Staff profile
Overview
| Affiliation |
|---|
| Associate Professor/ DEC Chair/ Curriculum Officer in the Department of Philosophy |
| Associate Professor in Philosophy in the Durham CELLS (Centre for Ethics and Law in the Life Sciences) |
| Fellow of the Institute for Medical Humanities |
Publications
Authored book
Chapter in book
- Puddifoot, K. (in press). Poverty, Stereotypes and Politics: Counting the Epistemic Costs. In L. Smith, & A. Archer (Eds.), The Moral Psychology of Poverty. Springer Nature
- Puddifoot, K. (in press). Mnemonic Justice. In S. Goldberg, & S. Wright (Eds.), Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press
- Puddifoot, K. (2021). Credibility Deficits, Memory Errors and the Criminal Trial. In Z. Hoskins, & J. Robson (Eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge
- Puddifoot, K. (2021). Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Dispositions. In K. McCain, S. Stapleford, & M. P. Steup (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003134565
- Holroyd, J., & Puddifoot, K. (2020). Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias. In E. Beeghly, & A. Madva (Eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315107615
- Bortolotti, L., & Puddifoot, K. (2019). Philosophy, Bias and Stigma. In P. D. Bubbio, & J. Malpass (Eds.), Why Philosophy?. De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110650990-007
- Holroyd, J., & Puddifoot, K. (2019). Implicit Bias and Prejudice. In M. G. Fricker, J. H. Peter, & N. David Pedersen (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717937
- Puddifoot, K. (2017). Epistemic Discrimination. In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination (54-67). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315681634
Journal Article
- Puddifoot, K. (2024). Understanding bias through diverse lenses. Philosophical Psychology, 37(6), 1287-1296. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2356947
- Puddifoot, K., & Sandelind, C. (2024). Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice. Journal of Social Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12557
- Puddifoot, K., & Trakas, M. (2024). Fear Generalization and Mnemonic Injustice. Episteme, https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.60
- Puddifoot, K., & Trakas, M. (2023). Epistemic Agency and the Generalisation of Fear. Synthese, 202, Article 1. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04222-2
- Holroyd, J., & Puddifoot, K. (2022). Implicit Bias and Epistemic Oppression in Confronting Racism. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 8(3), 476-495. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.12
- Puddifoot, K. (2020). Re-evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony: the misinformation effect and the overcritical juror. Episteme, 17(2), 255-279. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.42
- Puddifoot, K. (2019). Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 26(4), 333-348. https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2019.0048
- Puddifoot, K., & O'Donnell, C. (2019). Human Memory and the Limits of Technology in Education. Educational Theory, 68(6), 643-655. https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12345
- Puddifoot, K. (2019). Stereotyping Patients. Journal of Social Philosophy, 50(1), 69-90. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12269
- Puddifoot, K., & Bortolotti, L. (2019). Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs. Philosophical Studies, 176(3), 755-780. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1038-2
- Puddifoot, K. (2017). Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias. Philosophical Explorations, 20(sup1), 73-93. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1287295
- Puddifoot, K. (2017). Stereotyping: The Multifactorial View. Philosophical Topics, 45(1), 137-156. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20174518
- Puddifoot, K. (2016). Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(3), 421-434. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12056
- Puddifoot, K. (2014). A defence of epistemic responsibility: why laziness and ignorance are bad after all. Synthese, 191(14), 3297-3309. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0445-y
Other (Print)