Staff profile
Overview
https://apps.dur.ac.uk/biography/image/1108
Dr David Faraci
Associate Professor / Deputy Director of Research / Department Seminar Organiser / IT Officer
| Affiliation |
|---|
| Associate Professor / Deputy Director of Research / Department Seminar Organiser / IT Officer in the Department of Philosophy |
Biography
About Me
I am originally from New Jersey. I received my BA in philosophy from Rutgers University in 2004 and my doctorate in philosophy from Bowling Green State University in 2012. Between 2012 and arriving in Durham in 2018, I taught at Virginia Tech, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Georgetown University.
Research interests
- Metaethics
- Normative Ethics
- Applied Ethics (esp. Business Ethics)
- Epistemology
Publications
Book review
- Faraci, D. (2019). Review of Methodology and Moral Philosophy
- Faraci, D. (2018). Review of Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Analysis, 78(2), 377-381. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any019
- Faraci, D. (2015). Review of Moral Psychology & Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics
- Faraci, D. (2012). Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry, 46(2), 259-267. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x
Chapter in book
- Faraci, D., & McPherson, T. (2017). Ethical Judgment and Motivation. In T. McPherson, & D. Plunkett (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of metaethics (308-323). Routledge
- Faraci, D. (2017). On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics (244-264). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0010
- Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2015). Huck vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame. In J. Knobe, T. Lombrozo, & S. Nichols (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (7-27). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198718765.003.0002
- Faraci, D. (2009). Heroes and the Ethics of Time Travel: Does the Present Matter?. In W. Irwin, & D. Johnson (Eds.), Heroes and Philosophy: Buy the Book, Save the World (140-154). John Wiley and Sons
Journal Article
- Faraci, D., & Jaworski, P. M. (in press). On Leaving Space for Altruism. Public Affairs Quarterly, 35(2), https://doi.org/10.2307/48616068
- Faraci, D. (2020). We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. Mind, 129(513), 225-234. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy054
- Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2019). Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(3), 606-622. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12470
- Faraci, D. (2019). Wage Exploitation and the Nonworseness Claim: Allowing the Wrong, to Do More Good. Business Ethics Quarterly, 29(2), 169-188. https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2018.28
- Faraci, D. (2019). Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 16(1), 63-73. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20170002
- Faraci, D. (2019). Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence. Philosophers' Imprint, 19(4), 1-26
- Faraci, D. (2017). Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge. Journal of ethics & social philosophy, 12(3), 312-318. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.279
- Faraci, D. (2014). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies, 172(8), 2055-2072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0397-6
- Faraci, D., & Jaworski, P. M. (2013). To Inspect and Make Safe: On the Morally Responsible Liability of Property Owners. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17(4), 697-709. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9473-9
- Faraci, D. (2013). Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity?. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(3), 531-537. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1866-0
- Faraci, D. (2012). Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox. Philosophia, 41(3), 751-755. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9397-y
- Coons, C., & Faraci, D. (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia, 38(4), 733-740. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9250-0
- Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3), 319-332. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z