|Assistant Professor/Acting Director of Research/IT Officer/PR in the Department of Philosophy|
I am originally from New Jersey, USA. I received my BA in philosophy from Rutgers University in 2004 and my doctorate in philosophy from Bowling Green State University in 2012. Between 2012 and arriving in Durham in 2018, I taught at Virginia Tech, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Georgetown University.
- Applied Ethics (esp. Business Ethics)
- Moral Responsibility
- Faraci, David (2019). Review of Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
- Faraci, David (2018). Review of Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Analysis 78(2): 377-381.
- Faraci, David (2015). Review of Moral Psychology & Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
- Faraci, David (2012). Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. The Journal of Value Inquiry 46(2): 259-267.
Chapter in book
- Faraci, David (2017). On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Shafer-Landau, R. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 12: 244-264.
- Faraci, David & McPherson, Tristram (2017). Ethical Judgment and Motivation. In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D. New York; Abingdon: Routledge. 308-323.
- Faraci, David & Shoemaker, David (2014). Huck vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame. In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Knobe, J., Lombrozo, T. & Nichols, S. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1: 7-27.
- Faraci, David (2009). Heroes and the Ethics of Time Travel: Does the Present Matter? In Heroes and Philosophy: Buy the Book, Save the World. Irwin, W. & Johnson, D. John Wiley & Sons. 140-154.
- Faraci, David (2020). We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. Mind 129(513): 225-234.
- Faraci, David (2019). Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 16(1): 63-73.
- Faraci, David (2019). Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence. Philosophers' Imprint 19(4): 1-26.
- Faraci, David & Shoemaker, David (2019). Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98(3): 606-622.
- Faraci, David (2019). Wage Exploitation and the Nonworseness Claim: Allowing the Wrong, to Do More Good. Business Ethics Quarterly 29(2): 169-188.
- Faraci, David (2017). Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12(3): 312-318.
- Faraci, David (2015). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 172(8): 2055-2072.
- Faraci, David (2014). Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity? Journal of Business Ethics 125(3): 531-537.
- Faraci, David & Jaworski, Peter Martin (2014). To Inspect and Make Safe: On the Morally Responsible Liability of Property Owners. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17(4): 697-709.
- Faraci, David (2013). Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox. Philosophia 41(3): 751-755.
- Coons, Christian & Faraci, David (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia 38(4): 733-740.
- Faraci, David & Shoemaker, David (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1(3): 319-332.