenal sharing
  Goff, P., & Roelofs, L. In defence of phenomenal sharing. In L. Bugnon, & M. Nida-Rumelin (Eds.), The Phenomenology of Self-Awareness and the Nature of Conscious Subjects. Routledge
• Quantum mechanics and the consciousness constraint
  Goff, P. (2022). Quantum mechanics and the consciousness constraint. In S. Gao (Ed.), Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics (117-139). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197501665.003.0006
• Universal consciousness and the ground of logic
  Goff, P. (2020). Universal consciousness and the ground of logic. In B. Goecke, & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Pantheism and panpsychism (107-122). Brill/Mentis. https://doi.org/10.30965/9783957437303_007
• Russellian monism
  Coleman, S., & Goff, P. (2020). Russellian monism. In U. Kriegel (Ed.), Oxford handbook of the philosophy of consciousness. Oxford University Press
• Cosmopsychism, micropsychism and the grounding relation
  Goff, P. (2020). Cosmopsychism, micropsychism and the grounding relation. In W. Seager (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of panpsychism. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717708
• Panpsychism
  Goff, P. (2017). Panpsychism. In E. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Panpsychism
  Goff, P. (2017). Panpsychism. In S. Schneider, & M. Velmans (Eds.), Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd Ed. Blackwell
• Bertrand Russell and the problem of consciousness
  Goff, P. (2016). Bertrand Russell and the problem of consciousness. In J. Tartaglia, & S. Leach (Eds.), Consciousness and the Great Philosophers. Routledge
• The phenomenal-bonding solution to the combination problem
  Goff, P. (2016). The phenomenal-bonding solution to the combination problem. In G. Brüntrop, & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press
• Real Acquaintance and Physicalism
  Goff, P. (2015). Real Acquaintance and Physicalism. In P. Coates, & S. Coleman (Eds.), The nature of phenomenal qualities : sense, perception & consciousness. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198712718.003.0005
• Against constitutive Russellian monism
  Goff, P. (2015). Against constitutive Russellian monism. In T. Alter, & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world : perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford University Press
• The Cartesian argument against physicalism
  Goff, P. (2014). The Cartesian argument against physicalism. In J. Kallestrup, & M. Sprevak (Eds.), New waves in the philosophy of mind (3-20). Palgrave Macmillan
• Orthodox property dualism + linguistic theory of vagueness = panpsychism
  Goff, P. (2013). Orthodox property dualism + linguistic theory of vagueness = panpsychism. In E. Brown (Ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Verlag
• Reply to Simon and Robinson
  Goff, P. (2013). Reply to Simon and Robinson. In Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Verlag
• Idealism
  Goff, P. (2013). Idealism. In H. Pashler (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind (398 - 401). SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452257044.n148
• There is no combination problem
  Goff, P. (2011). There is no combination problem. In M. Blaumauer (Ed.), The Mental as Fundamental. Ontos Publishing House
• Experiences don't sum
  Goff, P. (2011). Experiences don't sum. In T. Alter, & R. Howell (Eds.), Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader. Oxford University Press
• There is more than one thing
  Goff, P. (2011). There is more than one thing. In P. Goff (Ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan
• Could the Daleks stop the pyramids being built?
  Goff, P. (2010). Could the Daleks stop the pyramids being built?. In C. Lewis, & P. Smithka (Eds.), Dr Who and Philosophy. Open Court Press
• Can the panpsychist get round the combination problem?
  Goff, P. (2009). Can the panpsychist get round the combination problem?. In D. Skrbina (Ed.), The Mind that Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. Benjamins
• Propertied objects as truth-makers
  Goff, P. (2006). Propertied objects as truth-makers. In P. Valore (Ed.), Topics in General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher

Journal Article

• Is the fine-tuning evidence for a multiverse?
  Goff, P. (2024). Is the fine-tuning evidence for a multiverse?. Synthese, 204(1), Article 3. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04621-z
• How Exactly Does Panpsychism Help Explain Consciousness?
  Goff, P. (2024). How Exactly Does Panpsychism Help Explain Consciousness?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 31(3-4), 56-82. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.056
• Is Consciousness Everywhere? Essays on Panpsychism
  Goff, P., & Moran, A. (2021). Is Consciousness Everywhere? Essays on Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 28(9), 9-15. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.28.9.009
• Putting Consciousness First: Replies to Critics
  Goff, P. (2021). Putting Consciousness First: Replies to Critics. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 28(9), 289-328. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.28.9.289
• Essentialist modal rationalism
  Goff, P. (2021). Essentialist modal rationalism. Synthese, 198, 2019-2027. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02109-9
• Revelation, consciousness+ and the phenomenal powers view
  Goff, P. (2020). Revelation, consciousness+ and the phenomenal powers view. Topoi, 39, 1089-1092. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9594-9
• Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism
  Goff, P. (2020). Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 120(2), 123-144. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa009
• Did the universe design itself?
  Goff, P. (2019). Did the universe design itself?. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 85(1), 99-122. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9692-z
• Conscious thought and the cognitive fine-tuning problem
  Goff, P. (2017). Conscious thought and the cognitive fine-tuning problem. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 98-122. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx039
• Is consciousness transcendent?
  Goff, P. (2017). Is consciousness transcendent?. Journal of philosophy of life, 7(1), 21-32
• Is it a problem that physics is mathematical?
  Goff, P. (2017). Is it a problem that physics is mathematical?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24(9-10), 50-58
• Fundamentality and the mind-body problem
  Goff, P. (2016). Fundamentality and the mind-body problem. Erkenntnis, 8(4), 881-898. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9773-7
• Is realism about consciousness compatible with a scientifically respectable world view?
  Goff, P. (2016). Is realism about consciousness compatible with a scientifically respectable world view?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 83-97
• What’s wrong with strong necessities?
  Goff, P., & Papineau, D. (2014). What’s wrong with strong necessities?. Philosophical Studies, 167(3), 749-762. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0195-6
• Does Mary know I experience plus rather than quus? A new hard problem
  Goff, P. (2012). Does Mary know I experience plus rather than quus? A new hard problem. Philosophical Studies, 160(2), 223-235. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9715-4
• A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and Cartesian doubt
  Goff, P. (2012). A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and Cartesian doubt. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), 742-46
• Ghosts are scarier than zombies
  Goff, P. (2012). Ghosts are scarier than zombies. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), 749-50
• A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
  Goff, P. (2011). A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(2), 191-209
• Ghosts and sparse properties: Why the physicalist has more to fear from ghosts than zombies
  Goff, P. (2010). Ghosts and sparse properties: Why the physicalist has more to fear from ghosts than zombies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1), 119-39
• Orthodox truthmaker theory cannot be defended by cost/benefit analysis
  Goff, P. (2010). Orthodox truthmaker theory cannot be defended by cost/benefit analysis. Analysis, 70(1), 45-50
• Why panpsychism doesn’t help explain consciousness
  Goff, P. (2009). Why panpsychism doesn’t help explain consciousness. Dialectica, 63(3), 289-311
• A non-eliminative form of austere nominalism
  Goff, P. (2008). A non-eliminative form of austere nominalism. European Journal of Philosophy, 16(1), 43-54
• Kirk on empirical physicalism
  Goff, P. (2007). Kirk on empirical physicalism. Ratio: An international journal of analytic philosophy, 20(1), 122-29
• Experiences don't sum
  Goff, P. (2006). Experiences don't sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10-11), 53-61

Other (Digital/Visual Media)

• Panpsychism
  Goff, P. (2017). Panpsychism